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Abstract 
 
In this publication-based dissertation, I focus on changes in the decision environment as 
a way to address urgent problems originating in human behavior and decision making. 
Unsustainable consumption patterns and their influence on climate change serve as the 
primary example for this approach. In three original publications and a broader 
framework, I introduce, test, and evaluate the concept that has recently been 
popularized as “nudges” (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). Nudges are intentional changes to 
the decision environment or “choice architecture” based on psychological insights and 
aiming at changes in decision making and behavior. The first paper contributes to 
conceptual sharpening of nudges and choice architectures by a bottom-up identification 
of nine recurring and distinct techniques used to foster behavior change. In Papers 2 and 
3, I integrate situational and individual predictors of behavior in three experimental 
studies in the realm of environmental decision making. Pro-environmental behavior is 
predicted by green defaults (i.e., preselected environmentally-friendly options) and 
environmental attitudes measured with different scales. The results from both 
experimental papers support the conclusion that defaults and attitudes additively 
influence decision making without limiting each other’s impact. These findings imply 
that defaults provide a suitable complement to other regulatory measures and 
environmental educational approaches but do not substitute them. The research 
program presented in these three papers is situated within different psychological 
research traditions such as bounded rationality, the heuristics and biases program, and 
advancements of behaviorism. Against this background, theoretical and practical policy 
implications are discussed. 
Keywords: Nudge, choice architecture, defaults, attitudes, behavior change, 
environmental behavior 
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Zusammenfassung 
 
In dieser publikationsbasierten Dissertation fokussiere ich auf Veränderungen der 
Entscheidungsumwelt als ein Weg, drängende Probleme zu adressieren, deren Ursachen 
in menschlichem Verhalten und Entscheiden liegen. Nicht nachhaltige Konsummuster 
und deren Einfluss auf den Klimawandel dienen als primäres Beispiel für diesen Ansatz. 
In drei Originalpublikationen und einem breiteren theoretischen Rahmen definiere, 
teste und bewerte ich Ansätze, die kürzlich unter dem Titel „Nudges“ (Thaler & Sunstein, 
2008) populär wurden. Nudges sind intentionale Veränderungen der 
Entscheidungsumwelt beziehungsweise der Entscheidungsarchitektur, die auf 
psychologischen Erkenntnissen beruhen und auf verändertes Entscheiden und Handeln 
abzielen. Das erste Papier trägt zur konzeptuellen Schärfung von Nudges und 
Entscheidungsarchitekturen bei, indem induktiv neun wiederkehrende Techniken 
identifiziert werden, die verändertes Handeln anstoßen sollen. In den Papieren zwei und 
drei integriere ich situative und individuelle Prädiktoren menschlichen Handelns in drei 
Experimenten im Kontext nachhaltiger Entscheidungen. Umweltbewusstes Handeln 
wird durch grüne Defaults (d.h. vorausgewählte umweltfreundliche Optionen) und die 
individuelle Umwelteinstellung vorhergesagt. Die Ergebnisse beider Papiere führen zu 
der Schlussfolgerung, dass Defaults und Einstellungen Entscheidungen additiv 
beeinflussen, ohne sich gegenseitig zu limitieren. Diese Befunde implizieren, dass 
Defaults eine nützliche Ergänzung zu anderen regulativen Mechanismen und 
Umweltbildung sein können, diese jedoch nicht ersetzen. Das dargestellte 
Forschungsprogramm wird innerhalb verschiedener psychologischer 
Forschungstraditionen wie begrenzter Rationalität, kognitiven Heuristiken und 
Verzerrungen, und Weiterführungen des Behaviorismus verortet. Vor diesem 
Hintergrund werden die theoretischen und praktischen Implikationen diskutiert. 
Schlüsselwörter: Nudge, Entscheidungsarchitektur, Defaults, Einstellungen, 
Verhaltensänderung, Umweltverhalten 
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1  Introduction: Context and behavior change 
The list of challenges humanity currently faces is long and, at first glance, it is not 
related to psychology more than it is to any other discipline. Climate change, extreme 
poverty, and infectious and acquired diseases are just a few out of a long list of “severe 
societal challenges” (Wissenschaftsrat, 2015) societies are confronted with and need to 
find solutions for. What unites most of these challenges, from obesity and 
overconsumption to global warming, a lack of organ donations, and unvaccinated 
children is that they often result from human behavior (intended and unintended) and 
decision making. As such, changes in human behavior and decision making can 
contribute to their solution (Oskamp, 2000). At this point, behavioral scientists and 
psychology research come into play to explain, predict, and help to change human 
behavior in order to approach problems with non-technical and non-financial solutions 
(Swim et al., 2011). The behavioral focus distinguishes psychological contributions from 
traditional political approaches (legislative), economical approaches (incentive-/tax-
based), and contributions from the natural sciences (technological improvements). 
The promise to contribute to behavior change on the basis of relatively cheap and 
easy alterations of features on “the interfaces between decision problems and decision 
makers” (Sugden, 2009, p. 366), that is, in decision environments, has recently sparked 
public interest in social scientists’ work and led to the formation of behavioral science 
units in governments (e.g., the Behavioural Insights Team in the United Kingdom, the 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the United States, and a small team in the 
German Office of the Federal Chancellor). Other Institutions such as the EU and the 
World Bank followed (World Bank, 2015). Stimulated by Thaler and Sunstein’s (2008) 
book Nudge, the notion that a considerable part of our behavior is influenced by the 
context in which it takes place is translated into concrete policies and interventions by 
the aforementioned “psychological science advisors” (Teachman, Norton, & Spellman, 
2015). Labelled somewhat metaphorically as “choice architecture” (Thaler, Sunstein, & 
Balz, 2010) and “nudging”, the basic idea is to design contexts based on psychological 
evidence from decision making research. By giving people a gentle “nudge” instead of a 
hard shove, a desired behavior is supported respectively an undesired behavior is 
inhibited. Choice architecture is defined as the context in which a decision is made, 
whereas nudges are concrete interventions within the choice architecture aiming at 
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changing people’s behavior (Barton & Grüne-Yanoff, 2015). The field is embedded in 
“libertarian paternalism” (Thaler & Sunstein, 2003), a term introduced to describe the 
school of thought that applies nudges in policy making and delineates it from purely 
liberal or paternalistic policies. Summed up by Thaler and Sunstein (2008, p. 6) who 
coined the term, a nudge alters “people’s behavior in a predictable way without 
forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives”. 
The accumulated evidence of how humans react, for instance, to different framings 
of the same message or the opportunity to postpone costs to the future instead of paying 
for them in the present stems from a long and rich research tradition grounded in 
(social-cognitive) psychology and dealing with cognitive biases (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974), heuristics (Gigerenzer, Todd, & ABC Research Group, 1999; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981) or, more negatively, “anomalies” in human decision making 
(Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992). Against this 
background, choice architecture is not a new idea (as will be outlined in more detail in 
Chapter 2). However, systematically checking whether peculiarities (the more neutral 
alternative to bias and anomaly) in human decision making can be harnessed to foster a 
desired behavior is novel. This “new branch to the ‘prescriptive’ part of the field of 
judgement and decision making” (Baron, 2010, p. 224) is what stimulated governments 
to think about changing the defaults in organ donation, made cafeterias change plate 
sizes, and inspired tax authorities to reframe their letters to taxpayers (Cabinet Office, 
Behavioural Insights Team, 2012). 
The growing interest in context-based approaches is also due to the relatively small 
effects of classical information and education interventions aiming at attitude change 
and behavior change. Extensive campaigns to increase organ donations in Germany have 
resulted in a high acceptance of organ donation, but although 68% of the German 
population are willing to donate organs, only 28% actually have a donor card 
(Bundeszentrale für gesundheitliche Aufklärung, 2014). Deliberately influencing context 
variables known to causally influence behavior thus offers a solution to the problem that 
psychological insights have not yet contributed to solving the various problems outlined 
above to its full potential, as criticized by some (e.g., Ernst & Wenzel, 2014). As such, 
choice architecture can be understood as a counterpart to traditional approaches such 
as education, information, or persuasion but does not necessarily contradict them as I 
outline in the following chapters. Rather, it acknowledges that all too often decision 
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making does not result from thorough and well-informed cost-benefit analyses but from 
quick heuristic judgments in a given situation. 
From a psychological perspective, the interplay of external (situational) and 
internal factors (e.g., attitudes) has received surprisingly little attention in recent choice 
architecture research. However, to achieve the most accurate prediction of human 
behavior and decision making, the focus should shift from an “either / or”, that is 
external or internal, to an “as-well-as” perspective. I present research integrating 
external and internal causes of behavior under the choice architecture framework in this 
dissertation, focusing on defaults as a prototypical example of nudges and attitudes as a 
core psychological construct to explain human behavior. 
Overview of the present research program  
This dissertation consists of three papers, two of which have been published in 
peer-reviewed journals while one is currently under review. I developed the study 
concepts and designs, collected, analyzed, and interpreted the data, drafted and revised 
the manuscripts, and oversaw the publication processes for all three papers. In Papers 1 
and 3, the close collaboration with coauthors during some or all of these steps resulted 
in shared first authorships. The three papers as published or submitted can be found at 
the end of this dissertation. 
In the three papers that form the body of this dissertation, I systematically analyze 
and test the potential of choice architectures as a means for behavior change. I present 
experimental tests of concrete interventions (green defaults) in internally and 
ecologically valid settings and specify the connection between defaults and individual 
attitudes. In Paper 1, I review existing choice architectures from various sources and 
cluster them into nine distinct categories (Münscher, Vetter, & Scheuerle, 2015). This 
taxonomy provides a comprehensive overview on the different fields of application in 
which behavioral insights are currently used. In the second paper of this dissertation 
(Vetter & Kutzner, 2016), I focus on defaults as a prototypical example of a nudge and 
one of the most commonly used techniques. This paper reports two preregistered 
replications of a study on default effects in electricity provider choices extended by an 
analysis of the interplay between attitude strength and defaults. In the third paper 
(Vetter & Arnold, under review), I also examine how defaults and environmental 
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attitudes interact to change behavior. This study uses a newly developed experimental 
setup with sustainable consumer choices as the target behavior. 
Before focusing on specific research questions and outlining the methods applied, 
the procedure, and the results in detail within each paper, I will present a more general 
overview of the theoretical background of choice architecture and nudging. For this aim, 
I situate nudging research within judgement and decision making research and point out 
its connection to concepts such as bounded rationality and heuristics and biases in 
Chapter 2. The chapter also includes a definition of nudging based on the literature. 
In Chapter 3, I focus on central issues that connect the papers that form my research 
program. These issues include defining the concept of nudging, identifying and testing 
concrete nudges (namely pro-environmental defaults), and examining the interplay of 
contextual factors such as defaults and individual attitudes. Implications for the idea of 
libertarian paternalism are outlined based on the papers and enriched by unpublished 
empirical data on the association between reactance and the acceptance of nudges. 
Conclusions and implications from the joint considerations of all three papers are 
presented in Chapter 4. I first outline the theoretical implications of my research before 
deducing practical policy implications. In the final part of Chapter 4, I point out 
limitations of my research program and outline several open questions that arise from 
them. The general overview of the research program presented in this dissertation is 
concluded with some final remarks in Chapter 5. 
  
How homo economicus became a choice architect: Nudging and decision making research | 6 
 
 
2 How homo economicus became a choice architect: Nudging and 
decision making research 
As mentioned above, summarizing behavioral insights under the term “choice 
architecture” merely stressed their prescriptive relevance, that is, what ought to be done, 
especially but not exclusively for policy making (Shafir, 2012). The concept originates 
from normative models of decision making such as rational agent models (“homo 
economicus”, expected-utility theory) and their descriptive advancements like the idea of 
“bounded rationality” (Simon, 1955) and prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
Whereas normative models provide a standard against which to evaluate decision 
making, descriptive models describe deviations from these standards and explain why 
these deviations occur (Baron, 2010). The virtue of a prescriptive approach lies in 
concrete recommendations on how to deal with deviations from optimal decision 
making identified by descriptive models. To apply behavioral insights to real world 
problems, this triad of normative, descriptive, and prescriptive is necessary but had 
been incomplete prior to the debate about choice architectures and nudges when 
prescriptive conclusions were frequently missing. 
Table 1 provides a schematic framework comparing normative, descriptive, and 
prescriptive approaches in judgement and decision making research. This framework 
serves to locate choice architecture on the scientific map of decision making research. As 
I will outline in this chapter, choice architecture research is closely connected to 
normative and descriptive models and should be evaluated in light of its scientific 
ancestors. Conceptions of human rationality are a key connecting link between these 
approaches. Instead of reviewing the history of rationality in chronological order, I will 
focus on the theoretical assumptions and empirical findings which I consider 
fundamental for the development of a prescriptive judgement and decision making 
science. 
 
  
How homo economicus became a choice architect: Nudging and decision making research | 7 
 
 
Table 1 
Framework of normative, descriptive, and prescriptive judgement and decision making 
approaches 
 Type of 
decision 
Decision 
explained 
Theoretical models Characteristics 
Normative Optimal 
decision 
How people 
should decide. 
Rational agents, 
expected-utility 
time-consistency, 
description invariance 
Descriptive Actual 
decision 
How people do 
decide. 
Prospect theory, 
bounded rationality 
Preference reversals, 
temporal discounting 
Prescriptive Desired 
decision 
How people 
ought to decide. 
Nudge, libertarian 
paternalism 
Directed behavior 
change, freedom of 
choice 
 
2.1 From bounded rationality to heuristics and biases 
The independence of a decisional outcome from information presentation, decision 
elicitation, and context is a cornerstone of rational agent models (Slovic, 1995). 
According to description invariance, it should not, for example, influence preferences and 
subsequent decisions differently, whether people are informed that donating blood 
saves lives or prevents deaths since the outcome is the same (Chou & Murnighan, 2013). 
Similarly, procedure invariance posits that different measurements of a preference order 
and decisions should not change their intransitive order. The choice between two 
equivalent gambles (a common paradigm in economic experiments) should not be 
influenced by the response mode used to assess the preference for one gamble 
(bidding/selling vs. preference ranking). Time-consistency of preferences is another 
characteristic of rational agents. If a person prefers 12€ over 10€ today (and this is a 
very robust finding), she should also choose 12€ in a week rather than 10€ today 
because the monetary difference between 12€ and 10€ does not change over a week. 
Finally, context-independent choices between two options should not be influenced by 
the presence of a third, inferior option. In other words, a restaurant client’s choice 
between a Barolo from 2012 and a 2010 Bordeaux should not be different whether there 
is a 2015 Lambrusco on the wine list or not. 
As the frequent use of the word “should” already indicates, normative models using 
utility maximization as the standard for rationality have proven untenable in real life. 
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Doubts in the quality of human judgement and decision making date back as far as Adam 
Smith or John Stuart Mill, who questioned the quality of human reasoning and, in more 
drastic words, Schumpeter, who calls associative and affective thinking primitive 
(Schumpeter, 2005). More recent research programs using empirical methods, most 
notably the heuristics and biases program, have demonstrated that human decision 
making deviates from these normative assumptions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
Logically and numerically equivalent information has been shown to lead to 
different decisions depending on its presentation format, thereby violating the 
description invariance axiom as, for example, in the Asian disease dilemma (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1981). In this scenario, 600 people are threatened by an Asian disease and 
participants have to choose between a certain option (saving 200 people out of 600) and 
an uncertain option (1/3 probability that all will be saved and 2/3 probability that no 
one will survive). Although both options have the same expected value (a survival of 
200), framing the choice in terms of gains (saved lives) makes people prefer the certain 
option whereas framing the choice in terms of losses (lost lives) leads to a preference for 
the uncertain option. The method of elicitation has also been shown to influence 
preferences, thus violating procedure invariance. Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971) could 
show that participants’ preferences for one of two gambles with equivalent expected 
utilities changed when the method of measuring this preference changed: although 
participants chose an option with a high winning probability and assigned higher 
preference ratings in the first step, they later bid more money for a different option with 
a higher jackpot. Likewise, temporal discounting functions show that choices between 
the same two options differ depending on the timing of the decision. The finding that 
value is discounted over time and 10€ now are preferred to 12€ in a week violates the 
assumption of time consistent preferences (Green, Fristoe, & Myerson, 1994; Soman et 
al., 2005). Finally, adding an inferior wine (e.g., Lambrusco, cheap and low quality) to 
two equally attractive wines (one is cheaper, the other is higher quality) can change 
preferences for one of the equally attractive options compared to a choice between the 
two equally attractive options alone. Although the inferior option (also called a “decoy”) 
is never chosen, it influences other choices (Huber, Payne, & Puto, 1982). Despite 
serious attempts to refute these “anomalies” (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992) by 
proponents of rational agent models (for a summary, see Slovic, 1995), systematic 
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deviations from the aforementioned axioms, and thus from the idea of a “homo 
economicus”, have prevailed and proven robust and replicable: description, elicitation, 
timing, and context do matter. From these findings, researchers drew opposing 
conclusions (for a detailed description, see also Fiedler & Wänke, 2009). The one side 
more pessimistically describes the human mind as fallible, whereas the other side points 
out the advantages of deviating from purely computational, probabilistic decision 
making and criticizes the applied norms of rationality as too “narrow” (Gigerenzer, 
1996). However, both sides agree with Simon (1955, p. 101), who pointed out the 
“physiological and psychological limitations of the organism” in terms of computing 
capacity. Because of these limitations, which are both external (time, available 
information) and internal to the organism (speed, capacity), Simon argued that human 
reasoning and decision making does not follow the rules of the “economic man” (homo 
economicus) who possesses complete knowledge, stable preferences, and sufficient 
computation skills to calculate his or her personal optimum. Rather, Simon introduced 
the idea of bounded rationality, that is, a rationality more oriented at descriptive, actual 
decision making than at normative, ideal decision making. Most notably, Simon (1985, p. 
297) claimed that “bounded rationality is not irrationality”. In the current debate about 
choice architecture, these two concepts are frequently equated (e.g., in the book 
Predictably Irrational by Dan Ariely, 2008) and bounded rationality has thus 
erroneously become an argument for nudging (as in Blumenthal-Barby & Burroughs, 
2012; Camerer, Issacharoff, Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, & Rabin, 2003). Irrespective of 
conclusions about human rationality drawn from the finding that human decision 
making and behavior deviates from that of a homo economicus, nudges make use of 
these heuristics and biases. 
The outlined effects (framing, temporal discounting, and decoy options) are 
complemented by a constantly growing number of cognitive biases such as the findings 
that: frequency and probability judgements are influenced by the availability of relevant 
instances (availability heuristic, Tversky & Kahneman, 1973); even arbitrary starting 
points can influence outcomes (anchoring and adjustment, Tversky & Kahneman, 1974); 
other people’s behavior is an important factor for people’s own behavior (social norms, 
Cialdini & Trost, 1998); people are overconfident when assessing their own 
performance (Weinstein, 1980); money and other resources are often evenly diversified 
among the available options independent of the number of options (naïve 
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diversification, Benartzi & Thaler, 2001); “losses loom larger than gains” (Kahneman et 
al., 1991; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p. 279); and the status quo is frequently preferred 
over an alternative (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988), to name just a few examples (for 
an overview, see Pohl, 2004). 
To sum up, how and when information and options are presented and described 
influences which option is chosen. In other words, the decision environment co-
determines the decision outcome. From a prescriptive perspective, making use of these 
contextual factors allows for the creation of a decision environment in which the 
probability that people decide how they ought to decide1 is higher than in normative or 
descriptive models. Thus, rational agent models – despite being refuted in many 
respects – should not be undervalued for they, together with descriptive models, 
provide the theoretical foundation that the prescriptive applications discussed in this 
thesis rest upon.  
2.2 Choice architecture and nudges  
From the influence of passively present decision structure on decision making, it is 
only a small step to the influence of consciously created choice architectures on behavior 
and choices (see Purnhagen & Reisch, 2015 for the differentiation of decision structure 
and choice architecture). Cognitive biases and ostensible deviations from rational 
behavior led some behavioral economists to conclude: “It is such errors – apparent 
violations of rationality – that can justify the need for paternalistic policies to help 
people make better decisions and come closer to behaving in their own best interest” 
(Camerer et al., 2003, p. 1218). Descriptive research on heuristics and biases thus 
provided the foundation for the next step: prescriptive policies with the intent to steer 
choices by giving people a gentle “nudge”. 
In their 2008 book Nudge, economist Richard Thaler and legal scholar Cass Sunstein 
review findings on the context sensitivity of choices and behavior and popularize the 
idea that active choice architecture influences behavior in a way that differs from 
classical regulation, education, or economic incentives. The basic idea of nudging is 
closely connected to the previous branches of research noted above; however, what 
actually defines a nudge has still only been vaguely described. Part of this vagueness 
                                                        
1 It would be a separate dissertation to discuss the question how and by whom to determine how 
people ought to decide. I will not be able to answer this question, but I would like to point out that this is a 
crucial and controversial question. 
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might be caused by the concept’s interdisciplinarity. Although the topic is an inherently 
psychological one, behavioral economists, political scientists, and legal scholars also 
contribute to research on choice architectures. Obviously, different disciplines focus on 
different aspects such as ethical problems with nudging (Bovens, 2009; Raihani, 2013), 
constitutional concerns (Purnhagen & Reisch, 2015), or the compatibility with the 
concept of rational agents (Gigerenzer, 2015). Further vagueness is introduced by the 
continuous retelling of anecdotes like “the fly in the urinal” often used as the prime 
example of a nudge. Putting a little picture of a fly in urinals to “aim” at is said to have 
reduced cleaning costs in airport toilets in Amsterdam. It is implied that men are gently 
nudged to aim at the fly which reduces spilling. These and other anecdotes not resulting 
from actual research hamper a bottom-up sharpening of the concept through a larger 
body of evidence (i.e., a collection of nudges from which to deduce criteria for a 
definition). Simultaneously, a top-down theoretical definition is missing, a state of affairs 
that led Gigerenzer to conclude that “almost everything that affects behavior has been 
renamed a nudge, which renders this concept meaningless” (Gigerenzer, 2015, p. 363). 
Indeed, one of the authors of Nudge claims: “Even weather can count as a nudge” 
(Sunstein, 2014, p. 584). Both claims – a meaningless concept as well as a concept that 
includes even the weather – appear not particularly suited to build a research program 
on or to deduce testable hypotheses from. Consequently, I will further sharpen the core 
concept of this thesis and establish some common ground on what nudging and choice 
architecture are. 
Nudges are defined as “any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s 
behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing 
their economic incentives” (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 6). The defining features of a 
nudge can thus be summarized as: 1) predictably behavior-steering, 2) choice 
preserving, and 3) not changing the economic incentive structure (for a similar 
definition, see also Barton & Grüne-Yanoff, 2015). Importantly, although nudges are 
based on predictable patterns of human behavior (and usually cognition), this does not 
imply that nudges only target the automatic processes often referred to as System 1 in 
dual-process approaches. Accordingly, nudges can either harness heuristics and biases 
or control for them, but nudges can also provide information. These three types have 
been labelled “heuristics-triggering”, “heuristics-blocking”, and “informing” nudge-types 
(Barton & Grüne-Yanoff, 2015, p. 343). 
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Although this top-down definition helps to differentiate a nudge from the weather 
(which is often less predictable and choice preserving than assumed), it leaves ample 
room for debate and probably raises more questions than it answers, such as: To which 
degree can a choice be aggravated and still count as free? Which amount of money 
constitutes a change in the economic incentive structure for whom? How can a 
predictable behavior change be reconciled with preserved choices? Due to these 
difficulties with top-down definitions, I will present a different, bottom-up approach 
complementing the top-down definition of nudges in Chapter 3.1 and Paper 1 of this 
thesis. 
Whereas nudges were originally intended “to influence choices in a way that will 
make choosers better off, as judged by themselves” (italics original, Thaler & Sunstein, 
2008, p. 5), the intraindividual benchmark for success is not present in many 
applications of nudges. Frequently, the choice architect decides what constitutes “better 
off” either for the decision maker (pro-self) or for society (pro-social, cf. Barton & Grüne-
Yanoff, 2015). However, assuming a benevolent, unbiased choice architect is in itself 
problematic (for a critical discussion of this fact, see Gigerenzer, 2015; White, 2011). 
A final remark on what constitutes a nudge concerns sector specific labels for the 
same basic idea. “Behavioral political economy” defined as “the psychologically 
informed, economic analysis of behavior and its effects in the political arena” 
(Schnellenbach & Schubert, 2015, p. 2), “behavioral public policy”, and “behaviorally 
informed regulation” (Barr, Mullainathan, & Shafir, 2012; Purnhagen & Reisch, 2015) all 
build on the same body of research described in this chapter and apply it to different 
areas (voters’ behavior, public policy, law). One could add marketing science, although 
the focus of target behaviors is narrower here (and mostly consumer-related, such as 
consumption, satisfaction, and loyalty).  
2.3 External and internal causation of human behavior 
When locating choice architecture on the scientific map of behavior change 
research, one has to mention contextual behavioral science which “seeks the 
development of basic and applied scientific concepts and methods that are useful in 
predicting-and-influencing the contextually embedded actions of whole organisms” 
(Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Wilson, 2012, p. 2). Similarly, one could compare the idea of 
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nudging to behavioristic stimulus-response models in which the decision environment is 
akin to the stimulus triggering a predictable and unanimous response. 
However, focusing only on external (contextual) factors is an unnecessarily narrow 
view of human behavior. This opinion has been largely accepted in scientific psychology 
since the cognitive turn (Dember, 1974) and applies to research on choice architectures 
as well. In current psychological models of human behavior, the notion that “external 
causation does not prevent internal responsibility” (Fiedler & Wänke, 2009, p. 701) is 
largely accepted. Herbert Simon, whose concept of bounded rationality is frequently 
used to justify focusing more on contexts and less on the human mind, proposed the 
metaphor of a pair of scissors to illustrate how human behavior is shaped by external 
and internal influences (Simon, 1990). In Simon’s metaphor, the pair of scissors’ two 
blades constitute two sources of bounds on rationality (Todd & Gigerenzer, 2003). The 
internal blade of the scissors is limited computational capability and the external blade 
is the decision environment, both of which impede perfectly rational decisions. 
Extending this metaphor, I will focus on the two blades of the scissors that drive 
behavior. In this dissertation, the internal blade is represented by individual attitudes, 
whereas the external blade constitutes the decision environment. This integration of 
external and internal causes of behavior under the theoretical umbrella of choice 
architecture takes current applications of nudges into account without ignoring 
psychological insights about intraindividual causes of behavior. It should be noted that, 
by equating the internal blade with attitudes in this thesis, I deliberately exclude other 
internal factors that might cause behavior such as motives, control beliefs, or intentions. 
The latter two are crucial parts of the theory of planned behavior, a dominant process 
theory linking beliefs and behavior (Ajzen, 1991). Thus, the two blades metaphor is 
more in line with the Campbell paradigm, a parsimonious theoretical model that 
explains behavior as resulting from only two factors: (internal) attitudes and (external) 
behavioral costs (Kaiser, Byrka, & Hartig, 2010, see also Paper 3 in this thesis).  
To sum up, nudging and choice architecture research are closely connected to 
descriptive research on human decision making. Both approaches acknowledge that 
purely computational models of rationality will frequently fail to predict actual human 
behavior. Whereas descriptive approaches like the heuristics and biases program focus 
on exploring systematic deviations from normative models of rationality, nudging and 
choice architecture research focus on the prescriptive implications of these deviations 
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and how they can be used to influence behavior. Despite lacking a clear definition and 
being applied under various labels, core defining characteristics of nudges exist to 
differentiate a nudge from a non-nudge. As nudging research has largely neglected 
internal factors (such as attitudes) as the causes of behavior, an integrative approach 
looking at both blades of the scissors is warranted and will be one of the central issues of 
the present work. 
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3 Central issues of the present work 
The present thesis is based on three papers focusing on different aspects of choice 
architecture. In Paper 1 (Münscher, Vetter, & Scheuerle, 2015), we2 review existing 
choice architectures from various sources and cluster them into nine distinct categories. 
Both the second (Vetter & Kutzner, 2016) and the third paper (Vetter & Arnold, under 
review) experimentally test the impact of defaults in environmental decision making 
and expand previous research by an analysis of the interplay of attitudes and defaults. 
Whereas Paper 1 focuses mostly on external factors, Papers 2 and 3 explicitly target the 
integration of ‘both blades of the behavioral scissors’ to stick to the metaphor outlined in 
the previous chapter. 
Rather than summarizing the three papers, I will outline central issues and research 
questions that motivated this research and that connect these papers. The major focus of 
this chapter is to jointly consider the results of the papers that form the body of this 
dissertation. It will complement rather than substitute a more fine-grained approach 
which can be found in each individual paper. Therefore, the reader is referred to the 
original publications at the end of this dissertation for more detailed theoretical 
backgrounds, hypotheses, methods used, results, and statistical information. 
3.1 The identification of choice architecture techniques 
As outlined in Chapter 2.2, although choice architecture research is based on 
concepts from judgement and decision making such as bounded rationality or heuristics 
and biases, the evidence base of nudges in policy making that have significantly 
influenced behavior (in terms of statistical as well as practical significance) is still 
relatively small. Few governments have actually tested large scale nudges empirically 
(for an exception, see the UK’s Behavioural Insights Team reports, e.g., Cabinet Office, 
Behavioural Insights Team, 2013; Haynes, Goldacre, & Torgerson, 2012). Furthermore, 
effect sizes in field studies using nudges might be very small and thus difficult to detect 
in research using modest sample sizes as discussed by Sanders and Chonaire (2015). 
It is yet unclear which kinds of nudges are actually applied and tested in the various 
sectors (public policy, markets, NGOs) and whether it is possible to identify a clear-cut 
toolbox of nudges. As outlined in more detail in Paper 1, previous attempts to identify 
                                                        
2 Since all of the papers referred to are the work of me and at least one coauthor, I will use “we” when 
referring directly to these papers. 
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such a toolbox lack a convincing, transparent methodology and an evidence base from 
which the frameworks are constructed or to which they are applied. Mnemonic 
frameworks such as MINDSPACE (Dolan et al., 2012), EAST (Cabinet Office, Behavioural 
Insights Team, 2014) and others (as, e.g., Datta & Mullainathan, 2012; Johnson et al., 
2012) are constructed top-down. However, a top-down construction in the absence of a 
clear definition of nudges is problematic (see Chapter 2.2 and Gigerenzer, 2015 who 
calls the concept “meaningless”). Top-down attempts to classify nudges based on their 
underlying processes bear the problem that most nudge-type interventions are effective 
due to several processes which introduces ambiguity. Default effects, for instance, are 
potentially caused by different processes, among them loss aversion (Dinner, Johnson, 
Goldstein, & Liu, 2011), implied endorsement (McKenzie, Liersch, & Finkelstein, 2006), 
decision inertia (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003), and selectively triggered queries (Dinner 
et al., 2011). Furthermore, a process responsible for the effectiveness of a nudge is not 
exclusive to this nudge. Any of the processes causing default effects can also underlie 
other intervention techniques besides default setting (e.g., loss aversion might also be 
responsible for reframing). As such, using processes to build a framework of different 
nudges is not sufficient and distinct.  
 Identifying recurring nudging techniques bottom-up provides an alternative to a 
top-down definition. It is a useful first step in a research program concerned with the 
evaluation of nudges, their applicability, and (empirical) evaluation and will further 
sharpen the concept. Developing a taxonomy of nudges also addresses the question of 
what actually constitutes a nudge by providing prototypes and examples. This seems 
necessary to avoid working with a concept that classifies more or less everything as a 
nudge and stands in contrast to Sunstein’s (2014, p. 584) claim that “Even weather can 
count as a nudge”. To counter the criticism related to top-down categorization 
approaches, we used inductive category development as a bottom-up approach to 
extract nudging techniques from documented examples of choice architecture 
interventions. Although the underlying database of documented nudges can neither 
claim to be representative nor does it contain every nudge that has ever been tested, it 
does help to identify recurring techniques that are documented and have been tested 
empirically. As such, it enables researchers and practitioners to identify best practices 
and to develop new hypotheses and testable designs. As a first step in the research 
program presented in this dissertation, the taxonomy helps to structure choice 
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architecture research and sharpen the concept of nudging by identifying a limited set of 
choice architecture techniques in a bottom-up approach rather than top-down. 
We identified three basic categories dealing with information provision (e.g., 
reframing and simplifying information, providing feedback or social reference points 
such as descriptive social norms), decision structure (e.g., setting defaults, influencing 
effort, changing the grouping of options), and decision assistance (e.g., offering reminders 
and commitment possibilities). Within these broad categories, we defined nine distinct 
techniques, for example, to make information visible by providing feedback on water 
consumption, to provide social norms as reference points for individual behavior, and to 
change default options (see Table 2 and Paper 1 for detailed descriptions). Note that the 
three nudging categories conceptually overlap with the categories “heuristics-
triggering”, “heuristics-blocking”, and “informing” suggested by Barton and Grüne-
Yanoff (2015). Decision structures such as defaults or decoy options mostly trigger 
heuristics or biases, decision assistance like commitment possibilities counteract 
suboptimal heuristics and biases, and information provision (e.g., via simplification) 
enriches the informational background against which decisions are made. Although not 
a classical cross-validation, this overlap supports the assumption that nudges do not 
only work unconsciously since providing information or commitment opportunities are 
very conscious interventions. 
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Table 2 
A taxonomy of choice architecture categories and techniques 
Category Technique 
A. Decision information A 1 Translate information 
 A 2 Make information visible 
A 3 Provide social reference point 
B. Decision structure B 1 Change choice defaults 
B 2 Change option-related effort 
B 3 Change range or composition of options 
B 4 Change option consequences 
C. Decision assistance C 1 Provide reminders 
C 2 Facilitate commitment 
3.2 Promising choice architecture techniques and their impact: The case of 
defaults 
Having extracted nine basic nudging techniques from the wealth of reported choice 
architectures, a logical next question of both researchers and practitioners is: What 
works? Despite extremely ambitious promises concerning the effectiveness and cost 
efficiency of nudging raised in the book “Nudge” (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008), a closer look 
at the evidence base reveals that much evidence does not suffice empirical and scientific 
standards. As the search for documented examples of nudges in Paper 1 revealed, a 
considerable amount of frequently cited nudges has not or insufficiently been tested and 
replications are scarce. Among these negative examples are the fly in the urinal 
mentioned earlier and the dollar a day program which is referred to as “extremely 
promising” (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 234) despite being evaluated in a study without 
a control group (Brown, Saunders, & Dick, 1999; for a similar criticism, see Gigerenzer, 
2015). A similar case concerns a frequently cited experiment on default meals in a 
school cafeteria. Researchers replaced the unhealthy French fries default by a healthier 
alternative (apple fries). However, school children chose the unhealthy (but tasty) 
French fries irrespective of whether they were offered as the default option or not (Just 
& Wansink, 2009). Only 43 children participated in this field experiment, but it is often 
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used as evidence for how preferences limit defaults. Given the small sample size and a 
lack of experimental control, the French fries experiment seems inappropriate to draw 
any generalizable conclusions (but see 3.3 and Papers 2 and 3 for different conclusions 
based on larger samples). 
These examples demonstrate that evaluating the potential, the limits, and the 
evidence base of nudges can only be done on a case by case basis. For the experimental 
part of this thesis (Papers 2 and 3), I will focus on defaults as one of the most 
prototypical nudges. A default is a pre-selected option that becomes effective unless a 
decision maker explicitly specifies otherwise (Brown & Krishna, 2004). Choosing a 
default requires no additional action while at the same time it is possible to opt-out, that 
is, decide against the default and choose an alternative. Defaults promise very low 
implementation efforts, applicability in many areas (above and beyond health, wealth, 
and happiness), and tremendous impact such as saving lives by increasing organ 
donations (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003), better medicine by avoiding prescription errors 
(Ansher et al., 2014), and greener lifestyles by introducing environmentally friendly 
defaults (Sunstein & Reisch, 2013). However, the track record of choice architectures 
using defaults and demonstrating their impact empirically and in rigorous designs lags 
behind the grandiose promises. Natural field studies such as comparing organ donation 
rates of countries with an organ donation default with those with a non-donor default 
provide impressive effect sizes but impede causally attributing donation rates on 
defaults since the latter were not experimentally varied (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003). 
The same applies to comparisons of communities with renewable energy defaults to 
communities with conventional energy providers (Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008). 
Despite methodological criticism and the need for conceptual replications, these studies 
indicate that defaults are promising nudges to be explored further. Indeed, experimental 
studies examining the influence of defaults in domains such as energy provider choices 
(Ebeling & Lotz, 2015; Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008), consumer behavior (Dinner et al., 
2011; Herrmann et al., 2011), and online privacy (Johnson, Bellman, & Lohse, 2002) 
support claims that defaults can make a significant difference. In search of promising 
techniques, defaults are a good example of choice architectures for which preliminary 
evidence exists but which require further testing. In light of publication bias probably 
preventing a more complete picture of (non-significant) default experiments and the 
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lack of independent replications, a better evaluation of the power of defaults requires 
further research; this research is presented in Papers 2 and 3. 
In Paper 2 (Vetter & Kutzner, 2016), we conducted two preregistered, extended 
replications of experiments on green defaults following the procedure of Pichert and 
Katsikopoulos (2008). Participants either received a green or a gray electricity default 
and were given the opportunity to opt-out to an alternative provider. In a hypothetical 
choice scenario, we replicated the findings from Pichert and Katsikopoulos (2008): 
People confronted with a green default were roughly four times more likely to choose 
green electricity than people confronted with the alternative gray default provider (odds 
ratios > 4 in both experiments). Given two independent and successful preregistered 
replications with high power due to sample sizes of NStudy 1 = 560 and NStudy 2 = 535 and 
large effect sizes, these findings support the assumption that green defaults influence 
environmental decision making at least in the domain of electricity provider choices. I 
will discuss practical implications of these results in Chapter 4.5. 
Of course, if defaults are to be considered as a policy instrument, their benefits 
should be independent of the domain they are applied in, the experimental procedure 
used to test them, and the sample they are applied to. Environmental decisions such as 
the electricity provider choices examined in Paper 2 might differ from decisions where 
the goal is less consensually shared and socially desirable than it is the case for CO² 
reduction. Critics might also argue that hypothetical lab/online studies as used in Paper 
1 differ from real choices although this criticism could be countered by a randomized 
controlled trial demonstrating similar effects of green defaults in the field (see Ebeling 
& Lotz, 2015). For these reasons, in Paper 3 (Vetter & Arnold, under review), defaults 
are tested in a different experiment targeting consumption decisions in the context of 
environmental decision making. In a simulated online shopping scenario, we asked 242 
participants to choose products (e.g., juice, chocolate, paper towel) from an online shop. 
They received either green (i.e., eco-friendly / organic) or conventional default products 
and could then stick to the default product or choose an alternative product from a real 
online shop. One out of six participants was sent the chosen products home, so choices 
were less hypothetical than in a scenario. The results further support the impact of 
defaults on choices: Participants who received a green default chose significantly more 
organic respectively eco-friendly products than participants who received a 
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conventional default. The size of this effect (d = 0.92) indicates a strong influence of the 
default. 
Taken together, the findings from Papers 2 and 3 consistently show that green 
defaults raise the probability to choose green products. The effect persists for different 
choices (consumer goods, electricity providers), different samples, and in different 
experimental designs. Besides statistical significance, the effect sizes of the presented 
studies indicate that the effect is also practically meaningful and green defaults thus 
qualify as tools for environmental policy. In light of the relatively weak evidence base of 
experimental demonstrations of nudges using defaults, the approach taken in this 
research program is promising. As the joint consideration of all three papers shows, 
identifying fruitful nudging techniques (Paper 1), testing them and transferring them to 
different settings (Papers 2 and 3) can go hand in hand. 
3.3 The interplay of defaults and attitudes  
Despite the repeated demonstration of the influence of green defaults on 
environmental decision making, a model including defaults as a single predictor will 
explain only a small proportion of variance in people’s choices. This is due to several 
reasons: 1) Defaults are only one of several contextual factors influencing decision 
making, 2) most behavior is not solely determined by contextual factors but also by 
individual factors such as attitudes, motives, or needs (see also Chapter 2.3 on external 
and internal causes of behavior), and 3) environmental attitudes have received little 
attention in nudging research dealing with environmental decision making. Taking 
attitudes and defaults simultaneously into account in a model of decision making and 
behavior change instantly raises the question how the two predictors relate to each 
other. This question resonates with processing models like the theory of planned 
behavior (Ajzen, 1991) in which attitudes (in addition to normative beliefs and control 
beliefs) are assumed to fuel intention building which in turn leads to behavior. Whereas 
the relationship of attitudes and behavior is explained in the theory of planned behavior 
(namely attitudes leading to intention building), it is subject to speculation in research 
on choice architectures. Existing hypotheses on the interplay of defaults and attitudes 
lack empirical testing. Two possibilities of a default and attitude relation are currently 
discussed. The majority of researchers assume a moderating influence of attitudes on 
default effects such that default effects decrease or disappear for stronger attitudes 
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(Johnson & Goldstein, 2003; Sunstein & Reisch, 2014; Sunstein & Thaler, 2003). An 
alternative relationship of defaults and attitudes is described by independent, additive 
effects of both (Kaiser, Arnold, & Otto, 2014). In Papers 2 and 3, we examine the 
interplay of defaults and attitudes by testing whether an interaction or additive main 
effects of defaults and attitudes best predict choices. 
In Paper 2, we tested the dominant hypothesis which assumes a moderating role of 
attitude strength. The results of two independent experiments from Paper 2 contradict 
the hypothesis that attitudes limit default effects. Instead, stronger (and more pro-
environmental) attitudes and green defaults independent of each other raised the 
probability to choose a green energy provider. This result contradicts the assumption of 
attitude-conditional default effects. The lack of a significant interaction between defaults 
and attitudes and their additive main effects are more in line with a compensatory 
model (Kaiser et al., 2014). The compensatory model is derived from the Campbell 
paradigm (Kaiser et al., 2010), an alternative theoretical model of the attitude-behavior 
relationship. Both the Campbell paradigm and the test of a conditional model against a 
compensatory model are outlined in more detail in Paper 3. 
In the online shop experiment (Paper 3), we found a pattern that conceptually 
replicates the results from the electricity provider experiment. Despite a different 
operationalization of defaults and choices and a different attitude measure, defaults and 
attitudes independently predicted choices and did not interact. In other words, green 
product defaults and more pro-environmental attitudes both predicted the amount of 
green products participants chose. The influence of a default persisted along the attitude 
continuum for participants with low environmental attitudes as well as for participants 
with high environmental attitudes. Because we measured actual choices but not 
intentions in both papers, it is not possible to directly map the results onto the theory of 
planned behavior. Whereas attitudes play an important role in both models, it would be 
worthwhile to examine whether defaults influence normative beliefs and control beliefs 
(the other two determinants of intentions and behavior in the theory of planned 
behavior) and would thus fit into the theory. 
Taken together, the results from the two papers provide converging support for the 
relative independence of default effects from attitudes and attitude strength at least for 
environmental decision making. As such, both papers present falsifying data on the 
intuitively appealing hypothesis that defaults work asymmetrically (Camerer et al., 
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2003) and only for people with weak attitudes. A potential objection is that an additive 
influence of defaults and attitudes as predicted by the compensatory model does not 
consider the difference between pro-environmental attitudes and strong attitudes 
(attitude position vs. attitude strength). One could imagine a person holding strong anti-
environmental attitudes (e.g., a convinced climate-change denier). We dealt with this 
objection in Paper 2 by measuring attitude position (pro/anti) and attitude strength 
(high/low) separately. Despite the successful construction of a reliable (internally 
consistent as well as stable over time) and valid measure of environmental attitude 
strength, differentiating between attitude and its strength proved difficult for 
environmental attitudes. Both constructs overlapped as indicated by their correlation 
(.37 < r < .40). Thus, the passionate climate-change denier does either not exist or was 
not part of our samples. Still, the results in Paper 2 using attitude strength as a potential 
moderator do not support the hypothesis that attitude strength moderates the influence 
of defaults on decision making. 
3.4 The predictive power of attitudes and their measurement 
In addition to the independence of defaults and attitudes, all three experiments 
from Papers 2 and 3 demonstrate that individual attitudes explain a significant 
proportion of variance in people’s choices. Thus, the internal blade of the behavior 
predicting ‘scissors’ (see Chapter 2.3 and Simon, 1990) is a valuable predictor. However, 
comparing the predictive power of the different scales used also highlights the challenge 
to measure latent constructs such as attitudes for the prediction of manifest behaviors. 
The widely used New Ecological Paradigm scale (NEP, Dunlap, van Liere, Mertig, & Jones, 
2000) employed in Paper 2 to measure environmental attitudes proved inferior to the 
newly created environmental attitude strength scale used in the same paper. A direct 
comparison between the NEP and the attitude strength scale reveals that the strength 
measure is superior in terms of incremental variance explanation and homogeneity (α > 
.84). It also proved stable over a period of eight weeks (rtt = .75). This makes the newly 
developed measure a viable alternative for environmental attitude measurement. In 
Paper 3, we used the more established general ecological behavior scale (GEB, Kaiser & 
Wilson, 2004) which is based on self-reported past behavior and is constructed based on 
the Rasch model. It also predicted green consumer choices well. 
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Comparing the performance of these three different measures of the same 
underlying construct illustrates that a reliable and valid attitude measurement is 
essential, albeit not trivial, to draw correct conclusions about the individual influence of 
each predictor as well as their interplay. The mere absence of a relationship between 
NEP scores and pro-environmental behavior is not sufficient to conclude that 
environmental attitudes do not influence behavior. 
3.5 How libertarian is libertarian paternalism? 
A frequent criticism concerning the use of nudges and defaults is that they reduce 
autonomy and restrict freedom of choice by manipulating the decision context. As the 
results from Papers 2 and 3 show, claiming that defaults only work for indifferent 
people and thus leave people with pronounced attitudes immune to their influence is 
not supported by empirical data. On the one hand, this speaks against the idea of 
libertarian paternalism or “asymmetric paternalism” (Camerer et al., 2003) because at 
least in the case of defaults, their influence seems to be relatively unanimous and 
symmetric. On the other hand, the studies from Papers 2 and 3 demonstrate that 
individual attitudes influence behavior independent of the choice architecture. This 
could be interpreted as an argument for the libertarian side of libertarian paternalistic 
interventions, although it stands in contrast to the claim from (mostly) economists who 
assume preferences (respectively attitudes) to be constructed on the spot rather than 
being stable dispositions (Slovic, 1995). Both the studies presented in Papers 2 and 3 
(using different attitude measures) as well as previous research on attitudes show that it 
is possible to measure attitudes in a stable and behavior-predictive way (Kaiser & Byrka, 
2015). As such, attitudes could represent the libertarian, context-independent side of 
libertarian paternalism. Thus, the data presented in this thesis provides arguments that 
could be used to defend the libertarian side by pointing out that attitudes do play a role 
in decision making. However, the finding that defaults exert influence even for people 
with very strong attitudes could also be interpreted as evidence for the high degree of 
manipulation that nudges in general and particularly defaults exert. What can be 
concluded from the presented data about libertarian paternalism then? 
If “libertarian” is defined by the mere existence of alternative options to choose 
from, a green default with the possibility to opt-out and to choose other energy sources 
instead can be classified as a libertarian measure. Still, the mere theoretical existence of 
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an alternative option that is not chosen in practice would not be sufficient to speak of a 
truly libertarian choice situation. However, in all three experiments participants also 
made practical use of the opportunity to opt-out and alternative options were also 
chosen despite strong default effects. Thus, the green energy and organic product 
defaults qualify as libertarian paternalistic. Given that Papers 2 and 3 demonstrate that 
defaults exert influence across all levels of attitudes, they can nevertheless be compared 
to other paternalistic measures with uniform consequences such as mandates or bans. 
Taken together, the present research allows situating default nudges between 
paternalistic laws and more libertarian educational approaches.  
As Paper 1 and the taxonomy of choice architecture interventions demonstrate, 
‘nudge’ is still a heterogeneous label and conclusions drawn from a specific intervention 
using a specific nudge cannot easily be transferred to the whole toolbox without 
oversimplifying. This also applies to evaluations of the degree of paternalism of an 
intervention. A nudge simplifying statistical information about risk propensities, for 
example, is very similar to an educational approach and as such certainly less 
paternalistic than a default nudge. 
For a more definite answer to the question How libertarian is libertarian 
paternalism?, further conceptual clarification and sharpening of the term is necessary 
and ethical issues might be more important than psychological questions. Psychology, 
on the other hand, has a long tradition in examining how people perceive certain stimuli 
and situations, oftentimes driven primarily by interest in people’s perceptions rather 
than the actual ‘truth’. To further examine the question How libertarian do people 
perceive libertarian paternalism?, I present a study on the perceived limitations of 
freedom evoked by different choice architectures in the following section. 
3.5.1 Libertarian paternalism and reactance 
In a different approach to examine how paternalistic a nudge is, I used perceived 
manipulation (a descriptive and quantifiable approach) instead of a normative definition 
of manipulation. Rather than theoretically determining whether one intervention is 
more manipulating than another, people indicated the degree of perceived manipulation 
of a nudge. I took this approach in a separate (yet unpublished) study in which I 
examined the acceptability of nudges and the connection to perceived restrictions of 
freedom. I will present the design and central findings of this study in the following.  
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The aforementioned criticism concerning the use of choice architectures (restricted 
freedom to choose and manipulation) is also an integral part of reactance theory which 
claims that persuasive message and external force can arouse the motivation to restore 
one’s freedom (Brehm, 1966). Reactance theory posits that this motivation cannot be 
measured directly but is expressed in behaviors such as direct restoration of freedom by 
enacting the threatened behavior, increased liking of the threatened behavior, 
derogating the source of threat, or exercising complementary behaviors. This conceptual 
definition of reactance as “the motivational state that is hypothesized to occur when a 
freedom is eliminated or threatened with elimination” (Brehm & Brehm, 1981, p. 37) 
renders its direct measurement impossible. However, its status as an intervening 
variable was also acknowledged by Brehm and Brehm (1981) who concluded that 
reactance can only be indirectly assessed via predicting behavioral effects. In case of 
nudges, these behavioral effects are, for instance, a lower acceptance of the measure. 
In an online study, I examined whether a perceived threat to individual freedom 
mediates whether a nudge is accepted or rejected. The central hypothesis derived from 
reactance theory is that nudges differ in the degree of acceptance due to the amount of 
freedom threat they provoke. This hypothesis was tested with a sample of N = 1740 
participants (Mage = 34 years, SD = 11.5, 50% female) recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk. Participants were presented a vignette describing one of six different nudges 
either presented as a regular nudge introduced by a choice architect or as a self-nudge 
which they could choose to implement themselves. For example, in the nudge condition, 
people were told that the default for printing in offices was changed from one-sided to 
double-sided printing. As with every default, this did not force them to print double-
sided as the setting could be changed for every print job. In the self-nudge condition, 
participants were told that they could change the default at their office printer to 
double-sided printing and thus nudge themselves. In total, six different scenarios3 with a 
nudge and self-nudge condition each were constructed in this way resulting in twelve 
different vignettes. Each participant randomly received only one of the twelve vignettes. 
After reading the vignette, participants indicated the amount of perceived freedom 
threat on a four item scale (α = .84, example-item: “The measure threatens my freedom 
                                                        
3 The other five nudges targeted savings rates with a saving default, food intake with smaller plates 
at buffets, grocery shopping with partitioned supermarket trolleys, energy consumption with smart 
meters, and snack food consumption with visual cues in chips containers. All of these nudges belonged to 
categories from the taxonomy presented in Paper 1. 
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to choose”). Then, the dependent variable “degree of acceptability” was assessed on a 
five-point semantic differential scale (α = .95, examples: un/acceptable, un/desirable). 
Further control variables were also assessed. 
Because the pattern was similar for each vignette, I aggregated measures over all six 
nudges. Self-nudges were preferred to regular nudges, M = 3.45 (SD = 1.19) vs. M = 3.84 
(SD = 1.05), t(1738) = 7.12, p < .001, d = 0.35. In line with the hypothesis, there was a 
significant indirect effect of nudge type on acceptance mediated by the amount of 
perceived freedom threat (see Figure 1). Self-nudges led to less freedom threat than 
regular nudges and a higher degree of freedom threat was associated with lower 
acceptance ratings of a nudge.  
One could argue that the mediator (freedom threat as a proxy for reactance) and the 
criterion (acceptance) are in fact two different manifestations of the same construct. 
However, although both measures correlate substantially (r = -.66), there remains a 
large proportion of unshared variance (56%). Besides statistical considerations, I 
consider both measures as sufficiently distinct in content to assume they represent 
distinct constructs. 
A joint consideration of the results from Papers 2 and 3 and the unpublished data 
on nudge acceptance suggests that research on the question “How libertarian is 
libertarian paternalism?” should consider external (nudges) and internal (attitudes) 
predictors of a decision and their interplay. Furthermore, the subjective experience of 
free choice (and its opposite freedom threat) can help to explain whether a measure is 
perceived as more libertarian or more paternalistic. The stronger people perceive the 
paternalistic side of a nudge (limiting freedom to choose, manipulating decisions), the 
Nudge type Acceptance 
Freedom threat 
b = -.49, p < .001 b = -.73, p < .001 
Direct effect, b = .03, p = .47 
Indirect effect, b = .36, 95% CI [0.29, 0.43] 
Figure 1. Model of nudge type as a predictor of acceptance, mediated by freedom 
threat. The confidence interval (CI) for the indirect effect is a bootstrapped CI based 
on 1000 samples. 
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lower is the acceptance of that measure. This is in line with predictions derived from 
reactance theory and points out how important it is to avoid reactance – even if 
objectively no freedom is limited because nudges do by definition preserve the freedom 
to choose an alternative (see also the defining criteria of nudges in section 2.2). 
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4 General discussion and implications 
In the previous chapter I have outlined the central issues to which the presented 
research provides new insight, which methods were used to deal with these issues, and 
which results were obtained. I will continue by pointing out the theoretical and practical 
implications these findings have for understanding and using choice architectures. It is 
possible that different approaches to tackle the issues raised would have yielded 
different answers and as such the conclusions presented (as any conclusions) are 
limited. I will point out some of these limitations and sketch alternative approaches to 
those presented in this thesis. Finally, in the course of searching for answers, new 
questions constantly come up to which the presented research does not speak. It is still 
useful to ask some of these follow-up questions which I will do to conclude this chapter. 
4.1 Conceptual sharpening of nudging 
The development of a taxonomy of nine nudge types provides further bottom-up 
sharpening of the concept by providing examples. Together with existing top-down 
definitions of nudges outlined in chapter 2.2, it helps to answer question like Does 
weather count as a nudge? Given the first three techniques which all deal with 
information provision, the taxonomy also supports definitions of nudging that include 
“information-nudges” (see Barton & Grüne-Yanoff, 2015). Thus, the taxonomy indicates 
that nudging is not limited to automatic (heuristic) processing or the exploitation of 
cognitive biases. This softens apprehensions that nudges target only intuitive, emotional 
processes (often referred to “System 1”) and prevent more durable changes due to 
neglecting complex, deliberate processing (“System 2”). The strict separation of the two 
Systems seems problematic in this light because nudges might ease deliberate 
processing by translating otherwise unused information into usable information (e.g., by 
simplification or providing feedback). 
Inevitably, the applied method of inductive category development is susceptible to 
subjective influences from the researchers developing the categories. Determining inter-
rater reliability of the developed categories (as done in Paper 1) provides one way to 
quantify the degree of subjectivity involved. It should be noted that previous 
categorizations refrained from using any specific (quantitative or qualitative) method at 
all. Nudge categories were developed intransparently, probably by intuition and 
experience of the researchers. Furthermore, despite problems with qualitative 
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methodology, one should keep in mind that also quantitative methods are far from 
objective. The operationalization of latent constructs, the translation of real world 
situations into the lab, significance thresholds, and the interpretation of sample-
dependent values and indices are similar gateways for subjectivity. I do not want to 
argue against the use of quantitative approaches as they frequently render subjectivity 
transparent, for example, by providing confidence intervals; however, for the aim of 
structuring the large amount of nudges into a finite number of categories, inductive 
category development is an appropriate method. An interesting (albeit similarly 
interpretation-intensive) alternative method would be multidimensional scaling (MDS). 
In MDS, participants rate how similar different stimuli (e.g., nudges) are. Because 
dimensions are not a priori determined by the researcher, this method can unveil latent 
factors that connect different stimuli without identifying them a priori. However, 
because comparing stimuli on more than two or three dimensions simultaneously is 
extremely complex and demanding, MDS would probably prevent the emergence of 
more than three dimensions. To detect basic underlying dimensions, it is still a very 
useful method. For developing a more fine-grained taxonomy that can be used to create 
new choice architectures, the chosen approach proved more suitable. 
4.2 Processes behind default effects: Defaults as behavioral cost factors 
From the experimental studies of default effects it can be concluded that defaults 
work by imposing or alleviating costs on decision making. Conceptualizing defaults as 
person-unspecific cost factors is in line with a compensatory understanding of how 
behavioral costs and individual attitudes change behavior (Kaiser et al., 2014; Kaiser et 
al., 2010). Behavioral costs, however, is a rather broad term (cf. the utility concept in 
neoclassical economic models). On the one hand, it allows for a parsimonious theoretical 
umbrella incorporating existing process explanations for defaults like effort or implied 
endorsement (McKenzie et al., 2006). On the other hand, it runs the risk of becoming too 
broad to be falsifiable which would reduce its epistemological utility. In this context, 
behavioral costs are akin to item difficulty in item-analysis: The lower the behavioral 
costs of a behavior, the more people show this behavior and vice versa. In Papers 2 and 
3, I tested the hypothesis that behavioral costs imposed by defaults are similar for a 
sample with heterogeneous attitudes. These tests support the assumption of comparable 
costs despite varying attitudes. However, if defaults work relatively similar for people 
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with different environmental attitudes, their influence should also be similar for people 
differing on further measures such as the need for cognition, knowledge, and other 
attitudes. In statistical terms, other needs or attitudes should also not interact with 
defaults. These tests have not been conducted yet. A challenge in conducting these tests 
is to a priori determine a cost-level that allows for variation in people’s choices without 
ceiling or floor effects. For example, an extremely high effort to change a default will 
prevent almost everyone from opting-out and introduce ceiling effects. Especially in 
experimental research extremely low costs of switching (e.g., a mouse click) are 
common and impede finding default effects. This was the case in a donation-by-default-
study I conducted in which participants could donate their participation gratification by 
default. Almost no one did so because opting-out was possible at no (behavioral or 
social) cost just by clicking. Thus, to achieve behavior change with defaults, knowledge 
about the size of behavioral costs a default imposes or alleviates is necessary. 
Another research design would be to experimentally vary the behavioral costs 
introduced by a default which should result in different actions. For instance, if the effort 
of switching from a default to an alternative increases, the amount of switching should 
decrease. If defaults are perceived as the recommended option (Tannenbaum & Ditto, 
2011), defaults in ambiguous situations should outperform defaults in certain situations 
because the costs of ignoring a recommendation in an uncertain situation are higher 
than in a certain situation. A challenge in all of these hypotheses is isolating and 
manipulating a single process (like the recommendation function of defaults). Most 
likely, different processes produce default effects simultaneously and to different 
degrees. 
Another process that might be responsible for the impact of defaults on choices is 
the perceived endowment a default elicits. According to the endowment effect 
(Kahneman et al., 1991; Knetsch, 1989) people are more willing to keep an endowment 
than they are to acquire the same object. This has been demonstrated with various 
objects (from duck habitats to coffee mugs) for which people demanded a higher price 
when they owned the object than they were willing to pay for it when they could buy it. 
In the case of defaults, this means that giving up a default (when it is perceived as an 
endowment) comes with a higher cost than choosing the same object when it is not the 
default. For experimental research on default effects this explanation implies that the 
scenario has to ensure a default option is actually perceived as an endowment. Although 
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speculative, this might have been another reason for an absent default effect in the 
donation-by-default-study mentioned above. Participants might not have perceived any 
endowment with the default, which could then not affect their behavior. By contrast, in 
Papers 2 and 3, the scenarios ensured that participants were actually endowed with a 
default before they received the possibility to opt-out. 
4.3 Attitudes as independent predictors and their measurement 
Moving from contextual factors to individual factors as predictors of behavior, 
Papers 2 and 3 demonstrated that individual attitudes increase the precision of a choice-
predicting model. Without drawing any definite conclusion concerning the existence or 
nonexistence of an attitude-behavior gap, three experiments with three different 
measurement approaches towards environmental attitudes indicate that attitude 
measurement plays an important role and is not trivial. The conceptual distance 
between the newly developed measure of environmental attitude strength (see Paper 2) 
and actual behavior as the criterion is larger than in the GEB as a behavioral attitude 
measure. It is well known that past behavior is a good predictor of future behavior, but it 
is probably not the only one. In contrast to the GEB, the attitude strength measure is not 
behavior-based but refers to different dimensions of attitude strength applied to 
environmental attitudes, namely importance, certainty, relevance, elaboration, 
knowledge, and ambivalence (Krosnick & Petty, 1995; Wegener, Downing, Krosnick, & 
Petty, 1995). Although assessing latent constructs like attitudes with self-report 
measures such as questionnaires can be difficult, the presented research demonstrates 
that it is worthwhile. 
If the editors’ claim in a recent special issue on nudging is true and “Libertarian 
paternalists, in contrast to other forms of paternalism, take individuals’ own preferences 
seriously” (Barton & Grüne-Yanoff, 2015, p. 346), this should result in more 
sophisticated attempts to capture attitudes than deriving them from one shot behaviors 
or choices only. Measuring latent constructs in psychology (as one of the core 
characteristics of empirical psychology) is certainly more difficult than measuring 
temperature or length. Conclusions about the reliability or change in a construct such as 
a person’s attitude also depend on its measurement. As such, conclusions about human 
irrationality drawn from a preference reversal in a preference measure using one-shot 
behaviors might provide more insight into irrational measurement practices than into 
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human irrationality. Note that this is not an argument against behavior-based attitude 
measurement per se. Even in the Campbell paradigm which provides the theoretical 
basis for the construction of the behavior-based GEB scale, an attitude is derived from 
several rank-ordered instances of behavior and their associated difficulties (see Kaiser 
et al., 2010 for a detailed description of the Campbell paradigm). 
Ultimately, different approaches suggest different methods for attitude 
measurement (e.g., classical test theory vs. item-response-theory). In the present thesis, 
I took individuals’ preferences seriously by jointly considering situational factors and 
individual attitudes. I used different methods for the measurement of environmental 
attitudes (classical in Paper 2, Rasch-based in Paper 3) to be able to draw conclusions 
that are not limited to a very specific scale or measurement method. This is necessary 
since my research questions focused on the influence of attitudes on defaults, not on the 
influence of attitude measurement on defaults. Despite the different measurements of 
attitudes, a recurring pattern of the default-attitude-behavior relationship emerged. The 
findings also allow for preliminary conclusions concerning their interplay. Despite the 
intuitively appealing hypothesis that attitudes moderate the influence of defaults and 
defaults should work asymmetrically influencing people with weak attitudes more than 
people with strong attitudes, this hypothesis proved untenable. From this it follows that 
defaults work relatively unconstrained by attitudes and possibly also unconstrained by 
further variables, although the present research provides no data for the latter 
assumption. The unconstrained effectiveness also has some important practical 
implications for the use of defaults in policy making to which I will return in Chapter 4.5. 
Prior to this, I will discuss implications of the three papers in this thesis for the different 
concepts of human rationality outlined in Chapter 2.  
4.4 Implications for human rationality 
Given that the experiments from Paper 2 and 3 repeatedly showed that people’s 
choices can be influenced by nudges such as defaults, one could conclude that human 
decision making is indeed biased, flawed, and utterly irrational. Indeed, it cannot be 
denied that decision making is context-dependent. Because random contexts (e.g., a 
randomly chosen green or gray default) exert a similar influence, this is often 
interpreted as a proof for irrationality. Conclusions markedly different from those of a 
cognitive bias perspective are drawn by both the cognitive-ecological approach (Fiedler 
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& Juslin, 2006; Fiedler & Wänke, 2009) and ecological rationality (Gigerenzer et al., 
1999; Todd & Gigerenzer, 2007). Both approaches shift the focus from a purely “intra-
psychic bias” perspective (Fiedler & Wänke, 2009, p. 704) towards the consideration of 
the human mind in a given information environment. In contrast to much of the research 
referring to bounded rationality (see also Chapter 2), the cognitive-ecological approach 
and ecological rationality stress the two potential gateways for seemingly irrational 
decisions: a biased mind and a biasing information environment. Ecological rationality 
criticizes the basic premise that context-dependence of human information processing is 
taken as a sign for irrationality. Rather, Gigerenzer and colleagues suggest that the use of 
heuristics and “biases” (such as sticking to the status quo) reflects the ability to derive 
meaning from contexts and cope with available information in a “fast and frugal” way 
(Hertwig & Herzog, 2009). This perspective is represented in one explanation of default 
effects which points out that defaults often reflect endorsement or advice from the 
person who sets the default (McKenzie et al., 2006; Tannenbaum & Ditto, 2011). 
Furthermore, whereas the source of deviation from what might be in a person’s best 
interest is found within the person in research on cognitive biases, Gigerenzer demands 
to locate it outside of the individual on an institutional level. Rather than blaming biased 
processing of ostensibly unbiased information, he turns the tables and blames massive 
“flaws in human institutions” (Gigerenzer, 2015, p. 367) for suboptimal decision making. 
Smoking advertisements serve as an example for this claim. Although people know that 
smoking kills, some smoke. This might be irrational, however, a billion-dollar industry 
works on promoting irrational behavior (smoking) by advertisement. One could also call 
this the major irrationality and locate it in the decision environment, not in the human 
mind. 
Despite these different assumptions about the reasons for biased decision making, 
the conclusions potentially drawn from an ecological rationality perspective are very 
similar to suggestions from proponents of choice architecture. Todd and Gigerenzer 
(2007, p. 167), for instance, conclude: “Knowing when and how people use particular 
heuristics can facilitate the shaping of environments to engender better decisions.” As a 
concrete measure they suggest to change organ donation defaults to increase donation 
rates, a suggestion that also appears in choice architecture research (Johnson 
& Goldstein, 2003). Thus, context-dependent human behavior such as the behavior 
guidance of pre-selected default options is not necessarily a sign of irrationality. 
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Irrespective of whether “predictably irrational” (Ariely, 2008) or “ecologically rational” 
human minds are responsible (Todd & Gigerenzer, 2007), the demonstration of context-
dependent human behavior allows for converging practical (policy) implications. 
4.5 Practical (policy) implications  
Behavioral sciences have certainly gained attention from policy makers as the 
installation of special units and the staffing of advisor positions in the UK, the US, 
Australia, Denmark, and Germany show. The expectation of concrete policy implications 
from research on nudging is thus even more prevalent than in other research areas. 
The presented taxonomy aims at a high practical value allowing for the creation of 
concrete nudges without being a mere toolbox detached from any theoretical 
foundation. As described in more detail in Paper 1, designing a behavioral intervention 
entails a definition of the target behavior, the identification of barriers, checking 
whether choice architecture is suited at all (see also the discussion of choice 
architecture as complementary regulation in this chapter), as well as choosing and 
testing a technique. Thus, the process is more complex than simple trial and error, but 
the taxonomy should be helpful for the last step in the behavioral design process 
(choosing and testing), as it outlines and describes the available options. 
The experimental papers on green defaults provide evidence for two starting points 
to achieve behavior change in the realm of environmental decision making: First, green 
defaults can foster pro-environmental decision making. Possible green defaults may 
range from the tested large-scale renewable energy defaults to small-scale waste 
reduction defaults (e.g., one-sided printing or reducing plastic bag use). Other green 
defaults might include sustainable consumption defaults, vegetarian defaults in schools 
or cafeterias, energy efficient wash cycle defaults, sustainable shipping defaults, or low 
emission defaults in individual transportation (taking the train instead of a plane). When 
these defaults are perceived as endowments, when opting-out introduces an extra effort 
(e.g., physical or temporal), and when their recommendation function does not restrict 
the perceived freedom of choice, green defaults increase the likelihood for pro-
environmental decisions in addition to the influence of a decision maker’s 
environmental attitude. 
Notwithstanding a clear recommendation for the use of nudges, the present 
research does not support the conclusion that nudges should completely substitute 
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other forms of regulation such as incentives, taxes, and the law. Rather, nudges 
complement the toolbox of regulatory means (see also Purnhagen & Reisch, 2015). This 
is especially important since the repeated demonstration of a successful nudge is 
independent from the success of other regulatory means such as bans or taxes. If green 
defaults foster sustainable shopping, this does not imply that banning or increasing 
prices for unsustainable consumer goods becomes unnecessary. To the contrary, truly 
cross-disciplinary approaches promise to be more successful than unidirectional 
measures. If technological improvements neglect psychological insights about how 
humans adopt new technologies, their impact might be severely limited or even lead to a 
rebound effect. In the realm of environmental behavior, rebound effects occur, for 
example, when more energy efficient technologies lead to higher emissions because 
people adapt their energy consumption due to a perceived technological improvement 
(Herring & Roy, 2007; Otto, Kaiser, & Arnold, 2014). Most probably, the technological fix 
– besides being a risky, uncertain, and complex option – cannot solve a societal challenge 
such as climate change without considering psychological insights (Amelung & Funke, 
2013). Similarly, as the hybrid discipline of behavioral economics shows, a purely cost-
benefit economic perspective neglecting how financial incentives are perceived by the 
individual will fail to produce lasting behavior change.  
4.5.1 Nudging and education 
A discussion of viable alternative approaches to achieve behavior change besides 
regulation by legislation, technological improvements, and financial incentives has to 
include educational approaches. Traditionally, environmental education is a popular 
alternative approach to achieve behavior change by enabling a person “to strive for and 
to attain a more ecological way of life” (Roczen, Kaiser, Bogner, & Wilson, 2014, p. 972) 
by increasing the relevant knowledge base. Environmental programs address 
knowledge more frequently than attitudes or behavior (see, for example, a meta-analysis 
from Pomerantz, 1991). However, whether an increase in the environmental knowledge 
base alone actually has a strong effect on behavior is disputed. Rather, appreciation for 
nature and environmental attitudes are assumed to motivate the search for information 
which in turn enables people to act pro-environmentally (Roczen et al., 2014). Thus, 
educational approaches as well as choice architecture interventions that neglect the 
influence of attitudes might similarly fall short in achieving behavior change. Despite 
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being compared as different means to achieve behavior change, educational approaches 
and choice architectures are not necessarily opposites. Nudges in Category A of the 
newly developed taxonomy target “decision information” (see Chapter 3.1 and Paper 1). 
This category provides techniques to facilitate the processing and understanding of 
decision-relevant information; in other words, they increase the relevant knowledge 
base, which is comparable to education. Whether the influence of nudges on attitudes is 
similar to the influence of nudges on learning, for example by achieving attitude change 
through consistent behavior change, is an open question. A take-home message for 
policymakers is not to focus either on educating or nudging their citizens but rather to 
consider both approaches as more connected and less mutually exclusive. 
A final practical implication of the presented data concerns the connection of 
reactance and acceptability of nudges. Policy makers are strongly urged to pay close 
attention to the communication of a nudge and to avoid reactance. Any indication of 
manipulation or restricted personal freedom can lead to reactance and will increase the 
likelihood that a nudge is rejected irrespective of the good intentions that led to its 
implementation. 
4.6 Limitations and open questions 
Despite the outlined theoretical and practical implications, the present research is 
of course limited in scope and leaves several questions unanswered. Keeping these 
limitations in mind can stimulate further research and will help to assess the 
implications outlined above.  
Within the central area of application (environmental decision making), I focused 
on only two examples of sustainable behavior as dependent variables: electricity 
provider choices and sustainable consumption. Both provide large leverage potential, 
but defaults can potentially be applied to other behaviors, too, such as meat 
consumption (vegetarian defaults), energy usage (recharging defaults of electric cars in 
a smart grid), and mobility (no plane defaults in companies). By focusing on 
environmental decision making, Papers 2 and 3 applied defaults to the same area. This 
precluded the test of defaults to foster other behaviors in domains outside of 
environmental decision making (e.g., financial decisions like saving or donating, or 
medical decision making). As mentioned earlier, environmental decision making might 
differ from other domains due to its consensual ultimate goal, which is less controversial 
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than the goals in other potential domains of application (e.g., organ donation or 
vaccination). Thus, claims made about the interplay of defaults and attitudes are limited 
to green defaults and environmental attitudes. Although there is no reason to believe 
that the relationship between defaults and attitudes should be fundamentally different 
in other areas, the present research does not speak to this question. Generalization 
warrants further conceptual replications of the findings in experiments targeting organ 
donation defaults and pro-social attitudes or political decisions and political orientation, 
to name just two examples. 
While this thesis presents an overview of choice architecture techniques in Paper 1, 
only one technique was tested in the experiments presented. Further techniques to 
foster sustainable decisions would potentially be fruitful but were not compared to 
defaults in this thesis. One possible approach would be a systematic test of different 
nudges against each other to explore best practices (see van der Linden, Sander, 
Maibach, & Leiserowitz, 2015). Despite this dissertation’s focus on nudges, I consider it 
crucial not to forget the high practical value of further psychological theories to tackle 
societal challenges. An example for one such theory is construal level theory (CLT, Trope 
& Liberman, 2010). CLT helps to explain why (temporally/spatially) distant events are 
treated differently from proximal events. As such, it is highly valuable to describe why 
climate change as a fact with distant consequences taking place thousands of miles away 
or in a distant future is currently handled on such an inappropriately abstract level. The 
descriptive value of psychological theories such as CLT can certainly be combined with 
prescriptive implications for policy making over and above the choice architecture 
approach. 
For more specific and methodological limitations concerning the individual 
experiments and the applied methods, the reader is referred to the discussion sections 
in each of the individual papers. 
Before concluding this part of this thesis and presenting the individual papers, I 
would like to focus on several general and specific, important yet unresolved questions 
concerning research on choice architectures and their application. Frequent criticism of 
nudges concerns their long-term effects and sustainability. Whether changing contexts 
also changes minds and ultimately attitudes (Dolan, Elliott, Metcalfe, & Vlaev, 2012) or 
leads to habituation and a gradual decline in effectiveness are crucial questions if 
nudges are discussed as viable alternatives to legislative regulation, information, or 
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economic incentives. Closely connected to this question are the processes relevant for a 
specific nudge. In the case of defaults, we found initial indications that defaults influence 
reasoning processes by selectively stimulating different queries (Dinner et al., 2011). 
Although one should treat introspective self-reports with caution, in Paper 2 (see 
Experiment 2), answers to the question of why participants made a certain choice were 
systematically influenced by the default they received. In other words, participants 
answered “greener” after a green electricity default than after a gray default. As such, 
defaults possibly also change information processing and post-decisional reasoning. 
Whether pre-decisional reasoning processes are also influenced by defaults is an open 
question the experiment cannot answer because we assessed queries after the decision. 
Others have tackled similar questions (Dinner et al., 2011) and raised the question of 
whether opting-out causes more thorough processing due to higher personal 
involvement (Toft, Schuitema, & Thøgersen, 2014). However, it is unclear whether this 
creates lasting patterns and transfers to other situations (e.g., via self-perception, Bem, 
1967) or is limited to the concrete default situation. Since nudges are often presented as 
an alternative to behavior change via attitude change, the opposite direction (attitude 
change via behavior change) is certainly worth examining and demonstrating the 
sustainability of a nudge would be great news. 
A more general open question that applies to every nudge is how to determine the 
desired target behavior. How do we arrive at a target behavior that can be called 
“desirable” and whose definition of “desirable” should be adopted? In the experiments 
on green electricity and sustainable consumer choices, I chose the green option as the 
target behavior. However, this is an arbitrary and subjective choice fueled by my own 
conviction that green energy is better than gray energy. Originally, nudges were defined 
to enable people to make better decisions “as judged by themselves” (italics in the 
original, Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 5). However, this becomes problematic when the 
same nudge is applied to large groups, which probably assess different outcomes as 
desirable, as is the case in policy making. For defaults, different ways to determine a 
target behavior have been suggested, among them impersonal defaults, personalized 
defaults, and majority rules (Sunstein, 2013). One pitfall that should be avoided is 
judging the means by their ends. Whereas this dissertation is primarily concerned with 
research on nudges as a means to achieve behavior change – and sustainable decisions in 
particular – and uses empirical methods to do this, it should be separated from research 
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on suitable ends, which would most likely combine empirical methods (e.g., surveys or 
life-cycle assessment) with analytical methods (e.g., political, legal, and ethical analyses). 
As such, it is possible to conduct research on promising means to increase market share 
for renewable energy while the question whether green electricity is more desirable 
than nuclear power could remain open. This is even more important when answers are 
less consensual and capable of winning a broad civic majority as, for instance, 
concerning organ donation or pension saving rates (Choi, Laibson, Madrian, & Metrick, 
2003).  
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5 Concluding remarks 
The public and scientific debate whether “To nudge or not to nudge” (Hausman & 
Welch, 2010) is in full swing covering minor questions like “Why couldn't I be nudged to 
dislike a Big Mac?” (Bovens, 2013) and major questions like “Should we be ‘nudging’ for 
cadaveric organ donations?” (Hansen, 2012). The growing evidence base about the 
influence of decision environments on choices and behavior has tempted some to focus 
exclusively on features of the choice architecture, neglecting individual causes of 
behavior which, in turn, provoked an almost reactant rejection of the idea to use this 
evidence. Reactance, as does any threat to freedom, reduces the degree of acceptance of 
a measure. 
In this dissertation, I pointed out how nudges and individual attitudes jointly 
contribute to behavior change; in contrast to intuitive assumptions, this happens 
relatively independently and without limiting the individual impact of either one. This 
finding also answers the question why one couldn’t be nudged to dislike a Big Mac: 
because liking (or a favorable attitude) is independent of the nudge. Both factors 
influence behavior but do not influence each other. As such, one could describe nudging 
as “impact-oriented” rather than “intent-oriented” (Stern, 2000). I consider neither 
orientation superior per se. Rather, for severe societal challenges like climate change, it 
is crucial that people fly less and eat less meat – it is of secondary importance whether 
they do this because they are deeply convinced or due to a vegetarian default or their 
company’s social norm of taking the train. As the organ donation approval rates in 
Germany show, intentions do not guarantee impact (see p. 3).  It remains an open 
question whether a choice architecture that fosters flying less would be negatively 
“compensated” by increased meat consumption and if this rebound effect could be 
avoided by a change in attitudes. 
 In light of this question and my research, I conclude that choice architectures do 
lead to behavior change but are no substitute for other forms of regulation, or for other 
predictors of behavior such as attitudes. Taking attitudes seriously includes serious 
attempts to measure them, which I assume will lead to fewer conclusions about human 
irrationality. With a not so irrational mind and clever choice architectures combined, 
behavior is a powerful leverage point for many severe societal challenges from the liking 
of Big Macs to organ donation and sustainable consumption. 
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Abstract 
We present a taxonomy of choice architecture techniques that focus on intervention 
design, as opposed to the underlying cognitive processes that make an intervention 
work. We argue that this distinction will facilitate further empirical testing and will 
assist practitioners in designing interventions. The framework is inductively derived 
from empirically tested examples of choice architecture and consists of nine techniques 
targeting decision information, decision structure, and decision assistance. An inter-
rater reliability test demonstrates that these techniques can be used in an 
intersubjectively replicable way to describe sample choice architectures. We conclude 
by discussing limitations of the framework and key issues concerning the use of the 
techniques in the development of new choice architectures. 
Keywords: behavior change; decision making; choice architecture; nudge; 
intervention design 
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A review and taxonomy of choice architecture techniques 
The growing field of choice architecture research investigates how the structure and 
presentation of decision situations influences certain behavioral choices over 
alternatives (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). Choice architecture research has gained 
attention in recent years for its promise to apply insights from behavioral research to 
areas beyond marketing, such as policy making (Shafir, 2012) or development aid 
(Banerjee & Duflo, 2011).  
Choice architecture emerged when researchers began to take an applied stance on 
cognitive peculiarities of human decision making drawing upon established judgment 
and decision making research. The wide focus on deviations in human decision making 
from the rational choice model ranges from Simon’s (1955) bounded rationality 
proposal and Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) heuristics and biases program to 
contemporary behavioral economics (Camerer, Loewenstein, & Rabin, 2004) or “applied 
behavioral science” (Kahneman, 2012, p. ix). Research on choice architectures was 
triggered by Thaler and Sunstein’s (2008) policy-oriented publication Nudge, which 
suggests that researchers should investigate how predictable deviations from rational 
behavior can be used to “nudge” people into socially desirable directions, e.g., improving 
their health or financial security. A “new branch to the ‘prescriptive’ part of the field of 
judgment and decision making” was added (Baron, 2010, p. 224). “Choice architecture” 
(Thaler, Sunstein, & Balz, 2010) refers to the idea that changes in the decision 
environment can affect individual decision-making and behavior while preserving 
freedom of choice. The approach alters “people’s behavior in a predictable way without 
forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives” (Thaler 
& Sunstein, 2008, p. 6). From this it follows that neither mandates nor classical economic 
incentives count as choice architecture. In contrast to persuasion, the focus of change is 
behavior rather than general attitudes or beliefs. Nudges can be understood as a specific 
type of behavior change technique primarily relying on reflexive cognitive processes 
(Oliver, 2013) often referred to as cognitive biases or heuristics (Gigerenzer & Todd, 
1999; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). A more general overview of behavior change 
techniques over and above nudges (including, e.g., mandates and incentives) is 
presented in the “behavior change technique taxonomy” (Michie et al., 2013). 
In recent years, research on how choice architecture interventions can influence 
individual behavior has been conducted in a growing number of fields, including 
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consumer protection (Shafir, 2006), public health (Blumenthal-Barby & Burroughs, 
2012; Cabinet Office, Behavioural Insights Team, 2010), environmental behavior 
(Cornforth, 2009; Weber, 2012), financial decision making (Thaler & Benartzi, 2004), 
and development aid (Banerjee & Duflo, 2011). Such research both adapts existing 
(descriptive) findings about judgment and decision making to the choice architecture 
paradigm and contributes new insights from research that has been carried out from a 
(prescriptive) choice architecture point of view (see Baron, 2010 for a similar 
argument). However, the field still lacks an integrative framework for the development 
and transfer of successful choice architecture interventions. To provide such a 
framework, we review the literature, noting both the necessity and the benefits of more 
clearly distinguishing intervention design from processes, and propose a taxonomy of 
nine intervention techniques derived through inductive category development from 
documented cases of choice architecture. 
Intervention design and underlying processes 
Michie and colleagues (2011) analyzed existing frameworks for behavior change 
interventions and concluded that “none are comprehensive and conceptually coherent” 
(p. 2). We argue that this applies for the subfield of choice architecture frameworks as 
well.  
As outlined for the broader field of behavior change, specifying the range of 
available intervention techniques in a systematic and theoretically sound way helps 
guiding the development of new testable interventions (Abraham & Michie, 2008). 
Likewise, choice architecture research and the widespread testing in this field would 
profit from a systematic outline of the techniques available for testing across contexts 
and domains. 
Previous attempts to enumerate techniques of choice architecture have followed 
two main approaches. The first approach focuses on the underlying (cognitive) processes, 
i.e., the mental constraints and cognitive biases targeted by an intervention. Datta and 
Mullainathan (2012) suggest that four basic “mental constraints” serve as a starting 
point for choice architecture interventions: self-control, attention, cognitive capacity, and 
understanding. Dolan et al. (2012) provide a framework of nine categories that consider 
psychological phenomena and processes, such as priming, salience, and affect, on which 
choice architectures can be built. In the second approach, choice architecture techniques 
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are structured according to the kinds of interventions used to modify the decision 
situation. Johnson et al. (2012) suggest as categories of intervention: reducing the 
number of alternatives, using technology and decision aids, setting defaults, adjusting the 
time frames and sequences of choices, partitioning options and attributes, and designing 
attributes. Abrahamse, Steg, Vlek and Rothengatter (2005) single out commitment, goal 
setting, information, modeling (i.e., giving examples of recommended behavior), 
feedback, and rewards. 
However, these two approaches are often intermixed. Dolan et al. (2012) admit that 
a possible critique of their taxonomy is the resultant blurring between internal 
psychological mechanisms, such as affect, and external levers, such as defaults – both of 
which are part of their taxonomy. Also Datta and Mullainathan (2012) draw upon both 
approaches when formulating techniques of choice architecture such as “facilitate self-
control by employing commitment devices” and “reduce inattention: reminders and 
implementation intentions”. However, such suggestions of direct relationships between 
mental constraints (e.g., self-control) on the one hand, and interventions (e.g., providing 
reminders) on the other hand cannot claim to be exclusive: reminders, for example, 
might also strengthen self-control. Moreover, the list of constraints and biases does not 
explicitly refer to prominent effects such as priming. Similarly, Johnson et al. (2012) 
describe problems such as decision inertia, alternative overload, and long searching 
processes and relate them directly to certain interventions which again suggests an 
exclusive link between a problem in decision making and a choice architecture 
technique.  
Beyond these two basic approaches, a variety of broad and nonspecific intervention 
categories are discussed; examples include encouraging vs. discouraging a certain 
behavior, functioning in a mindful vs. mindless way from the perspective of the target 
person, being transparent or non-transparent to the subject (Hansen & Jespersen, 2013; 
Ly, Mažar, Zhao, & Soman, 2013), structuring the choice task vs. describing the choice 
options (Johnson et al., 2012), and influencing the antecedents vs. the consequences of a 
decision (Abrahamse et al., 2005). These categories may help to describe a decision 
situation but provide little guidance in setting up concrete interventions that can be 
tested empirically.  
Summing up, there are several attempts in the field of choice architecture to build a 
more systematic theoretical framework taking into account the large body of evidence 
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on constraints and biases of human decision making and the resulting opportunities for 
choice architecture interventions. However, some confusion results from disregarding 
the factual many-to-many nature of the relationship between intervention techniques 
(the prescriptive part) and cognitive processes (the explanatory part). One intervention 
technique might alternatively draw on different cognitive processes, while one such 
process might underlie different intervention techniques. Consider one of the most 
prominent examples of choice architecture, default setting: Several processes are 
discussed to cause default effects, among them loss aversion (Dinner, Johnson, Goldstein, 
& Liu, 2011), implied endorsement (McKenzie, Liersch, & Finkelstein, 2006), and 
decision inertia (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003). Conversely, any of these processes can also 
underlie other intervention techniques besides default setting (e.g., loss aversion might 
also underlie information translation by reframing gains as losses). Furthermore, the 
same process might appear in two different techniques, but this does not increase 
similarity from the perspective of the choice architect who might, e.g., only be able to 
intervene on the level of information framing but not on the level of default setting. As a 
consequence, attempts to more stringently systematize the field need to opt for either 
techniques (cf. Johnson et al., 2012) or processes (cf. Vlaev & Dolan, 2015) as the basic 
categorization logic. 
We provide a suggestion of how to use intervention techniques as the structuring 
principle. We view this alternative as particularly suited for facilitating the development 
of new, testable choice architecture interventions. 
Integration with an underlying model of behavior 
The development process for choice architectures can be specified as a systematic 
approach of sequenced steps as, e.g., suggested by Datta and Mullainathan (2012) for 
development aid policy. In the following, we propose a more general and revised version 
building on the “behaviour change wheel” model by Michie et al. (2011): 
Step 1. Define behavioral problem and target behavior 
Step 2. Analyze applicability of choice architecture framework 
Step 3. Check for behavioral bottlenecks  
Step 4. Build hypotheses on promising choice architecture interventions 
Initially, any choice architecture intervention (and any behavior change attempt in 
general) requires a definition of the target behavior. Second, the kind of behavior change 
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approach applicable to the behavioral context should be determined. This includes 
checking whether choice architecture is applicable at all. If people strongly oppose a 
behavior or are forced not to display it due to external factors, choice architecture does 
not appear suited. Alternative measures of behavior change (such as education, bans or 
mandates, or economic incentives) might be more promising than choice architecture. 
However, choice architecture might be pertinent for pragmatic reasons if alternative 
measures are not available, too expensive, or not admissible. 
Third, the reasons why people fail to display the target behavior should be analyzed. 
The crucial question is whether they are to be found in the psychology of human 
decision-making. This analysis has been termed the check for a “behavioral bottleneck” 
(Datta & Mullainathan, 2012, p. 15). It yields hypotheses on why the target behavior is 
not displayed, opening up a path towards choosing potentially effective intervention 
techniques. To do so, we suggest focusing on the central determinants of behavior in the 
“behaviour change wheel” (Michie et al., 2011): capability, opportunity, and motivation, 
and to identify corresponding biases or constraints such as limits in self-control, 
attention, cognitive capacity, and understanding (see Datta & Mullainathan, 2012). 
Possible results of this analysis could be that capability is constrained by a lack of 
understandable information (e.g., complicated information on the costs of insurance 
alternatives); the physical setup might negatively impact opportunity (e.g., inaccessible 
healthy food options), or self-control deficits might undermine the translation of 
motivation into behavior (e.g., in smoking cessation attempts).  
Due to the complex influence of multiple variables, a general description of the 
analysis for behavioral bottlenecks necessarily remains vague. Thus, there can be no 
straightforward how-to for connecting the results of the bottleneck analysis with 
distinct choice architecture intervention techniques as a fourth step. Nonetheless, 
knowing about pertinent biases or constraints which prevent a target behavior while 
step-by-step checking each of the intervention techniques from the presented taxonomy, 
provides a more systematic way of developing choice architectures than currently 
available. In the following section, we first describe the development of our framework 
of choice architecture techniques and then explain the techniques in more detail. 
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A taxonomy of choice architecture techniques 
Taxonomy development 
While a large range of techniques for behavior change, including choice architecture, 
has been described, particularly in health and social psychology, they tend to be 
presented “as practical tools without reference to their evidence base” (Michie, 
Johnston, Francis, Hardeman, & Eccles, 2008, p. 665). To remedy this fact, we based 
category development on a sample of 127 documented examples of empirically tested 
choice architecture interventions. These were collected from academic publications and 
practitioner reports provided by organizations such as the British Cabinet Office’s 
Behavioural Insights Team and MIT’s Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab. Examples 
mentioned in blogs or non-academic publications were also included after the original 
publication was checked for academic soundness.  
The aim of any taxonomy or classification scheme is to “categorize phenomena into 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive sets” (Doty & Glick, 1994, p. 232), so that those sets 
describe the greatest possible share of the respective phenomena. To adopt a traceable 
approach to develop categories of choice architecture techniques meeting these 
requirements, we used inductive category development (Chenail, 2008; Corbin & 
Strauss, 2008; Mayring, 2010). Just as quantitative data reduction techniques (e.g., 
principal component analysis, cluster analysis), inductive category development aims at 
providing a limited number of categories suited to describe a given data set. The method 
is used to identify thematic relationships between units and to build categories through 
a recursive process of analyzing units and accordingly creating new or adapting existing 
categories (for a similar application, see Abraham & Michie, 2008; Michie et al., 2011). 
Ultimately, saturation in category development is expected because – if an adequate set 
of categories could be developed – no further categories need to be defined but further 
units can be subsumed under the previously defined categories (Corbin & Strauss, 
2008). In order to define the units for analysis, we first compiled a unified description 
for all 127 interventions in our database, specifying a) the actors, b) the desired 
behavior, c) a description of the intervention, and d) the effect of the intervention on 
behavior. Processing each of these units we then developed and recursively refined a set 
of descriptive categories of types of interventions suited to subsume all studied 
interventions. For each newly processed intervention, we checked whether it could be 
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subsumed under the definition of one of the previously created categories, required 
further specification of the category’s definition, or required the creation of an 
additional category. To maximize intersubjectivity during category development, all 
three authors discussed the sample cases in an iterative process. The sample database 
was large enough to continue category development to the point of saturation where all 
further sample interventions could be subsumed under existing categories, resulting in a 
stable classification scheme (cf. Eisenhardt, 1989). We thus found that heterogeneous 
choice architecture interventions can be described using a limited number of common 
choice architecture techniques. 
The resulting taxonomy was then subjected to an inter-rater reliability test to 
quantify the degree of how well the taxonomy enables independent others to subsume 
given choice architecture interventions under the pre-defined categories. Four coders 
(two female and two male) categorized a random subset of 55 of the 127 choice 
architecture examples (see supplementary material for a table containing descriptions 
and references of all 55 coded interventions). Prior to the categorization, all coders 
received written definitions of techniques and examples which they were free to use 
during coding. After practicing with 20 examples, the coders were presented with the 
target cases in a random, identical order. Complete inter-rater agreement was achieved 
in 47 % of cases, at least three coders agreed in 73 % of cases, and only 5 % (three 
cases) were rated entirely different. Given that complete agreement by chance is 
extremely unlikely (0.14 % per case), the high agreement rates already indicate inter-
rater-reliability. Following Hallgren’s (2012) recommendations for fully crossed designs 
with nominal data, Cohen’s Kappa was computed for each pair of coders and then 
averaged to provide a single index (Light, 1971). Pairwise Kappas lie between κ = .56 
and κ = .65, all p < .001. The overall mean Kappa of κ = .60 (SD = .03) provides a 
conservative estimate of inter-rater reliability and indicates moderate to substantial 
agreement (Landis & Koch, 1977).  
Structure of the taxonomy 
We suggest three basic categories of choice architecture intervention techniques: 
decision information, decision structure, and decision assistance. These categories reflect 
different streams in the judgment and decision making literature. 
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 Decision information. How people process available information has been a 
core topic in behavioral decision research since Simon’s (1955) bounded rationality 
claim. Scholars have pointed to the relevance of “perceptual processes of problem 
representation, formulation, or framing” (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1992, p. 111) to 
decision making. Accordingly, this category covers choice architecture techniques that 
target the presentation of decision-relevant information without altering the options 
themselves, e.g., by (re)arranging existing information or changing its presentation 
(how, by whom).  
 Decision structure. Many decision making models assume that decision-
makers compare attributes or alternatives. Because maximizing strategies often prove 
impossible or maladaptive (Schwartz et al., 2002), alternative strategies have been 
suggested (e.g., weighted additive, satisficing, lexicographic, see Payne, Bettman, & 
Johnson, 1988 for an overview). Accordingly, choice architects can alter the decision 
structure, i.e., the arrangement of options and the decision making format, by modifying 
the available options in the decision situation, including their range or composition, the 
default option, or the effort required for selecting an option and the consequences of 
selecting it. 
 Decision assistance. A third stream of decision research has focused on self-
regulation and “self-regulation failures” (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996), i.e., problems 
of bridging the intention-behavior gap (Sheeran, 2002). Accordingly, choice architects 
can use techniques to provide decision-makers with further assistance which aims at 
helping them to follow through with their intentions. For example, choice architects can 
foster deliberate commitment or take measures to remind people of preferred 
behavioral options. 
Each basic category contains a number of techniques. In the following sections, we 
will describe the techniques and cite examples of their effective application from 
empirical studies. The examples are structured according to subtypes, but the subtypes 
given do not constitute an exhaustive list. We will also refer to underlying cognitive 
processes which – as illustrated above – are not exclusively linked to a technique. 
 
------------ INSERT TABLE 1 HERE ------------ 
Decision information 
Decision makers usually base their decisions on available information, be it factual 
or social. The way this information is presented influences subsequent decisions, and 
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thus changing the presentation of information can be seen as part of the choice 
architect’s role (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008).  
  Translate information (A1). Choice architects can translate existing, decision-
relevant information for the decision maker by changing the format or presentation of 
information but not the content. 
 Reframe. One way to change the format of existing information is to reframe it 
by “shifting the perspectives of decision makers in ways that change their subjective 
evaluations of choice options” (Weber, 2012, p. 387). Following classical definitions, 
framing effects occur when the same (equivalent) information presented in different 
ways leads to systematically different decisions (Sher & McKenzie, 2011). According to 
this definition, translating information by reframing it includes formally, logically, and 
mathematically equivalent information presentation as illustrated by the following 
examples. Framing the call for blood donations as death-preventing rather than as life-
saving raised the amount of blood donations in one study (Chou & Murnighan, 2013). 
Another study using this technique aimed at increasing teacher performance. By paying 
end-of-the-year bonuses for teachers in advance, bonuses were presented as 
conditionally awarded money which had to be paid back at the end of the year in case of 
poor performance (Fryer, Levitt, List, & Sadoff, 2012). But harnessing loss aversion is 
only one process that the reframing technique can draw on. Since the framing of 
probability and quantity estimates affects their communicative content (Halberg & 
Teigen, 2009), a reframing intervention can aim at influencing patients’ decisions when 
confronted with health statistics (Gigerenzer, Gaissmaier, Kurz-Milcke, Schwartz, & 
Woloshin, 2007). Whereas strict definitions of framing require equivalence, the term is 
often also used in a more loose sense including “linguistic redescriptions of the same 
decision problem” (Krüger, Vogel, & Wänke, p. 13). For choice architects it follows that 
variants of the reframe technique may not be equivalent as long as they target the same 
behavior and refer to the same decision problem. Reframing hygiene measures in a 
hospital to emphasize the patient’s rather than the doctor’s health is such an example of 
reframing decision-relevant information to target doctors’ overconfidence in their own 
resilience (Grant & Hofmann, 2011). Clearly, the health frames are not logically 
equivalent (because doctors’ health and patients’ health are not the same) and do not 
suffice the criteria of a strict framing definition. However, the same target behavior 
(hand hygiene) is described with the same information (hygiene prevents disease) by 
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varying the framing of its consequences (me vs. others) and thus suffices a loose framing 
definition.  
To count as a reframing, non-equivalent frames must not reveal new information as 
e.g. by making it visible (cf. technique A2) but rather shift the focus of decision makers 
by presenting existing information differently. This is exactly what equivalent frames 
also do. 
  Simplify. An alternative way of making existing information more helpful to 
decision makers is simplification, i.e., reducing the burden of cognitive effort necessary 
to process the information available and increase its usefulness in the decision making 
process. Simplification can, for instance, adjust for constraints in cognitive capacity and 
understanding. This technique can be easily implemented and substantially improve 
decision making because in many situations relevant information is theoretically 
available but practically underused. Simplified information has been shown to increase 
college enrolment rates and financial aid application rates (Bettinger, Long, Oreopoulos, 
& Sanbonmatsu, 2009). Micro-entrepreneurs with little knowledge of accounting or 
economic decision making also profit from simplification, such as the provision of rules 
of thumb (Drexler, Fischer, & Schoar, 2010). Further simplifications concern numerical 
information, e.g., on fuel efficiency (Larrick & Soll, 2008; Soll, Keeney, & Larrick, 2013). 
Generally, simplification facilitates processing existing information in a given decision 
situation and refers only to available information that is simplified (e.g., by translating it 
into plain language or understandable numerical formats). By contrast, reducing the 
number of options available to facilitate processing does not count as a simplification 
because it changes the decision structure and goes beyond information translation. 
  Make information visible (A2). Frequently, the information necessary for 
making a decision or for changing behavior is not apparent or readily available. For 
example, the daily amount of calories we consume can be made available for decision 
making by simple measurement and disclosure. Many current approaches to public 
policy strive to provide easier access to information that is normally invisible, such as 
annual credit card statements informing consumers how they have used their credit 
card or energy performance certificates containing information about house insulation 
(cf. Cabinet Office, Behavioural Insights Team, 2011b, chapter 1). 
  Make own behavior visible (feedback). Feedback can have a powerful 
influence on behavior (Hattie & Timperley, 2007). In particular, behavioral 
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consequences are often invisible in situations where feedback is infrequent or 
temporally and spatially disconnected from decision making. Such a lack of feedback 
manifests in both common behaviors (people taking a shower lack feedback on their 
consumption of water and energy) as well as infrequent situations (the annual utility bill 
aggregates a multitude of past energy consumption behaviors). More direct feedback on 
behavior can have various forms, including smart electricity meters displaying energy 
consumption (Jessoe & Rapson, 2014) as well as segmentation cues, such as including a 
red potato chip for every five chips, allowing an individual to track the amount of food 
already consumed (Geier, Wansink, & Rozin, 2012). In many cases, providing feedback 
about one’s own behavior counteracts the constraints in attention and processing 
capacity that make this information inaccessible in daily life. Tools and devices that 
provide feedback (such as pedometers for counting steps) are becoming increasingly 
popular as part of a recent trend in self-optimization (Lubans, Morgan, & Tudor-Locke, 
2009).  
  Make external information visible. Apart from the consequences of one’s own 
behavior, much external decision-relevant information is also frequently unavailable, 
and making this information visible can empower decision makers. For example, when 
information about restaurant hygiene was bundled and conveniently displayed at the 
front door with a colored label, people could more easily choose to avoid unsanitary 
restaurants and the incidence of food-borne disease was reduced (Simon et al., 2005). 
Sponsor-a-child programs work similarly by ensuring the visibility of the donation’s 
purpose (Small & Loewenstein, 2003). The visibility of relevant information is already a 
key tenant of consumer-protection (e.g., food nutrition labelling). The American 
government website www.data.gov provides another example of a large-scale attempt to 
facilitate access to external information. In contrast to feedback which is, in principle, 
available but requires effort to obtain, external information as mentioned in the 
examples above usually remains inaccessible if it is not made visible through choice 
architecture. 
  Provide social reference point (A3). People neither make decisions nor 
behave in total isolation, but in a social and cultural environment. Within this 
environment, the behavior of others influences the behavior of the individual and serves 
as a social reference point (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). The behavior of other people can 
appear in the form of group behavior or behavior of specific persons valued for special 
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reasons, such as knowledge, fame, group membership, or a specific function (teacher, 
parent, or role model). Providing such social reference points is therefore a choice 
architecture technique that encompasses Allport’s (1968) observation that “the thought, 
feeling and behavior of individuals are influenced by the actual, imagined, or implied 
presence of others“ (p. 3). 
  Refer to descriptive norm. Descriptive social norms depict the observable 
behavior of other people, i.e., what others actually do, in contrast to injunctive norms 
describing what one should do (Bicchieri & Xiao, 2009; Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990). 
Choice architecture interventions which refer decision-makers to pertinent descriptive 
norms might draw on a variety of cognitive processes. According to Cialdini and 
Goldstein (2004), what drives people to follow norms is situational ambiguity and 
behavioral uncertainty combined with the goals to behave appropriately, receive 
approval, and maintain a positive self-concept. This manifests, e.g., in experiments on 
the bystander effect, in which people ignored smoke in a room if other people in the 
room ignored it (Latane & Darley, 1968). The need to belong (cf. social identity theory, 
Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and the fear of ostracism (cf. Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004) are 
further drivers for aligning one’s behavior with others.  
Empirical evidence about the efficiency of social norms comes from various fields. 
People informed about the energy consumption or recycling behavior of their neighbors 
adjusted their own behavior as a consequence (Allcott & Mullainathan, 2010; Cotterill, 
Moseley, & Richardson, 2012; Dolan & Metcalfe, 2013; Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, 
& Griskevicius, 2007). In a classic study, the reuse of towels in a hotel room depended on 
the information people were given stating whether other hotel guests had used their 
towels more than once (Goldstein, Cialdini, & Griskevicius, 2008). Aside from 
environmental behavior, social norms have been shown to help lessen student 
substance abuse by pointing out that the majority of students do not drink to excess 
(DeJong et al., 2006; Perkins, 2003). Contributions to charity (Shang & Croson, 2009), 
environmental protection behaviors (Cialdini, 2003), and voting in elections (Bond et al., 
2012; Gerber & Rogers, 2009) are also influenced by social norms. As all techniques, 
referring to the descriptive norms might also work contrary to the intention of the 
choice architect. Complaints about low voter turnout or teacher absence in developing 
countries can worsen such problems by the same process that can be used to improve 
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them: the contagious impact of others’ behavior (Chaudhury, Hammer, Kremer, 
Muralidharan, & Rogers, 2006). 
 Refer to opinion leader. As known from dual processing models (Chaiken, 
1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), the source of information matters in addition to its 
contents. Highly valued, respected messengers (e.g., experts or role models) can 
influence opinions and behavior. From advertising to communicating health topics or 
technological innovation, opinion leaders are used as information disseminators to 
improve the impact of campaigning (Leonard-Barton, 1985; for a review, see Valente & 
Pumpuang, 2007). In development aid, changing the behavior of opinion leaders has 
been shown to improve the acceptance of safer and healthier non-traditional cook 
stoves (Miller & Mobarak, 2013). This technique makes use of peripheral processing 
(Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). With increasingly far-reaching social networks and 
heightened complexity in many domains, opinion leaders appear to be powerful social 
reference points, and thus this intervention technique can be a useful tool for choice 
architects. 
Decision structure 
A choice architect will not always be able to influence information presentation and 
as a consequence may be unable to use one of the techniques described above. In such 
cases, the choice architect can revert to techniques addressing the decision structure, 
i.e., the arrangement of options and the decision making format, which includes setting 
defaults, rearranging the composition of options, and changing option-related efforts or 
consequences. 
  Change choice defaults (B1). Defaults are pre-selected options that leave 
decision makers the freedom to actively select a different option. Research has shown 
that in many situations people accept the default. This effect is present in both minor 
decisions such as online privacy settings (Johnson, Bellman, & Lohse, 2002) and more 
important decisions concerning pension savings (Thaler & Benartzi, 2004), end-of-life-
care (Halpern et al., 2013), and organ donation (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003). The effect 
of defaults on behavior is caused by a number of different processes, including effort 
reduction, implied endorsement, and the unwillingness to give up the status quo when it 
is understood as an endowment (Dinner et al., 2011; McKenzie et al., 2006). 
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  Set no-action default. No-action defaults “refer to what happens in the absence 
of choice” (Dinner et al., 2011, p. 332) and can range from universal mass defaults to 
custom-made personalized defaults based on past behavior or past choices (Goldstein, 
Johnson, Herrmann, & Heitmann, 2008; Sunstein, 2013). Clever defaults can also help 
bridge the gap between intentions and behavior, such as in the choice of green 
electricity, which is favored by far more people than those who actually opt for it. When 
green energy was the default in a field experiment, more people used green energy 
compared to the traditional grey energy that was offered as the default in most 
communities (Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008; Sunstein & Reisch, 2013). Other fields in 
which setting defaults is used as a choice architecture intervention are financial 
behavior (Beshears, Choi, Laibson, & Madrian, 2009), medical decision making (Ansher 
et al., 2014), and health care (Halpern, Ubel, & Asch, 2007). Even room temperature in 
offices depended on the default in a field experiment, although not when the default 
setting was too extreme (Brown, Johnstone, Haščič, Vong, & Barascud, 2013).The size of 
a unit (e.g., a cup, a plate, a suitcase) also serves as a default. In restaurants, it may often 
be plate size rather than hunger which determines how much people eat (Wansink, 
2006), as plate size is often taken for granted as an indicator of the appropriate amount 
of food (Geier, Rozin, & Doros, 2006; Kallbekken & Sælen, 2013). As illustrated by these 
very heterogeneous examples, default-setting can be applied successfully to promote 
behavior change in many different fields. Successfully using defaults in choice 
architecture is easier with homogeneous target groups. For controversial decisions or 
for very heterogeneous target groups, determining the optimal default can prove 
difficult (Choi, Laibson, Madrian, & Metrick, 2003). 
  Use prompted choice. For heterogeneous target groups, prompted choice, i.e., 
forcing people to actively decide without a preexisting default, can be more suitable than 
defaults. Prompted choice avoids the status-quo bias or default effects due to inertia or 
assumed recommendations. However, enforcing active choice and deliberation may give 
cognitive biases more influence due to greater reflection (Amir & Lobel, 2008). Thus, 
one bias (status quo bias) might just be replaced by another bias (e.g., choice aversion). 
As discussed by Sunstein (2014), further complexities might arise through prompted 
choice especially when people actively “choose not to choose”. With the power and 
limits of defaults in mind, it must be a case by case decision of the choice architect 
whether to actively set defaults or make a decision mandatory. In any case, 
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knowledgeable choice architects can avoid disadvantageous defaults, such as one-sided 
printing preselected at most printers (Egebark & Ekström, 2013). 
  Change option-related effort (B2). The effort involved in choosing an option 
plays an important role in determining which of several options people choose. The 
higher the effort for choosing an option, the more this effort acts as a barrier. However, 
to qualify as choice architecture and differ from standard economic transaction costs, 
the change in effort should only be marginal which excludes imposing unsurmountable 
(economic or behavioral) costs on the decision maker (which would clearly not be in 
line with the metaphor of just giving a slight ‘nudge’, either). What exactly counts as a 
marginal effort is difficult to quantify and differs between situations and people but 
relatively little extra effort should not justify behavior change on rational grounds. 
Changing physical or financial effort modifies the decision structure. Note that choice 
architects can also modify the cognitive effort required; however, this alters the way 
decision-relevant information is presented and is thus covered in the section on decision 
information. 
  Increase / decrease physical effort. The physical effort necessary to realize a 
behavior is determined by a variety of factors, such as the accessibility or distance of a 
target object. The little extra effort introduced by a choice architect should not justify 
behavior change according to a rational cost-benefit analysis or else efforts would be 
standard economic transaction costs. Still, these marginal physical facilitations or 
barriers can lead to significant behavior change. Making an apple easier to grasp than 
less healthy alternatives is discussed as an example for promoting healthy choices in a 
situation where hunger or appetite deplete self-control, leading to regrettable decisions. 
More generally, facilitating access to healthy food options and increasing the effort 
needed to choose the unhealthy option by “changing places” (Ashe, Graff, & Spector, 
2011) can support people in their intention to eat healthier (Wansink, 2004). In 
development aid, decreasing the effort for farmers to get fertilizer simply by delivering it 
to them helped raise fertilizer use and thus increased crop yield (Duflo, Kremer, & 
Robinson, 2011). The effort to clear out the attic entailed by opting for installing an 
energy-saving insulation is another example for a physical effort that functions as a 
“hassle factor” (Caird, Roy, & Herring, 2008) for people to use more efficient insulation.  
  Increase / decrease financial effort. We suggest the term “financial effort” to 
designate issues paralleling the concept of physical effort in decisions concerning 
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financial transactions. Independent of the actual amount in question, people perceive 
the realization of financial transactions as more or less costly. Choice architects can 
intervene to change the factors determining this perception of financial effort. Note that 
the economic fundamentals of an option such as the final price remain unchanged or 
else the technique would not differ from classical benefits. Examples include postponing 
costs to the future without changing actual final costs. This intervention was suggested 
by the British government in their “Green Deal”: allowing citizens to pay for more 
energy efficient appliances or technologies using the savings generated by these should 
reduce the barrier of adopting green technology which pays off in the long run but poses 
high costs immediately (Cabinet Office, Behavioural Insights Team, 2011a). The 
otherwise discouraging financial effort tied to an investment that ultimately pays off is 
thus spread out over a larger period and perceived as smaller. Human tendencies to 
discount the future (costs and benefits) more than the present and limited self-control 
lead to different perceptions of the effort connected to a financial transaction depending 
on its timing (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992; O'Donoghue & Rabin, 1999). 
Correspondingly, people save more money if they can opt for raising the amount saved 
in the future as opposed to increasing it on the spot (Thaler & Benartzi, 2004). The same 
applies to donations: when people were asked to increase their donations starting in the 
future (“Give more tomorrow”), the increase in donations was 32 % higher than in a 
control group asked to give more immediately (Breman, 2011). Furthermore, small but 
frequent donations are not perceived to be as costly as single large donations. Choice 
architects can make use of this so called “peanuts effect” (Weber & Chapman, 2005) by 
shaping the perception of effort connected to a financial decision. 
  Change range or composition of options (B3). Choice architects can not only 
change how something is presented but also what is presented to influence the relative 
attractiveness of choice options (Chang & Liu, 2008). Assuming that fixed preferences do 
not always guide behavior entails that many preferences are constructed in the decision 
situation and thus depend heavily on the alternatives offered (Ariely, Loewenstein, & 
Prelec, 2003; Slovic, 1995). For example, decoy alternatives (Huber, Payne, & Puto, 
1982), i.e., the introduction of additional expensive options, are used strategically to 
influence consumer decisions (Heath & Chatterjee, 1995). 
  Change categories / grouping. Because resources like money or time are 
limited for most individuals, they have to be allocated across different goals following 
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some rationale. This necessity is a gateway for cognitive biases, among them the 
diversification bias, i.e., the tendency to divide resources by the amount of available 
categories and allocating them evenly (Fox, Ratner, & Lieb, 2005). A related bias is 
mental accounting (Thaler, 1999), i.e., treating a fungible resource like money as non-
fungible between purposes (borrowing money to avoid taking money from a savings 
account). Studies have also found that a higher amount of money is spent when it 
appears in small units ($1 bills) than larger units ($20 bills) (labeled “denomination 
effect” by Raghubir and Srivastava, 2009). Allocation biases, such as the diversification 
bias, variety seeking, mental accounting, and the denomination effect, have a large 
influence on how people allocate available resources in decision situations. A choice 
architect can thus tactically arrange the respective categories or allocation alternatives, 
such as segregating healthy options into more diverse categories (Kahn & Wansink, 
2004), partitioning safety and style attributes of a car differently (Martin & Norton, 
2009), or presenting more fine grained, segregated charity purposes instead of 
presenting an overall goal (Fox et al., 2005). 
  Change option consequences (B4). Choice architects can also modify the 
consequences of decision options. This appears similar to incentivizing or 
disincentivizing particular behaviors. However, in contrast to the classical rational 
choice cost-benefit paradigm (according to which considerable (monetary) reasons for 
or against a behavior are provided), choice architecture provides ‘micro-incentives’, i.e., 
changes of the consequences of decision options that are insignificant from a rational 
choice perspective (e.g., providing an improbable chance of winning a lottery or 
requiring middle class shoppers to pay five cents for a shopping bag, cf. Homonoff, 
2012). If this kind of intervention is effective, the choice behavior is affected by 
processes aside from rational cost-benefit analyses. From an intervention perspective, 
one can distinguish the manipulation of small, individual monetary benefits/costs from 
the social consequences of a choice option. 
  Connect decision to benefit or cost. Independent of the effort directly entailed 
by realizing a behavior (cf. above), the behavior might trigger additional costs or 
benefits. Connecting a desired behavior to a small benefit or an undesired behavior to a 
small cost changes the probability of occurrence, even if the respective benefit or cost is 
too small to “significantly [change the] economic incentives” (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 
6). While we acknowledge that it is difficult to draw a hard line separating “significant” 
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from “insignificant” incentives, there are some clear examples. In one study, introducing 
a five-cent tax for shopping bags substantially reduced bag-use in US middle class 
supermarkets (Homonoff, 2012), but five cents is not a significant monetary incentive to 
middle class shoppers. In another study, offering participation in a lottery for each day 
that people took their medication properly generated an insignificant chance for a small 
payoff but did increase the regularity of taking medication (Volpp et al., 2008). In line 
with Thaler and Sunstein (2008), we posit that interventions involving such “micro-
incentives” as a 5 cent tax for shopping bags are different from classical incentive 
schemes such as 35 % price cuts. However, it is not yet understood precisely how micro-
incentives work. Lotteries might harness the tendency to overweigh small probabilities, 
whereas a micro-tax or the prospect of missing out on a small benefit already mentally 
booked as property might harness loss aversion. Note that choice architecture 
cost/benefit interventions serve as additional motivators for people, not as persuasive 
arguments as in advertising.  
  Change social consequences. The range of consequences that a choice option 
might have for an individual extends beyond (small) monetary costs and benefits. For 
example, consequences might also concern the social integrity of the individual. Choice 
architects can connect the choice of a specific option with the consequence to be 
regarded more positively or more negatively by others. This might draw, e.g., on image 
motivation as the desire to be liked and well-regarded by others, a concept which has 
been suggested to be “a driver in prosocial behavior” (Ariely, Bracha, & Meier, 2009). 
Likewise, competitive altruism (Barclay & Willer, 2007; van Vugt, Roberts, & Hardy, 
2007) and costly signaling theory (Glazer & Konrad, 1996; Griskevicius et al., 2007) have 
been proposed to explain altruistic decisions through the socio-communicative 
messages associated with altruistic behavior and the desire for social approval. In 
addition to demonstrating socially desirable behavior, altruistic decisions signal the 
ability to spend money, time or effort on these decisions without suffering from 
disadvantages. In one study, activating status motives made people choose 
environmentally friendly products more often in a public situation where positive self-
presentation through choice-behavior was possible (Griskevicius, Tybur, & van den 
Bergh, 2010). Choice architects can create such self-serving presentation possibilities for 
a desirable behavior. As an example for connecting a behavioral alternative to negative 
social consequences, in the Grameen model of microcredit a loan is given to each 
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member of a group only after the previous loan receiver has returned the loan. Not 
repaying is thus connected to the consequence of peer pressure by the others waiting for 
their loan (Auwal, 1996). 
Decision assistance 
Besides working on information and options, choice architects can provide decision-
makers with further assistance to help them follow through with their intentions. To do 
so, choice architects can remind individuals of the preferred alternative in the decision 
situation and foster deliberate commitment to beneficial actions.  
  Provide reminders (C1). Within the daily flood of information and new stimuli, 
information that is salient and easy to access has a higher chance of guiding behavior 
and decisions. Oftentimes, however, important information is not salient and thus, due 
to limits in attention and cognitive capacity, it is not considered. Choice architects can 
intervene by providing positive reminders that heighten the salience of a desired option, 
e.g., reminding people of socially desirable concepts such as voting (Greenwald, Carnot, 
Beach, & Young, 1987) or honesty (Shu, Mazar, Gino, Ariely, & Bazerman, 2012). More 
specifically, reminding bank clients via text messages or letters of saving more increased 
savings in a field study, especially if reminders highlighted particular savings goals 
(Karlan, McConnell, Mullainathan, & Zinman, 2010). In addition to providing positive 
reminders, choice architects can also intervene to oppress cues which remind people of 
an undesired option. Choice architects can diminish the salience of undesired options or 
external cues that hint towards them by, e.g., putting unhealthy food in non-see-through 
containers (Wansink, Just, & Payne, 2009), or positioning unhealthy food options in the 
middle of the menu instead of at the beginning or at the end where they would have 
primacy or recency advantages of being chosen (Dayan & Bar-Hillel, 2011; Li & Epley, 
2009).  
Providing reminders should not be confused with the make information visible 
technique, which refers to making previously unknown or inaccessible information 
accessible to decision makers; providing reminders only changes the position of familiar 
stimuli by moving them into or out of the attention focus. 
  Facilitate commitment (C2). Private or public commitment towards certain 
behaviors makes individuals more likely to follow through because it counteracts self-
control problems. Deviations lead to cognitive dissonance or the need to justify the 
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deviation in front of others. Facilitating commitment is thus a way to help people to 
overcome constrained self-control and bridge the intention-behavior gap. 
  Support self-commitment. As research on self-commitment has shown, people 
understand their own deficits in self-control such as temptation or procrastination and 
try to work against them by self-imposing deadlines (Ariely & Wertenbroch, 2002). 
Commitment devices, i.e., arrangements “with the aim of helping fulfil a plan” (Bryan, 
Karlan, & Nelson, 2010, p. 1), such as websites offering to formalize a commitment and 
set up a penalty for deviance (e.g., www.stickk.com), are choice architecture 
interventions tailored to support willpower when it reaches its limits. Other suggestions 
include addicted gamblers putting their name on a ban list (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008), 
browser applications blocking internet access for specific times, or depositing money to 
foster smoking cessation (Giné, Karlan, & Zinman, 2010). Among the processes 
harnessed by many of these self-commitments is cognitive dissonance that arises when 
goals (commitments) and action (behavior, decisions) are inconsistent. 
  Support public commitment. In a similar vein, commitments can be made in 
front of other people, thus introducing another “supervisor” in addition to the self. 
Publicly committing to a behavior (working out) or to refrain from a behavior (smoking) 
creates external pressure and possibly negative consequences in case of breaking the 
commitment (like face-management problems or a heightened need to justify one’s 
behavior). Effects of public commitment have been found in studies on recycling 
behavior (Cotterill, John, Liu, & Nomura, 2009; DeLeon & Fuqua, 1995), weight loss 
(Nyer & Dellande, 2010), or formalized agreements between parents and schools 
(Evans, Hall, & Wreford, 2008). The degree of formality of public-commitment 
interventions can vary from simple public announcements or pledges up to formal 
written agreements, but in all cases the commitment is voluntary, preserving freedom of 
choice as in any choice architecture technique. The choice architect’s task is to create 
and support public commitment possibilities. 
Note that public commitment and changing the social consequences of a decision may 
work due to the same process (social pressure) but still represent separate 
interventions, as they are of different intervention types: connecting a choice to a social 
consequence (e.g., publicly appearing as an altruist / egoist) is a different intervention 
than providing an opportunity for public commitment. Public commitment likely does 
not work exclusively due to anticipated social pressure but also due to further processes 
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like preference for consistency (Cialdini, Trost, & Newsom, 1995). This illustrates our 
claim that, even if we separate interventions from processes, process overlap between 
intervention techniques remains possible. However, this overlap is exactly what allows 
the choice architect to design interventions: while she might not be able to install a 
commitment device, she might be able to connect a decision option with a positive social 
consequence. Thus, the separation of intervention techniques that work partially due to 
the same processes ensures the greatest flexibility for the choice architect to design 
intervention strategies. 
Discussion 
We have proposed a theoretical framework for choice architecture consisting of 
nine intervention techniques inductively derived from an analysis of documented 
empirical examples of choice architecture. The techniques target the provision of 
decision information, changes in the decision structure, and measures of decision 
assistance. These techniques structure options for designing choice architecture 
interventions as opposed to the underlying processes (cognitive biases or mental 
constraints) and thus belong to the prescriptive branch of the judgment and decision-
making tree (cf. Baron, 2010). A potential benefit of a systematic framework of 
techniques summarizing concrete cases is its power to sharpen the concept of choice 
architecture in a bottom-up approach. 
The nine techniques are conceived of as ideal types which can be found in different 
combinations in real-world situations. Furthermore, as we have pointed out, 
differentiating between the techniques is ultimately an issue of definition (cf. reminders vs. 
make visible or public commitment vs. social consequences). While the chosen method of 
inductive category development facilitates the development of a testable taxonomy, both 
throughout category development (developing definitions) and in using the categories 
(applying the definitions), subjective decisions are unavoidable. Hence, raters may 
disagree on the correct classification of a specific intervention, in particular if raters differ 
by educational background, training, or experience. On the other hand, a quantitative 
method to reduce data and detect latent categories like multidimensional scaling, even if 
requiring less interpretation, would hardly lead to a sufficiently fine-grained solution. This 
holds true, in particular, for categorizing choice architecture interventions which cannot 
easily be transformed into numerical data but are available as text data. Qualitative 
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differences between such interventions are thus better captured using a qualitative 
method. It is important to take measures to maximize intersubjectivity, both during 
category development (all cases were discussed by at least three researchers) and after 
finalizing category development. Therefore, inter-rater agreement in applying the 
categories was tested with four independent raters. The resulting kappa coefficient 
reflects the expectable amount of subjectivity involved while still allowing to conclude 
that the categories have proven inter-subjectively replicable.  
Given the growth of new evidence from the heterogeneous field of choice architecture, 
we expect an inductively generated framework such as the one we propose to further 
develop in the future. As this is a cumulative process, additions are likely (Michie et al., 
2008), but we assume that additions will primarily concern the subtypes which illustrate 
the techniques rather than representing an exhaustive list of subcategories. 
We agree with Lunn (2012), who concludes in a review on choice architecture in 
policy making that the field is too complex to suggest a straightforward toolkit for 
generalists. Instead of a toolkit, we suggest that choice architects use the nine 
techniques to determine which one could be applicable to a specific challenge. By 
synthesizing evidence and providing a method to structure and evaluate interventions, 
taxonomies support the transfer of and access to successful interventions (Michie, 
Jochelson, Markham, & Bridle, 2009). This has been demonstrated domain-specifically, 
e.g. in public health (Michie et al., 2012) as well as across domains (Michie et al., 2013). 
Similarly, the presented framework is expected to facilitate the identification of 
potentials (generalizations) and pitfalls. Specific life circumstances (e.g., poverty, see 
Mani, Mullainathan, Shafir, & Zhao, 2013) or interpersonal differences (Beshears, Choi, 
Laibson, & Madrian, 2010) might impede transfer of interventions across situations. 
Thus, empirical testing remains crucial for clarifying what works. 
 To date, empirical evidence on the limitations and success conditions of choice 
architecture remains scarce (see Heilmann, 2013 for a methodological perspective on 
success conditions). Setting aside those situations in which choice architecture is not the 
most promising approach, it is clear that where it works, it likely provides a less costly 
way to change behavior than alternative measures. If we have a clearly defined target 
behavior and understand how cognitive biases or constraints affect the behavioral 
target-actual gap, then the proposed framework can contribute to designing promising 
testable choice architecture interventions. 
Paper 1: A review and taxonomy of choice architecture techniques | 77 
 
 
References 
Abraham, C., & Michie, S. (2008). A taxonomy of behavior change techniques used in 
interventions. Health Psychology, 27, 379–387. 
Abrahamse, W., Steg, L., Vlek, C., & Rothengatter, T. (2005). A review of intervention 
studies aimed at household energy conservation. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 
25, 273–291. doi:10.1016/j.jenvp.2005.08.002   
Allcott, H., & Mullainathan, S. (2010). Behavior and energy policy. Science, 327, 1204–
1205. 
Allport, G. W. (1968). The person in psychology: Selected essays. Boston, MA: Beacon 
Press. 
Amir, O., & Lobel, O. (2008). Stumble, predict, nudge: How behavioral economics informs 
law and policy. Columbia Law Review, 108, 2098–2137. 
Ansher, C., Ariely, D., Nagler, A., Rudd, M., Schwartz, J., & Shah, A. (2014). Better medicine 
by default. Medical Decision Making, 34, 147–158. doi:10.1177/0272989X13507339   
Ariely, D., Bracha, A., & Meier, S. (2009). Doing good or doing well? Image motivation and 
monetary incentives in behaving prosocially. The American Economic Review, 99, 544–
555. doi:10.2307/29730196   
Ariely, D., Loewenstein, G., & Prelec, D. (2003). "Coherent arbitrariness": Stable demand 
curves without stable preferences. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118, 73–106. 
doi:10.1162/00335530360535153   
Ariely, D., & Wertenbroch, K. (2002). Procrastination, deadlines, and performance: Self-
control by precommitment. Psychological Science, 13, 219–224. 
Ashe, M., Graff, S., & Spector, C. (2011). Changing places: Policies to make a healthy 
choice the easy choice. Public Health, 125, 889–895. doi:10.1016/j.puhe.2011.04.010   
Auwal, M. A. (1996). Promoting microcapitalism in the service of the poor: The Grameen 
Model and its cross-cultural adaptation. Journal of Business Communication, 33, 27–
49. doi:10.1177/002194369603300105   
Banerjee, A. V., & Duflo, E. (2011). Poor economics: A radical rethinking of the way to fight 
global poverty. New York, NY: Public Affairs. 
Barclay, P., & Willer, R. (2007). Partner choice creates competitive altruism in humans. 
Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 274, 749–753. 
Paper 1: A review and taxonomy of choice architecture techniques | 78 
 
 
Baron, J. (2010). [Review of the book Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth, 
and happiness, by R. H. Thaler & C. Sunstein]. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 
23, 224–226. doi:10.1002/bdm.652   
Baumeister, R. F., & Heatherton, T. F. (1996). Self-regulation failure: An overview. 
Psychological Inquiry, 7, 1–15. 
Beshears, J., Choi, J., Laibson, D., & Madrian, B. (2010). The limitations of defaults (NBER 
Retirement Research Center Paper No. NB 10-02). Retrieved from the National 
Bureau of Economic Research website: 
http://www.nber.org/aging/rrc/papers/onb10-02  
Beshears, J., Choi, J. J., Laibson, D., & Madrian, B. C. (2009). The importance of default 
options for retirement saving outcomes: Evidence from the United States. In J. Brown, 
J. Liebman, & D. A. Wise (Eds.), Social security policy in a changing environment 
(pp. 167–195). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Bettinger, E. P., Long, B. T., Oreopoulos, P., & Sanbonmatsu, L. (2009). The role of 
simplification and information in college decisions: Results from the H&R Block FAFSA 
experiment (NBER Working Paper No. 1536). Retrieved from the National Bureau of 
Economic Research website: http://www.nber.org/papers/w15361.pdf  
Bicchieri, C., & Xiao, E. (2009). Do the right thing: but only if others do so. Journal of 
Behavioral Decision Making, 22, 191–208. 
Blumenthal-Barby, J. S., & Burroughs, H. (2012). Seeking better health care outcomes: 
The ethics of using the “nudge”. American Journal of Bioethics, 12(2), 1–10. 
doi:10.1080/15265161.2011.634481   
Bond, R. M., Fariss, C. J., Jones, J. J., Kramer, A. D. I., Marlow, C., Settle, J. E., & Fowler, J. H. 
(2012). A 61-million-person experiment in social influence and political mobilization. 
Nature, 489, 295–298. doi:10.1038/nature11421   
Breman, A. (2011). Give more tomorrow: Two field experiments on altruism and 
intertemporal choice. Journal of Public Economics, 95, 1349–1357. 
Brown, Z., Johnstone, N., Haščič, I., Vong, L., & Barascud, F. (2013). Testing the effect of 
defaults on the thermostat settings of OECD employees. Energy Economics, 39, 128–
134. doi:10.1016/j.eneco.2013.04.011   
Bryan, G., Karlan, D., & Nelson, S. (2010). Commitment devices. Annual Review of 
Econonomics, 2, 671–698. 
Paper 1: A review and taxonomy of choice architecture techniques | 79 
 
 
Cabinet Office, Behavioural Insights Team. (2010). Applying behavioural insight to health. 
Retrieved from 
http://nsmc.rechord.com/sites/default/files/403936_BehaviouralInsight_acc.pdf  
Cabinet Office, Behavioural Insights Team. (2011a). Behaviour change and energy use. 
Retrieved from http://www. cabinetoffice.gov.uk/resourcelibrary/behaviour-
change-and-energy-useS  
Cabinet Office, Behavioural Insights Team. (2011b). Better choices, better deals: 
Consumers powering growth. Retrieved from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/6
0540/better-choices-better-deals.pdf  
Caird, S., Roy, R., & Herring, H. (2008). Improving the energy performance of UK 
households: Results from surveys of consumer adoption and use of low-and zero-
carbon technologies. Energy Efficiency, 1, 149–166. 
Camerer, C., Loewenstein, G., & Rabin, M. (Eds.). (2004). Advances in behavioral 
economics. The Roundtable Series in Behavioral Economics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Chaiken, S. (1980). Heuristic versus systematic information processing and the use of 
source versus message cues in persuasion. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 39, 752-766. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.39.5.752   
Chang, C., & Liu, H. (2008). Which is the compromise option? Information format and 
task format as determinants. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 21, 59–75. 
Chaudhury, N., Hammer, J., Kremer, M., Muralidharan, K., & Rogers, F. H. (2006). Missing 
in action: Teacher and health worker absence in developing countries. The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 20, 91–116. 
Chenail, R. (2008). Categorization. In L. M. Given (Ed.), The Sage encyclopedia of 
qualitative research methods (pp. 73–74). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Choi, J. J., Laibson, D., Madrian, B. C., & Metrick, A. (2003). Optimal defaults. The American 
Economic Review, 93, 180–185. doi:10.2307/3132221   
Chou, E. Y., & Murnighan, J. K. (2013). Life or death decisions: Framing the call for help. 
PLoS ONE, 8, 1–6. 
Paper 1: A review and taxonomy of choice architecture techniques | 80 
 
 
Cialdini, R., Reno, R., & Kallgren, C. (1990). A focus theory of normative conduct: 
Recycling the concept of norms to reduce littering in public places. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 58, 1015–1026. 
Cialdini, R. B. (2003). Crafting normative messages to protect the environment. Current 
Directions in Psychological Science, 12, 105–109. doi:10.1111/1467-8721.01242   
Cialdini, R. B., & Goldstein, N. J. (2004). Social influence: Compliance and conformity. 
Annual Review of Psychology, 55, 591–621. 
Cialdini, R. B., Trost, M. R., & Newsom, J. T. (1995). Preference for consistency: The 
development of a valid measure and the discovery of surprising behavioral 
implications. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 318–328. 
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.69.2.318   
Corbin, J. M., & Strauss, A. L. (2008). Basics of qualitative research: Techniques and 
procedures for developing grounded theory. Los Angeles, CA: Sage Publications. 
Cornforth, A. (2009). Behaviour change: Insights for environmental policy making from 
social psychology and behavioural economics. Policy Quarterly, 5(4), 21–28. 
Cotterill, S., John, P., Liu, H., & Nomura, H. (2009). Mobilizing citizen effort to enhance 
environmental outcomes: A randomized controlled trial of a door-to-door recycling 
campaign. Journal of Environmental Management, 91, 403–410. 
Cotterill, S., Moseley, A., & Richardson, L. (2012). Can nudging create the Big Society? 
Experiments in civic behaviour and implications for the voluntary and public sectors. 
Voluntary Sector Review, 3, 265–274. 
Datta, S. & Mullainathan, S. (2012). Behavioral design: A new approach to development 
policy (CGD Policy Paper No. 016). Retrieved from the Center for Global Development 
website: http://www.cgdev.org/publication/behavioral-design-new-approach-
development-policy  
Dayan, E., & Bar-Hillel, M. (2011). Nudge to nobesity II: Menu positions influence food 
orders. Judgment and Decision Making, 6, 333–342. 
DeJong, W., Schneider, S. K., Towvim, L. G., Murphy, M. J., Doerr, E. E., Simonsen, N. R., … 
(2006). A multisite randomized trial of social norms marketing campaigns to reduce 
college student drinking. Journal of Studies on Alcohol and Drugs, 67, 868–879. 
Paper 1: A review and taxonomy of choice architecture techniques | 81 
 
 
DeLeon, I. G., & Fuqua, R. W. (1995). The effects of public commitment and group 
feedback on curbside recycling. Environment and Behavior, 27, 233–250. 
doi:10.1177/0013916595272007   
Dinner, I., Johnson, E. J., Goldstein, D. G., & Liu, K. (2011). Partitioning default effects: 
Why people choose not to choose. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 17, 
332–341. 
Dolan, P., Hallsworth, M., Halpern, D., King, D., Metcalfe, R., & Vlaev, I. (2012). Influencing 
behaviour: The mindspace way. Journal of Economic Psychology, 33, 264–277. 
Dolan, P. & Metcalfe, R. (2013). Neighbors, knowledge, and nuggets: Two natural field 
experiments on the role of incentives on energy conservation (CEP Discussion Paper No. 
1222). Retrieved from the London School of Economics Centre for Economic 
Performance website: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/51563/1/dp1222.pdf  
Doty, D. H., & Glick, W. H. (1994). Typologies as a unique form of theory building: 
Toward improved understanding and modeling. Academy of Management Review, 19, 
230–251. 
Drexler, A., Fischer, G., & Schoar, A. (2010). Keeping it simple: Financial literacy and rules 
of thumb. Paper contributed to the CEPR Development Economics Workshop, 
Barcelona. Retrieved from the Centre for Economic Policy Research 
website: http://dev3.cepr.org/meets/wkcn/7/784/papers/FischerFinal.pdf  
Duflo, E., Kremer, M., & Robinson, J. (2011). Nudging farmers to use fertilizer: Theory 
and experimental evidence from Kenya. American Economic Review, 101, 2350–2390. 
doi:10.1257/aer.101.6.2350   
Egebark, J. & Ekström, M. (2013). Can indifference make the world greener? (IFN Working 
Paper No. 975). Retrieved from the Social Science Research Network website: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2324922  
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Building theories from case study research. Academy of 
Management Review, 14, 532–550. 
Evans, L., Hall, L., & Wreford, S. (2008). Education-related parenting contracts evaluation 
(DCSF Report No. DCSF-RR030). Retrieved from the Department for Children, Schools 
and Families website: http://dera.ioe.ac.uk/7917/  
Fox, C. R., Ratner, R. K., & Lieb, D. S. (2005). How subjective grouping of options 
influences choice and allocation: Diversification bias and the phenomenon of partition 
Paper 1: A review and taxonomy of choice architecture techniques | 82 
 
 
dependence. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 134, 538–551. 
doi:10.1037/0096-3445.134.4.538   
Fryer, R. G., Levitt, S. D., List, J., & Sadoff, S. (2012). Enhancing the efficacy of teacher 
incentives through loss aversion: A Field Experiment (NBER Working Paper No. 1827). 
Retrieved from the National Bureau of Economic Research website: 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w18237  
Geier, A., Wansink, B., & Rozin, P. (2012). Red potato chips: Segmentation cues can 
substantially decrease food intake. Health Psychology, 31, 398–401. 
Geier, A. B., Rozin, P., & Doros, G. (2006). Unit bias: A new heuristic that helps explain the 
effect of portion size on food intake. Psychological Science, 17, 521–525. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01738.x   
Gerber, A. S., & Rogers, T. (2009). Descriptive social norms and motivation to vote: 
Everybody’s voting and so should you. The Journal of Politics, 71, 178–191. 
Gigerenzer, G., Gaissmaier, W., Kurz-Milcke, E., Schwartz, L. M., & Woloshin, S. (2007). 
Helping doctors and patients make sense of health statistics. Psychological Science in 
the Public Interest, 8, 53–96. 
Gigerenzer, G., & Todd, P. M. (1999). Simple heuristics that make us smart. New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press. 
Giné, X., Karlan, D., & Zinman, J. (2010). Put your money where your butt is: A 
commitment contract for smoking cessation. American Economic Journal: Applied 
Economics, 2, 213–235. 
Glazer, A., & Konrad, K. A. (1996). A signaling explanation for charity. The American 
Economic Review, 86, 1019–1028. doi:10.2307/2118317   
Goldstein, D. G., Johnson, E. J., Herrmann, A., & Heitmann, M. (2008). Nudge your 
customers toward better choices. Harvard Business Review, 86, 99–105. 
Goldstein, N. J., Cialdini, R. B., & Griskevicius, V. (2008). A room with a viewpoint: Using 
social norms to motivate environmental conservation in hotels. Journal of Consumer 
Research, 35, 472–482. doi:10.1086/586910   
Grant, A. M., & Hofmann, D. A. (2011). It’s not all about me: Motivating hand hygiene 
among health care professionals by focusing on patients. Psychological Science, 22, 
1494–1499. doi:10.1177/0956797611419172   
Paper 1: A review and taxonomy of choice architecture techniques | 83 
 
 
Greenwald, A. G., Carnot, C. G., Beach, R., & Young, B. (1987). Increasing voting behavior 
by asking people if they expect to vote. Journal of Applied Psychology, 72, 315–318. 
doi:10.1037/0021-9010.72.2.315   
Griskevicius, V., Tybur, J. M., Sundie, J. M., Cialdini, R. B., Miller, G. F., & Kenrick, D. T. 
(2007). Blatant benevolence and conspicuous consumption: When romantic motives 
elicit strategic costly signals. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93, 85–102. 
Griskevicius, V., Tybur, J. M., & van den Bergh, B. (2010). Going green to be seen: Status, 
reputation, and conspicuous conservation. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 98, 392–404. doi:10.1037/a0017346   
Halberg, A., & Teigen, K. H. (2009). Framing of imprecise quantities: When are lower 
interval bounds preferred to upper bounds? Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 
22, 490–509. 
Hallgren, K. A. (2012). Computing inter-rater reliability for observational data: An 
overview and tutorial. Tutorials in Quantitative Methods for Psychology, 8, 23–34. 
Halpern, S. D., Loewenstein, G., Volpp, K. G., Cooney, E., Vranas, K., Quill, C. M., … (2013). 
Default options in advance directives influence how patients set goals for end-of-life 
care. Health Affairs, 32, 408–417. doi:10.1377/hlthaff.2012.0895   
Halpern, S. D., Ubel, P. A., & Asch, D. A. (2007). Harnessing the power of default options 
to improve health care. New England Journal of Medicine, 357, 1340–1344. 
Hansen, P. G., & Jespersen, A. M. (2013). Nudge and the manipulation of choice: A 
framework for the responsible use of the nudge approach to behaviour change in 
public policy. European Journal of Risk Regulation, 1, 3–28. 
Hattie, J., & Timperley, H. (2007). The power of feedback. Review of Educational 
Research, 77, 81–112. doi:10.3102/003465430298487   
Heath, T. B., & Chatterjee, S. (1995). Asymmetric decoy effects on lower-quality versus 
higher-quality brands: Meta-analytic and experimental evidence. Journal of Consumer 
Research, 22, 268–284. doi:10.2307/2489613   
Heilmann, C. (2013). Success conditions for nudges: A methodological critique of 
libertarian paternalism. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 4, 1–20. 
doi:10.1007/s13194-013-0076-z   
Paper 1: A review and taxonomy of choice architecture techniques | 84 
 
 
Homonoff, T. A. (2012). Can small incentives have large effects? The impact of taxes versus 
bonuses on disposable bag use (Job Market Paper). Princeton University. Retrieved 
from http://www.princeton.edu/~homonoff/index_files/Page540.htm  
Huber, J., Payne, J. W., & Puto, C. (1982). Adding asymmetrically dominated alternatives: 
Violations of regularity and the similarity Hypothesis. Journal of Consumer Research, 
9, 90–98. doi:10.1086/208899   
Jessoe, K., & Rapson, D. (2014). Knowledge is (less) power: Experimental evidence from 
residential energy use. American Economic Review, 104, 1417–1438. 
doi:10.1257/aer.104.4.1417   
Johnson, E. J., Bellman, S., & Lohse, G. L. (2002). Defaults, framing and privacy: Why 
opting in-opting out. Marketing Letters, 13, 5–15. doi:10.1023/A:1015044207315   
Johnson, E. J., & Goldstein, D. (2003). Do defaults save lives? Science, 302, 1338–1339. 
Johnson, E. J., Shu, S. B., Dellaert, B. G. C., Fox, C., Goldstein, D. G., Häubl, G., … (2012). 
Beyond nudges: Tools of a choice architecture. Marketing Letters, 23, 487–504. 
Kahn, B. E., & Wansink, B. (2004). The influence of assortment structure on perceived 
variety and consumption quantities. Journal of Consumer Research, 30, 519–533. 
Kahneman, D. (2012). Foreword. In E. Shafir (Ed.), The behavioral foundations of public 
policy (pp. VII–IX). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Kallbekken, S., & Sælen, H. (2013). ‘Nudging’ hotel guests to reduce food waste as a win–
win environmental measure. Economics Letters, 119, 325–327. 
Karlan, D., McConnell, M., Mullainathan, S., & Zinman, J. (2010). Getting to the top of mind: 
How reminders increase saving (Center Discussion Paper, Economic Growth Center 
No. 988). Retrieved from the EconStor website: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59142  
Krüger, T., Vogel, T., & Wänke, M. (manuscript submitted for publication). Framing 
effects in consumer judgment and decision-making. In C. Jansson-Boyd & M. Z. 
Zawisza (Eds.), International Handbook of Consumer Psychology. Sussex, UK: Taylor & 
Francis.  
Landis, J. R., & Koch, G. G. (1977). The measurement of observer agreement for 
categorical data. Biometrics, 33, 159–174. 
Larrick, R. P., & Soll, J. B. (2008). The MPG illusion. Science, 320, 1593–1594. 
doi:10.1126/science.1154983   
Paper 1: A review and taxonomy of choice architecture techniques | 85 
 
 
Latane, B., & Darley, J. M. (1968). Group inhibition of bystander intervention in 
emergencies. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 10, 215–221. 
doi:10.1037/h0026570   
Leonard-Barton, D. (1985). Experts as negative opinion leaders in the diffusion of a 
technological innovation. Journal of Consumer Research, 11, 914–926. 
doi:10.2307/2489217   
Li, Y. E., & Epley, N. (2009). When the best appears to be saved for last: Serial position 
effects on choice. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 22, 378–389. 
Light, R. J. (1971). Measures of response agreement for qualitative data: Some 
generalizations and alternatives. Psychological Bulletin, 76, 365–377. 
Loewenstein, G., & Prelec, D. (1992). Anomalies in intertemporal choice: Evidence and 
an interpretation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107, 573–597. 
doi:10.2307/2118482   
Lubans, D. R., Morgan, P. J., & Tudor-Locke, C. (2009). A systematic review of studies 
using pedometers to promote physical activity among youth. Preventive Medicine, 48, 
307–315. 
Lunn, P. D. (2012). Behavioural economics and policymaking: Learning from the early 
adopters. Economic and Social Review, 43, 423–449. 
Ly, K., Mažar, N., Zhao, M., & Soman, D. (2013). A practitioner’s guide to nudging 
(Research Report Series Behavioural Economics in Action). Rotman School of 
Management, University of Toronto. Retrieved from the Rotman School of 
Management website: 
http://inside.rotman.utoronto.ca/behaviouraleconomicsinaction/practitioners-
guide-to-nudging/  
Mani, A., Mullainathan, S., Shafir, E., & Zhao, J. (2013). Poverty impedes cognitive 
function. Science, 341, 976–980. doi:10.1126/science.1238041   
Martin, J. M., & Norton, M. I. (2009). Shaping online consumer choice by partitioning the 
web. Psychology and Marketing, 26, 908–926. doi:10.1002/mar.20305   
Mayring, P. (2010). Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse : Grundlagen und Techniken: Pädagogik 
(11th ed.). Weinheim, Basel: Beltz. 
Paper 1: A review and taxonomy of choice architecture techniques | 86 
 
 
McKenzie, C. R., Liersch, M. J., & Finkelstein, S. R. (2006). Recommendations implicit in 
policy defaults. Psychological Science, 17, 414–420. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
9280.2006.01721.x   
Michie, S., Jochelson, K., Markham, W. A., & Bridle, C. (2009). Low-income groups and 
behaviour change interventions: a review of intervention content, effectiveness and 
theoretical frameworks. Journal of Epidemiology & Community Health, 63, 610–622. 
doi:10.1136/jech.2008.078725   
Michie, S., Johnston, M., Francis, J., Hardeman, W., & Eccles, M. (2008). From theory to 
intervention: Mapping theoretically derived behavioural determinants to behaviour 
Change Techniques. Applied Psychology, 57, 660–680. doi:10.1111/j.1464-
0597.2008.00341.x   
Michie, S., Richardson, M., Johnston, M., Abraham, C., Francis, J., Hardeman, W., … (2013). 
The behavior change technique taxonomy (v1) of 93 hierarchically clustered 
techniques: Building an international consensus for the reporting of behavior change 
interventions. Annals of behavioral medicine, 46, 81–95. 
Michie, S., van Stralen, M. M., & West, R. (2011). The behaviour change wheel: A new 
method for characterising and designing behaviour change interventions. 
Implementation Science, 6, 1–11. doi:10.1186/1748-5908-6-42   
Michie, S., Whittington, C., Hamoudi, Z., Zarnani, F., Tober, G., & West, R. (2012). 
Identification of behaviour change techniques to reduce excessive alcohol 
consumption. Addiction, 107, 1431–1440. doi:10.1111/j.1360-0443.2012.03845.x   
Miller, G., & Mobarak, A. M. (2013). Learning about new technologies through opinion 
leaders and social networks: Experimental evidence on non-traditional stoves in rural 
Bangladesh. Yale University. Retrieved from the Yale University 
website: http://faculty.som.yale.edu/mushfiqmobarak/stove_MS.pdftechnologies-
through-opinion-leaders-and-social-networks-experimental.pdf  
Nyer, P. U., & Dellande, S. (2010). Public commitment as a motivator for weight loss. 
Psychology and Marketing, 27, 1–12. 
O'Donoghue, T., & Rabin, M. (1999). Doing it now or later. The American Economic 
Review, 89, 103–124. doi:10.2307/116981   
Paper 1: A review and taxonomy of choice architecture techniques | 87 
 
 
Oliver, A. (2013). From nudging to budging: Using behavioural economics to inform 
public sector policy. Journal of Social Policy, FirstView, 1–16. 
doi:10.1017/S0047279413000299   
Payne, J. W., Bettman, J. R., & Johnson, E. J. (1988). Adaptive strategy selection in decision 
making. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 14, 
534–552. 
Payne, J. W., Bettman, J. R., & Johnson, E. J. (1992). Behavioral decision research: A 
constructive processing perspective. Annual review of psychology, 43, 87–131. 
Perkins, H. (Ed.). (2003). The social norms approach to preventing school and college age 
substance abuse: A handbook for educators, counselors, and clinicians. San Francisco, 
CA: Jossey-Bass. 
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986). The elaboration likelihood model of persuasion. In 
R. E. Petty & J. T. Cacioppo (Eds.), Communication and persuasion: Central and 
peripheral routes to attitude change (1st ed., pp. 1–24). New York, NY: Springer. 
Pichert, D., & Katsikopoulos, K. V. (2008). Green defaults: Information presentation and 
pro-environmental behaviour. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 28, 63–73. 
doi:10.1016/j.jenvp.2007.09.004   
Raghubir, P., & Srivastava, J. (2009). The denomination effect. Journal of Consumer 
Research, 36, 701–713. doi:10.1086/599222   
Schultz, P. W., Nolan, J. M., Cialdini, R. B., Goldstein, N. J., & Griskevicius, V. (2007). The 
constructive, destructive, and reconstructive power of social norms. Psychological 
Science, 18, 429–434. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01917.x   
Schwartz, B., Ward, A., Monterosso, J., Lyubomirsky, S., White, K., & Lehman, D. R. (2002). 
Maximizing versus satisficing: Happiness is a matter of choice. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 83, 1178–1197. 
Shafir, E. (2006). A behavioral perspective on consumer protection. Competition and 
Consumer Law Journal, 15, 302–317. 
Shafir, E. (Ed.). (2012). The behavioral foundations of public policy. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
Paper 1: A review and taxonomy of choice architecture techniques | 88 
 
 
Shang, J., & Croson, R. (2009). A field experiment in charitable contribution: The impact 
of social information on the voluntary provision of public goods. The Economic 
Journal, 119, 1422–1439. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02267.x   
Sheeran, P. (2002). Intention—behavior relations: A conceptual and empirical review. 
European Review of Social Psychology, 12, 1–36. doi:10.1080/14792772143000003   
Sher, S., & McKenzie, C. R. (2011). Levels of information: A framing hierarchy. In G. Keren 
(Ed.), Perspectives on framing (pp. 35–63). New York, NY: Psychology Press. 
Shu, L. L., Mazar, N., Gino, F., Ariely, D., & Bazerman, M. H. (2012). Signing at the 
beginning makes ethics salient and decreases dishonest self-reports in comparison to 
signing at the end. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States 
of America, 109, 15197–15200. doi:10.1073/pnas.1209746109   
Simon, H. A. (1955). A behavioral model of rational choice. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 69, 99–118. 
Simon, P. A., Leslie, P., Run, G., Jin, G. Z., Reporter, R., Aguirre, A., & Fielding, J. E. (2005). 
Impact of restaurant hygiene grade cards on foodborne-disease hospitalizations in 
Los Angeles County. Jounal of Environmental Health, 67(7), 32–36. 
Slovic, P. (1995). The construction of preference. American Psychologist, 50, 364–371. 
Small, D. A., & Loewenstein, G. (2003). Helping a victim or helping the victim: Altruism 
and identifiability. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 26, 5–16. 
Soll, J., Keeney, R., & Larrick, R. (2013). Consumer misunderstanding of credit card use, 
payments, and debt: Causes and solutions. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 32, 
66–81. 
Sunstein, C. R. (2013). Deciding by default. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 162, 
1–57. 
Sunstein, C. R. (2014). Choosing not to choose. Duke Law Journal, 64, 1–51. 
Sunstein, C. R., & Reisch, L. A. (2013). Green by default. Kyklos, 66, 398–402. 
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. In S. 
Worchel & W. G. Austin (Eds.), Psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 7–24). Chicago, 
IL: Nelson-Hall. 
Thaler, R. H. (1999). Mental accounting matters. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 
12, 183–206. 
Paper 1: A review and taxonomy of choice architecture techniques | 89 
 
 
Thaler, R. H., & Benartzi, S. (2004). Save More Tomorrow™: Using behavioral economics 
to increase employee saving. The Journal of Political Economy, 112, 164–187. 
Thaler, R. H., & Sunstein, C. R. (2008). Nudge: Improving decisions about health wealth 
and happiness. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Thaler, R. H., Sunstein, C. R., & Balz, J. P. (2010). Choice architecture (SSRN Working 
Paper Series No. 1583509). Retrieved from the Social Science Research Network 
website: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1583509  
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. 
Science, 185, 1124–1131. doi:10.1126/science.185.4157.1124   
Valente, T. W., & Pumpuang, P. (2007). Identifying opinion leaders to promote behavior 
change. Health Education & Behavior, 34, 881–896. doi:10.1177/1090198106297855   
van Vugt, M., Roberts, G., & Hardy, C. (2007). Competitive altruism: Development of 
reputation-based cooperation in groups. In R. I. M. Dunbar & L. Barrett (Eds.), Oxford 
handbook of evolutionary psychology (pp. 531–541). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Vlaev, I., & Dolan, P. (2015). Action change theory: A reinforcement learning perspective 
on behavior change. Review of General Psychology, 19, 69–95. 
Volpp, K. G., Loewenstein, G., Troxel, A. B., Doshi, J., Price, M., Laskin, M., & Kimmel, S. E. 
(2008). A test of financial incentives to improve warfarin adherence. BMC Health 
Services Research, 8, 272–277. doi:10.1186/1472-6963-8-272   
Wansink, B. (2004). Environmental factors that increase the food intake and 
consumption volume of unknowing consumers. Annual Review of Nutrition, 24, 455–
479. 
Wansink, B. (2006). Mindless eating: Why we eat more than we think. New York, NY: 
Bantam-Dell. 
Wansink, B., Just, D. R., & Payne, C. R. (2009). Mindless eating and healthy heuristics for 
the irrational. American Economic Review, 99, 165–169. doi:10.1257/aer.99.2.165   
Weber, B. J., & Chapman, G. B. (2005). Playing for peanuts: Why is risk seeking more 
common for low-stakes gambles? Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, 97, 31–46. 
Paper 1: A review and taxonomy of choice architecture techniques | 90 
 
 
Weber, E. U. (2012). Doing the right thing willingly: Using the insights of behavioral 
decision research for better environmental decisions. In E. Shafir (Ed.), The behavioral 
foundations of public policy (pp. 380–397). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
  
Paper 1: A review and taxonomy of choice architecture techniques | 91 
 
 
Table 1 
Choice architecture categories and techniques 
 
Category Technique 
D. Decision 
information 
A 1 Translate information 
 Includes: reframe, simplify 
 A 2 Make information visible 
 Includes: make own behavior visible (feedback), make external 
 information visible 
 A 3 Provide social reference point 
 Includes: refer to descriptive norm, refer to opinion leader 
E. Decision 
structure 
B 1 Change choice defaults 
 Includes: set no-action default, use prompted choice 
 B 2 Change option-related effort 
 Includes: increase/decrease physical/financial effort 
 B 3 Change range or composition of options 
 Includes: change categories, change grouping of options 
 B 4 Change option consequences 
 Includes: connect decision to benefit/cost, change social 
 consequences of the decision 
F. Decision 
assistance 
C 1 Provide reminders 
C 2 Facilitate commitment 
 Includes: support self-/public commitment 
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Abstract 
Defaults (i.e., preselected options that become effective without active choice) are 
becoming increasingly popular as the idea of nudging enters the political arena. Their 
interplay with individual attitudes is largely unknown. In two preregistered and highly 
powered experimental studies, we examined how defaults and attitudes interact to 
influence decision-making. In both studies, we manipulated the default electricity 
provider (gray versus green electricity sources) and measured environmental attitudes 
and attitude strength. The default manipulation and measures of attitude strength 
independently predicted people’s choices. Yet, we found no compelling evidence for an 
attenuated default effect for participants with strong preexisting attitudes. Implications 
for the concept of libertarian paternalism and the use of green defaults as a means for 
policymakers to foster pro-environmental choices are discussed.  
Keywords: defaults, attitude strength, choice architecture, nudge, ecological behavior 
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Nudge me if you can - How defaults and attitude strength interact to change behavior 
After the initial publication of the status quo bias and its consequences on choices 
(Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988), defaults have become a prominent concept in the 
discussion about how to apply behavioral insights to policy making and directed 
behavior change (Dolan et al., 2012; Shafir, 2012). Selecting a default, i.e., an option that 
becomes effective when no active choice is made, can be applied to various contexts, 
such as medical decision making (Ansher et al., 2014; Halpern et al., 2013), consumer 
choices (Brown & Krishna, 2004), or online privacy (Johnson, Bellman, & Lohse, 2002). 
Among the most frequently cited effects are the influence of defaults on organ donation 
(Johnson & Goldstein, 2003) and on contributions to retirement saving plans (Madrian & 
Shea, 2001). Another prominent field of application for choice architectures influencing 
behavior and decision making is environmental policy (Sunstein & Reisch, 2014) where 
defaults were used to explain the differences in adoption rates of renewable energy in 
German cities (Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008). 
Several processes have been suggested to cause default effects. All have received 
some empirical support without one explanation having emerged as the dominant yet. 
Decision inertia and the avoidance of cognitive or physical effort provide an explanation 
as to why people avoid making an active decision and stick to a default even if they do 
not actively endorse this default. Others have demonstrated the informational function 
of defaults as “implied endorsements” (McKenzie, Liersch, & Finkelstein, 2006). In 
several studies, defaults were perceived as indicators of the recommended action, for 
example, concerning organ donation and enrollment in saving plans (McKenzie et al., 
2006). Defaults might also function due to reference dependence when they are 
perceived as endowments (Park, Jun, & MacInnis, 2000) and every attempt to depart 
from this endowment makes the resulting “losses loom larger than gains” (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981). This mechanism has been explained with query theory predicting 
that defaults influence the number, position and valence of queries concerning the 
default and non-default options (Dinner, Johnson, Goldstein, & Liu, 2011). 
Much of the research on default effects is conducted as natural field experiments or 
macro-level case studies demonstrating how the situational setup can influence choices. 
This approach has clear advantages in explaining existing phenomena like differences in 
organ donation rates between similar countries (Abadie & Gay, 2006; Johnson 
& Goldstein, 2003) or changes in the use of green energy over time (Pichert 
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& Katsikopoulos, 2008). Other field studies report default effects on financial decisions 
(Choi, Laibson, Madrian, & Metrick, 2003; Madrian & Shea, 2001), end-of-life treatment 
preferences (Kressel, Chapman, & Leventhal, 2007), and online privacy (Johnson et al., 
2002). Yet, this approach also bears disadvantages. Default effects are only sporadically 
tested, replicated and explained (see also Ölander & Thøgersen, 2014). Causality is also 
difficult to demonstrate in macro-level comparisons. For these reasons, the 
straightforward recommendations for policymakers presented in many articles are 
somewhat surprising and may be premature (as, e.g., in Keller, Harlam, Loewenstein, & 
Volpp, 2011, p. 376; Smith, Goldstein, & Johnson, 2013). Indeed, policy makers in the 
United Kingdom have recommended not changing the default policy for organ donation 
in 2008 and maintaining the explicit consent policy (House of Lords, 2008, p. 60). Thus, 
to avoid possible downsides like reactance (Brown & Krishna, 2004) or regret (Brown, 
Farrell, & Weisbenner) and to underscore recommendations for the effectiveness of 
defaults with reliable data, more experimental demonstrations are warranted.  
That being said, default effects have been demonstrated in controlled experiments, 
most of them using hypothetical choices and self-reports as dependent variables. These 
studies cover domains such as organ donation decisions (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003), 
choices of light bulbs (Dinner et al., 2011) and electricity providers (Pichert 
& Katsikopoulos, 2008), decisions about advance directives (Halpern et al., 2013), 
consumer goods (Lu & Xie, 2014), and recruitment rates for patients in medical research 
(Junghans, Feder, Hemingway, Timmis, & Jones, 2005).  
Moderators of default effects 
Policy makers and the general public have criticized the use of defaults in policies as 
undue manipulation by working non-transparently (Hansen & Jespersen, 2013). If valid 
for default manipulations, defaults would have to make use of cognitive weaknesses and 
be able to overrule pre-existing preferences. Indeed, the idea that defaults would be 
accepted despite being counter-attitudinal seems difficult to reconcile with the liberty-
preserving promise inherent in the use of defaults (Thaler & Sunstein, 2003). In defense, 
proponents argue that interventions from the choice architecture toolbox are 
“asymmetrically paternalistic” (Camerer, Issacharoff, Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, & 
Rabin, 2003) because they influence choices differently depending on the decision 
maker’s preferences. Support for this notion comes from Fox, Ratner, and Lieb (2005) 
who demonstrated that partition dependence (i.e., the tendency to diversify ones 
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choices dependent on the categories offered) is moderated by experience (Study 5) and 
salience of preferences (Study 6). The same moderation has been discussed for default 
effects, e.g., by Johnson and Goldstein (2003, p. 1339) who claim: “If preferences […] are 
strong, we would expect defaults to have little or no effect”. Yet, the interplay of default 
manipulations and individual attitudes lacks clear experimental evidence.  
Results from research on moderating factors that might differentially influence 
whether a default leads to behavior change or not are mixed. Socio-demographic 
variables and experience did not moderate the influence of a participation vs. non-
participation default in an online study (Johnson et al., 2002). However, high social 
intelligence (Brown & Krishna, 2004) and the social role of being an advisor rather than 
a decision maker reduced default effects (Lu & Xie, 2014). Similarly, when people had 
specific plans on how to spend tax refunds, default refund allocations did not influence 
their spending decisions (Bronchetti, Dee, Huffman, & Magenheim, 2011). A high level of 
experience concerning environmental issues is also assumed to attenuate the influence 
of defaults on pro-environmental decisions (Löfgren, Martinsson, Hennlock, & Sterner, 
2012), but experience was neither measured directly nor manipulated thus impeding 
causal interpretations. In an experiment on the interplay of financial literacy and 
investment decisions, high literacy attenuated the propensity to stay with the default 
investment (Agnew & Szykman, 2005).  
These findings suggest that interindividual differences like knowledge or experience 
influence whether people stick to a default or not. This fits with the claim that strong 
attitudes attenuate the influence of defaults. The amount of experience and time spent 
with an issue are important aspects of the attitude strength concept. Thus explaining the 
absence of default effects by claiming strong pre-existing attitudes seems reasonable 
(Sunstein & Reisch, 2014). Yet, the role of strong attitudes as, for example, reflected by 
high subjective importance and centrality of an issue has not been directly investigated. 
Instead, several indirect proxies for attitude strength (experience, financial literacy, 
specific plans) have been used to demonstrate moderators of default effects. The 
conceptual overlap between these proxies and attitude strength suggests that the latter 
may play a role in understanding the influence of defaults on behavior and choices. 
Before examining a possible influence on default effects, we will shed some more light 
on the broader concept of attitude strength. 
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Default effects and attitude strength 
According to Krosnick and Petty (1995), strong attitudes are persistent, resistant, 
and exert influence on cognition and behavior. As such, external cues such as defaults 
should become less influential (Chaiken & Baldwin, 1981) and strong attitudes towards 
the decision for which a default option exists might override the default and moderate 
its effect on behavior. Attitude strength has been found to moderate the influence of 
salient behavioral information on self-perceptions (Chaiken & Baldwin, 1981). People 
with weak attitudes were more influenced by salient past pro-environmental or past 
anti-environmental behaviors than people holding strong attitudes.  
Attitude strength has been conceptualized as a multi-facetted construct consisting of 
several different dimensions (Krosnick, Boninger, Chuang, Berent, & Carnot, 1993). We 
focus on importance, certainty, personal relevance, elaboration, subjective knowledge, 
and ambivalence to assess attitude strength comprehensively and explore the individual 
influence of each dimension. Importance depicts the degree of caring for the attitude. 
Certainty reflects the amount of confidence with which a person holds an attitude and is 
closely linked to personal relevance which refers to the extent that a topic “holds 
significant consequences” (Wegener, Downing, Krosnick, & Petty, 1995, p. 470). The 
amount of thought devoted to a topic is depicted in the elaboration dimension (see 
Petty, Haugtvedt, & Smith, 1995). The fifth dimension discussed here, subjective 
knowledge, refers to the belief about one’s own information on the topic. This might 
differ from actual, objective knowledge as measured in a test. Finally, ambivalence is the 
amount of mixed positive and negative evaluations of a topic (for a detailed review of 
strength dimensions, see Petty & Krosnick, 1995). Some of the discussed proxies for 
attitude strength used in research on default effects map directly onto these dimensions 
and suggest the same direction of effects, e.g., financial literacy (knowledge) or 
experience (knowledge, elaboration). Other dimensions have not been tested but have 
been discussed as attenuating default effects (e.g., importance and personal relevance, 
see Sunstein & Reisch, 2014, p. 128). For these reasons, we assume the same direction 
for the individual dimensions’ influence on default effects. 
Our hypothesis is that defaults predict behavior particularly in the absence of strong 
attitudes. This hypothesis can be derived separately for the different causal mechanisms 
of default effects sketched before. Implied endorsement should be less important in the 
face of strong a priori attitudes especially when confidence and certainty are high. 
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Holding a more pronounced attitude for an alternative should also lead to a higher 
willingness to invest effort to change the default especially when attitude importance is 
high. Strong attitudes should attenuate endowment effects caused by defaults and thus 
departing from the default should be viewed less as a loss the stronger an attitude is. 
This implies that defaults can be understood as endowments and evoke loss aversion 
only when they are either in line with existing attitudes or are applied in the absence of 
strong attitudes. Finally, strong attitudes towards an action should render the action a 
starting point for deliberation as is the case for highly accessible attitudes, counteracting 
the effects of the default option on the sequence of queries. 
To test the moderating effect of attitude strength on default effects, we propose two 
consecutive studies in the realm of environmental decision making. Our target behavior 
is the choice of an electricity provider. People are usually customers of a local provider 
by default but may change to any other provider. The environmentally relevant choice is 
between electricity from either renewable energy sources such as wind, solar power, 
and water (labelled “green electricity”) or non-renewable sources such as nuclear power 
and fossil fuels (labelled “gray electricity”). At the time the study took place, renewable 
energy and green electricity had been on the political agenda in Germany for almost five 
years. In Experiment 1, we replicate an existing experiment to examine the robustness 
of the default-effect and add measures of attitude strength. In Experiment 2, we 
manipulate rather than measure attitude strength to examine its moderating effect on 
default effects. 
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 investigated choices between a green and a gray electricity provider. 
Although this was not a direct replication of the study by Pichert and Katsikopoulos 
(2008), due to a different sample and sampling method as well as further questions, we 
tried to stick to the original experiment as closely as possible by using the material from 
the original experiment.  
Methods 
Power analysis 
The required sample size for a planned power of 80% (two-tailed, α = .05, Pr(Y = 1 | 
X = 1) H0 = .6) was calculated with G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009) 
using odds ratios (OR). Pichert and Katsikopoulos (2008) reported an effect size of Φ = 
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.26 for the main effect of default condition. This translates into an odds ratio of 2.9. For 
sample size calculations we conservatively assumed a lower effect size of OR = 2 which 
results in a minimum overall sample size of 308 to detect a main effect of default 
condition. It can further be assumed that the effect of environmental attitude on choices 
is at least medium sized. Thus, it is reasonable to assume an odds ratio of at least 1.5, 
which results in a necessary sample size of 215 to detect the main effect of attitude. 
Because no prior studies on the attitude strength by default interaction exist, we 
conducted a sensitivity analysis with N = 308 which revealed an odds ratio of 1.4 for the 
interaction. To allow for potential participant exclusions, we planned a sample size of 
350 to test for the hypothesized main effects and the interaction. 
Participants 
Data was collected via the German online panel Social Science Survey (Leiner, 2014) 
which sends out a link to the study based on previous response rates and the planned 
sample size. Because panelists are free to fill out the survey any time within a two-week 
period stopping data collection after reaching the planned sample size was not possible. 
An unexpectedly high response rate lead to a sample size of N = 600 participants despite 
the planned sample size of only 350. The Poisson distribution of participation time 
stamps lends credence to the fact that data was collected in a single experimental wave. 
To account for this deviation from the preregistered sample size but simultaneously 
make use of the larger sample, we also included calculations for the planned sample size 
in Appendix C. Mean age of the sample was 36.1 years (SD = 13.7), 61% were female, 
36% male, and 3% did not indicate gender. Among all participants, 25 vouchers worth 
25 Euros each were raffled. 
Procedure 
The procedure was followed exactly as preregistered. Participants were confronted 
with the choice between two electricity providers equal to the scenario used by Pichert 
and Katsikopoulos (2008, see Appendix A for material). They were told to imagine that 
they had moved to another town and that, per default, they had become customers of an 
electricity provider. About this provider, they received the name and information about 
monthly costs. The default electricity provider was varied between participants to be 
either a green electricity provider, exclusively relying on renewable energy sources, or a 
gray, low cost electricity provider, providing electricity from an unidentified mix of 
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energy sources. In the original experiment, a neutral condition was also included and 
yielded almost identical results as the green default. Likewise, in other studies, the 
neutral condition was very similar to one of the default conditions rather than being 
located between them (Toft, Schuitema, & Thøgersen, 2014). Because we were mainly 
interested in the default effect and less in the “genuine” preferences for electricity 
providers in the absence of defaults, we dropped this condition and focused exclusively 
on the two default conditions.  
After having chosen one option, participants were probed whether they 
remembered the default electricity supplier correctly and had read the text. They were 
then asked to rate the two providers on 7-point scales (very negative to very positive) 
for their environmental impact and pricing policy. Following the original experiment, 
participants also ranked five attributes (company reputation, environmental impact, 
location of provider, quality of service, price) according to their relevance for choosing 
an electricity provider. Participants then filled out the environmental attitude and 
attitude strength measures. Before being debriefed and thanked for participation we 
asked participants whether they would be willing to participate in a follow-up study 
several weeks after the first data collection. This follow up enabled us to measure 
attitude stability over time. Matching was based on a code to guarantee anonymity. 
Measures 
To assess the influence of attitudes and attitude strength on default effects and 
choices, we separately measured attitude position and attitude strength. The following 
measures were assessed as preregistered. Scale characteristics are displayed in Table 1. 
Environmental attitude. For attitude position, participants filled out a German 
version of the New Ecological Paradigm scale (NEP, Dunlap, van Liere, Mertig, & Jones, 
2000) measuring environmental attitude with 15 items answered on a fully labeled 5-
point scale. Evidence for the dimensionality of the NEP is mixed (see Dunlap et al., 
2000). Despite the modest amount of variance explained by one factor (25.9 %), the 
scree plot and internal consistency justified a one-factorial solution in this experiment.  
Attitude towards renewable energy. Because specific attitudes towards 
renewable energy might be more predictive than general environmental attitudes for 
our dependent variable “choice between green and gray electricity provider” (evaluative 
consistency, see Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005), we also assessed the specific attitude towards 
renewable energy with four items (see Appendix A). We did so, to be able to compare 
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possible effects between specific and general attitudes. Yet, in contrast to the NEP, the 
specific measure is novel and untested and related analysis will thus serve exploratory 
purposes. These four items formed a strong, one-dimensional measure (see Table 1).  
We did not assume changes in environmental attitudes or attitudes towards 
electricity providers to be caused by the default manipulation, which allowed measuring 
it after all replication relevant parts of the experiment. This assumption was checked 
(see randomization checks). 
Attitude strength. Attitude strength was assessed with self-report measures for six 
dimensions of attitude strength used in previous research (Brannon, Tagler, & Eagly, 
2007; Wegener et al., 1995). Participants indicated on 7-point scales the levels of 
importance (How important is the topic how humans should deal with the environment 
for you personally? How important is the topic to you compared with other issues?), 
certainty (How sure are you that your opinion on how humans should deal with the 
environment is correct? How likely are you to change your opinions about the topic? 
How certain do you feel about your attitude towards the topic?), personal relevance 
(How relevant is the topic how humans should deal with the environment for you 
personally?), elaboration (How much have you thought about the topic before?), and 
subjective knowledge about the environment and ecology (How well informed are you 
about the topic?). The latter two most closely correspond to the amount of experience 
and knowledge previously found to moderate default effects. Finally, subjective 
ambivalence was measured similar to Priester and Petty (1996) with the following three 
sentences: “Concerning the topic how humans should deal with the environment, I feel… 
no conflict at all / feel no indecision at all / have completely one-sided reactions vs. 
maximal conflict / maximal indecision / completely mixed reactions”. 
Krosnick and colleagues (1993) argue that different dimensions of attitude strength 
should be treated as distinct rather than as a combined measure of attitude strength. 
Others have successfully combined dimensions to form an attitude strength index (e.g., 
Brannon et al., 2007). Although an individual interpretation of dimensions of attitude 
strength becomes impossible for a combined index, this approach avoids over-fitting 
caused by too many predictors and high inter-correlations. Thus, we planned to conduct 
our analyses twice: with individual dimensions as separate predictors and with a one-
dimensional index of attitude strength by combining the different self-report measures.  
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To construct the attitude strength index, we performed a principal component 
analysis and combined those items clearly loading on the same factor as indicated by 
one large eigenvalue and a drop in eigenvalues thereafter visible in the scree-plot. The 
eleven attitude strength items measuring different dimensions clearly loaded on one 
reliable factor despite the negative item-test correlation of one item (ambivalence item 
measuring internal conflict, rit = -.18). Eliminating this item leads to an alpha increase to 
.87.5 
We also included a measure of specific attitude strength towards the choice of an 
electricity provider (see Appendix A), using the same strength items but relating to the 
choice of an electricity provider. Equivalent to the general environmental attitude 
strength measure described above, the specific measure can be conceived of as one 
factorial. The same item as in the general attitude strength measure possessed an item-
test correlation close to zero6 (rit = .06). 
------ insert Table 1 about here ------ 
Demographics. Demographic data including age, gender, profession, and mother 
tongue was gathered at the end. Information about participants’ electricity provider was 
also assessed. All of these measures were used for exploratory purposes only. 
Hypotheses 
H1: Replicating the experiment by Pichert and Katsikopoulos (2008), we assume a 
main effect of the default on the choice of the electricity provider. More people should 
choose green electricity in the green-default group than in the grey-default group. 
Similarly, more people should choose a gray electricity provider in the gray-default 
group than in the green-default group.  
H2: People with more pro-environmental attitudes should be more likely to choose 
green electricity than people with less pro-environmental attitudes (main effect of 
attitude).  
H3: The critical moderation should be visible in a decreasing impact of the default 
manipulation as attitude strength increases. This translates into an interaction of the 
                                                        
5 Because the pre-registered criterion for item deletion was a drop in Alpha below .70 instead of low 
item-test-correlations, the item was retained for all following analyses. Excluding the item does not 
change any of the results. We recommend replacing it in future research. 
6 See footnote 1 
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default condition and attitude strength. Specifically, in the green electricity default 
condition, we expect a decreasing rate of green choices with increasing attitude 
strength. Analogously, in the gray electricity default condition we expect a decreasing 
rate of gray choices with increasing attitude strength. 
Results 
Manipulation checks and randomization checks 
As outlined in the preregistered analyses, we checked whether participants 
remembered the name of the default electricity provider correctly. Forty participants 
(6.7%) did not remember the default electricity provider correctly in the attentiveness 
check and were excluded from all analyses as preregistered7. 
 Separate t-tests indicated no significant differences between the two conditions in 
our core predictors environmental attitude strength (Mgray = 4.81, SD = .74 vs. Mgreen = 
4.76, SD = .70, t(558) = .91, p = .36), specific attitude towards renewable energy (Mgray = 
3.96, SD = .69 vs. Mgreen = 3.89, SD = .64, t(558) = 1.17, p = .24), and specific attitude 
strength (Mgray = 3.90, SD = 1.00 vs. Mgreen = 3.95, SD = .91, t(558) = -.58, p = .57). Mean 
environmental attitude in the gray condition (M = 3.84, SD = .47) was slightly but not 
significantly larger than in the green condition (M = 3.78, SD = .41, t(558) = 1.71, pNEP = 
.09), and thus randomization was successful. This also removes concerns that the 
manipulation could have influenced the measures collected after the dependent variable 
and used as predictors. Environmental impact of the green provider (M = 5.06, SD = 
1.24) was rated higher than impact of the gray provider (M = 3.12, SD = 1.13), t(559) = 
27.23, p < .001, 95% CI [1.80, 2.08], Hedges’ gav = 1.63. The price of the gray provider (M 
= 2.91, SD = 1.09) was rated lower than the green provider’s price (M = 4.46, SD = 1.06), 
t(559) = 31.08, p < .001, 95% CI [1.45, 1.65], Hedges’ gav = 1.44. This pattern equals the 
pattern found by Pichert and Katsikopoulos (2008) and indicates a successful 
manipulation and understanding of the scenario as intended. 
Across both conditions, there is no evidence that either of the providers was chosen 
more frequently, 47.7% green vs. 52.3% gray, χ²(1, 560) = 1.21, p = .27. 
                                                        
7 Including these forty participants neither changed the significance levels nor the overall results.  
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Does general attitude strength moderate default effects? (Model 1) 
As preregistered, we used a logistic regression model to test the influence of default 
condition, environmental attitude, attitude strength, and the two-way interaction of 
default by strength on the probability to choose green electricity. The analysis was 
carried out twice: in Model 1, we used general attitude and attitude strength as 
predictors; in Model 2, we used the specific attitude and specific attitude strength 
measures as predictors. All predictors were mean-centered prior to analyses and 
entered into the regression simultaneously.  
The full model predicted electricity provider choices significantly better than the 
intercept-only model, χ²(4, 560) = 83.73, p < .001. Nagelkerke’s pseudo-R²  as a measure 
of determination was .19 (Nagelkerke, 1991). Table 2 contains regression coefficients, p-
values, odds ratios, and 95% confidence intervals for odds ratios of all predictors. 
Similar to the results from Pichert and Katsikopoulos (2008), a green default 
significantly increased the odds of choosing green electricity by 4.05, b = 1.40, p < .001. 
Environmental attitude measured with the NEP did not significantly increase the 
prediction. However, an increase in attitude strength by one unit significantly increased 
the odds of choosing green electricity by 2.44. The critical interaction of default 
condition and attitude strength was insignificant indicating that the influence of the 
default manipulation was independent of people’s attitude strength, b = -.49, p = .08, OR 
= 0.61. Although intended to be uncorrelated, attitude strength and environmental 
attitude overlapped, r = .40, p < .001. 
------ insert Table 2 about here ------ 
To illustrate the influence of default condition and attitude strength on choices, we 
divided attitude strength into quartiles. Figure 1 (upper left) shows both the main 
effects of the default and attitude strength. Although the difference in percentage of 
green energy choices between the two default conditions is larger in the first (lowest) 
quartile of attitude strength (53.5% vs. 11.7%) than in the fourth (highest) quartile of 
attitude strength (74.0% vs. 49.4%), default condition remains a significant predictor in 
all four quartiles as indicated by the interaction of p = .08.  
------ insert Figure 1 about here ------ 
As preregistered, we calculated diagnostic statistics to assess model fit which turned 
out to be good: 98.57% of standardized residuals lie within a range of -1.96 < z < 1.96, 
and 99.46% lie within a range of -2.58 < z < 2.58. Cook’s distances as indicators for the 
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overall influence of a single case on the model are small [.00, .16] and far from the 
critical threshold of one. 98.9% of all leverage values are below the recommended 
threshold of three times the average leverage (Stevens, 2002, in this case 3 × 0.00893 = 
0.0268). According to these statistics, the model parameters are not biased by the undue 
influence of single cases. 
Dimensions of general attitude strength as individual predictors 
High internal consistency, item inter-correlations, and principal component analysis 
of the attitude strength items provide strong support for a one-dimensional solution 
(see Table 1). Moreover, individual dimensions were measured with very few or single 
items and were thus less reliably assessed than the compound strength measure. We 
checked for the differential impact of each facet in separate regression models where we 
replaced the compound measure of attitude strength with individual facets. Whereas 
importance (p = .004), certainty (p = .03), and elaboration (p = .024) moderated the 
influence of the default manipulation, defaults did not interact with the strength 
dimensions relevance (p = .098), knowledge (p = .132), and ambivalence (p = .229). This 
mixed pattern mirrors the marginally significant interaction for the compound measure 
(p = .08).  
Does specific attitude strength moderate default effects? (Model 2) 
We conducted the same analysis with mean centered condition, specific attitudes 
(towards green electricity), specific attitude strength, and the condition by strength 
interaction as predictors. The full model predicted electricity provider choices 
significantly better than the intercept-only model, χ²(4, N = 560) = 110.45, p < .001, R² = 
.24 (Nagelkerke). Table 3 provides an overview of the predictors and reveals a similar 
pattern: Again, a green default significantly raised the odds to choose green electricity 
(by the factor four). Unlike the general environmental attitude, the specific attitude 
towards renewable energy also predicted provider choices and so did stronger attitudes. 
Again, specific attitudes and attitude strength were correlated although to a smaller 
degree, ρ = .186, p < .001. In contrast to Model 1, the condition by strength interaction 
was significant. Simple slope analysis using the Johnson-Neyman technique shows that 
the interaction is driven by the upper 7% of participants with very high attitude 
strength (specific attitude strength > 1.56 SDs above the mean, see Figure 1 upper right). 
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For these participants, default condition did not predict choices, whereas for the 
remaining 93% choices were influenced by the default condition. 
------ insert Table 3 about here ------ 
Dimensions of specific attitude strength as individual predictors 
As in Model 1, we checked for the differential impact of each facet in separate 
regression models where we replaced the compound measure of attitude strength with 
individual facets. Similar to Model 1, importance (p < .001) and elaboration (p < .001) 
moderated the influence of the default manipulation. Defaults did only marginally 
interact with knowledge (p = .07), and there was no interaction with ambivalence (p = 
.14). In contrast to Model 1, certainty (p = .23) did not interact with the default condition 
whereas relevance (p < .001) did. 
Because the preregistered sample size was 350, we additionally conducted both 
regression analyses for the first 350 participants only. Twenty-two participants were 
excluded due to the failed attentiveness check. The results for the reduced sample 
mirror the presented pattern except for the default by specific attitude strength 
interaction which remains insignificant (p = .09). All coefficients are displayed in Table 
C1 and Table C2 in Appendix C. 
Relevance ratings 
The relevance rank order of the five attributes for electricity provider choice was 
equal to the order reported in Pichert and Katsikopoulos (2008). Price was ranked 
highest (M = 1.97, SD = 1.11) followed by environmental impact (M = 2.50, SD = 1.25), 
service quality (M = 2.73, SD = 1.07), reputation (M = 3.45, SD = 1.18), and location of the 
provider (M = 4.34, SD = 1.13).  
Stability over time 
To assess the stability over time of the measures used, we invited all participants to 
take part in a second study eight weeks after the first study. We assessed environmental 
attitude, general attitude strength, and specific attitudes towards green energy in the 
follow-up. In total, 307 people (51%) participated in the follow-up (Mage = 37.6, SD = 
13.6, 62% female, 38% male). Participants in the follow-up did not differ from people 
who did not participate in the follow-up on any measure. Test-retest correlations of the 
measures and the same correlations corrected for measurement error are depicted in 
Table 4 and all reveal a large stability of the measures over time.  
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------ insert Table 4 about here ------ 
Discussion 
We found a strong effect of the default manipulation on choices replicating the 
findings from previous studies on default effects (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003; Pichert 
& Katsikopoulos, 2008) and supporting Hypothesis 1. Further, general environmental 
attitudes as assessed by the NEP did not predict choices while general attitude strength 
did. This dissociation might be due to the fact that we did not succeed in separating 
attitude position and strength. At the same time, holding more positive specific attitudes 
towards renewable energy and holding them more strongly did lead to a higher 
propensity to choose the green electricity provider. Overall, this partial support of 
Hypothesis 2 lends credence to the validity of the scenario as a whole.  
Despite this systematic pattern, we did not find support for a relevant moderating 
influence of attitude strength on defaults (H3). The corresponding interaction was only 
marginally significant in Model 1 and only significant at p < .05 for the strength of 
specific attitudes towards renewable energy. A simple slope analysis revealed this 
interaction to be driven by a small fraction of participants holding extremely strong 
attitudes.  
To illustrate the moderation in Model 1, assuming that it exists, consider that a 
person with average attitude strength (centered at 0, SD = .72) is 4 times more likely to 
choose green energy after a receiving green default compared to the same person 
receiving a gray default (OR for default condition). Yet, even a person with the most 
extreme attitude strength in the sample (strength = 1.67) is still 1.79 times more likely 
to choose green energy given a green default compared to a gray default8. Thus, even 
extremely strong attitudes in our sample did not render the default influence 
meaningless. 
In sum, Experiment 1 was set up to investigate whether the strength of preexisting 
environmental attitudes, general or specific, moderates the influence of a default 
manipulation for an environmentally relevant choice. We conclude that there is at best a 
weak influence.  
One might argue that Experiment 1 has two weaknesses: First, the default 
manipulation might have influenced attitudes which were assessed afterwards. Even 
though there was no evidence for such an influence, in Experiment 2 we measured 
                                                        
8 b(default) + attitude strength × b(interaction) = 1.4 + 1.67 × (-.49) = 0.58, exp(0.58) = OR = 1.79 
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attitudes before the manipulation. Second, we measured rather than manipulated 
attitude strength and hence cannot make causal claims. We address both issues in 
Experiment 2.   
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, we seek to experimentally manipulate attitude strength. This 
entails assessing environmental attitudes before rather than after the choice task. Thus, 
as an extended replication, in Experiment 2, we a) first assess attitudes and b), for half of 
the participants, increase attitude strength. We chose to do so by instigating deeper 
elaboration.  
Methods 
Power analysis 
As preregistered, we based power calculations for Experiment 2 on observed effect 
sizes in Experiment 1. Experiment 1 yielded a (non-significant) odds ratio of 1.679. We 
conservatively assumed a somewhat smaller effect size of 1.4 for the critical interaction. 
To achieve 90% power (two-tailed, α = .05, Pr(Y = 1 | X = 1) H0 = .6, R² other X = .2), a 
sample size of N = 506 is necessary. This sample size is sufficient to demonstrate the 
default main effect (assumed OR = 4) with even larger power of over 99%. 
Participants 
Equal to Experiment 1, data was collected via the German online panel Social Science 
Survey (Leiner, 2014) over a period of two weeks. We assured that no participant had 
already taken part in Experiment 1 by excluding these participants’ serial numbers. 
Complete surveys were received from 572 participants. Deviations from planned sample 
size were again due to the sampling procedure of the panel outlined in Experiment 1. 
After excluding 37 participants who did not remember the default electricity provider 
correctly in the attentiveness check10, the resulting sample’s mean age was 37.5 years 
(SD = 14), 62.8% were female, 34.6% male, and 2.6% did not indicate gender. Among all 
participants, 25 vouchers worth 25 Euros each were raffled. 
                                                        
9 We transformed the .6 odds ratio using 1/OR. 
10 Including these participants neither changed the significance levels nor the overall results. 
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Procedure 
The procedure was followed exactly as preregistered. At the beginning of the 
experiment, all participants filled out the new ecological paradigm scale (NEP, Dunlap et 
al., 2000). Upon completion, participants were randomly allocated to either the 
enhanced strength condition or the control condition. In the enhanced strength 
condition participants received all 15 NEP-items again and were asked to pick four 
items which they felt most certain about, knew most about, or which were most 
important to them (see Appendix B for instructions). For these items, participants were 
asked to give a short reason for their answer. This should increase attitude strength by 
making participants elaborate on subjectively important aspects of their attitude. 
Participants in the control condition did not receive the NEP items again and did not 
provide reasons.  
Participants were then confronted with the electricity provider scenario used in 
Experiment 1. Again, half of the participants received a gray electricity default, the other 
half received a green electricity default. As in Experiment 1, participants were then 
asked to make a choice between the two providers by either following the default or 
opting for another electricity provider. After this, participants answered several control 
questions to check whether they understood the text correctly. As a manipulation check, 
we also included all self-report items for attitude strength from Experiment 1. Before 
asking participants to provide socio-demographic data, they were asked to list all 
thoughts that were relevant for their choice of an electricity provider (“Please list all 
aspects that influenced your decision for or against the two electricity providers.” See 
Dinner et al., 2011 for a similar procedure). A debriefing followed this. 
Measures 
Dimensionality, item-test correlations and internal consistency of all multi-item 
measures used in Experiment 2 are depicted in Table 1 and mirror the findings from 
Experiment 1. 
Environmental attitude. As in Experiment 1, we assessed environmental attitude 
using the NEP scale (Dunlap et al., 2000). 
Attitude strength. Now serving as a manipulation check, attitude strength was 
assessed with the same self-report measures as in Experiment 1 relating to the 
dimensions importance, certainty, relevance, elaboration, knowledge, and ambivalence 
(see Appendix A for the translated items). 
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Demographics. We gathered demographic data including age, gender, profession, 
and mother tongue at the end. Participants’ electricity provider was also assessed. 
Hypotheses 
H1: Equivalent to Experiment 1, we predict a main effect of the between-participant 
factor default condition. More people should choose green electricity in the green-
default group than in the gray-default group. Vice versa, more people should choose gray 
electricity in the gray-default group than in the green-default group. 
H2: We also predict a main effect of environmental attitude such that participants 
with more pro-environmental attitudes are more likely to choose green electricity than 
participants with less pro-environmental attitudes. 
H3: We also predict an interaction of the default condition and the manipulation of 
attitude strength. This should correspond to a smaller difference in choice proportions 
between the green and the gray default condition given participants are in the enhanced 
strength rather than in the control strength condition. 
Results 
Manipulation checks and randomization checks 
We planned to check whether the manipulation affected attitude strength by 
calculating an attitude strength index as described in Experiment 1 and comparing mean 
attitude strength between the two strength conditions. This manipulation check 
revealed that the enhanced strength condition and the control condition did neither 
differ in overall attitude strength as measured by the 11-items, Mcontrol = 5.02 (SD = .69) 
vs. Menhanced strength = 4.95 (SD = .77), t(533) = 1.11, p = .27, 95 % CI [-0.05; 0.19], nor were 
there significant differences on any of the dimensions except for knowledge, Mcontrol = 
5.17 (SD = 1.04) vs. Menhanced strength = 4.94 (SD = 1.22), t(533) = 2.35, p = .02, 95 % CI 
[0.04, 0.42], Hedges’ gs = 0.20. This small difference is not further interpreted. Thus, we 
have to assume that the intended manipulation of attitude strength by instigating 
deeper elaboration was not successful. Originally, we had planned to exclude 
participants in the enhanced strength condition if their attitude strength levels were 
lower than 99% of all participants this condition. Analogously, we had planned to 
exclude participants in the control group whose attitude strength exceeded 99% of their 
fellow participants. Since the strength manipulation failed, the planned exclusion of 
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participants who were unaffected by the manipulation becomes arbitrary. Thus, we did 
not exclude participants based on strength scores. 
There was no evidence for failed randomization with similar environmental attitude 
levels across the different conditions (p = .63). The differences between the two 
providers in price and environmental impact were perceived by participants as 
intended: Environmental impact of the green provider (M = 5.51, SD = 1.13) was rated 
higher than the impact of the gray provider (M = 2.89, SD = 1.16), t(534) = 33.62, p < 
.001, 95% CI [2.47, 2.77], Hedges’ gav = 2.29. The price of the gray provider (M = 3.11, SD 
= 1.25) was rated lower than the green (M = 4.54, SD = 1.19) provider’s price, t(534) = 
20.98, p < .001, 95% CI [1.20, 1.47], Hedges’ gav = 1.10 . Overall, significantly more 
people chose green electricity (68%) than gray electricity (32%), χ²(1, 535) = 72.54, p < 
.001. Environmental attitude and attitude strength were again correlated, r = .39, p < 
.001. 
Choices 
Despite the failed manipulation of the factor strength, we analyzed the 2 (default: 
gray vs. green) by 2 (strength: weak vs. strong) design with environmental attitude as a 
random factor as preregistered using logistic regression analysis. The electricity 
provider choice (1 = green, 0 = gray) was predicted from mean-centered variables for 
the default condition, the attitude strength condition, environmental attitude, and the 
two-way interaction between the default condition and the attitude strength condition. 
These predictors were entered into the model simultaneously.  
The analysis revealed the following results: A test of the full model against a 
constant-only model was statistically significant, χ²(4, 535) = 73.98, p < .001, R² = .18 
(Nagelkerke) indicating that the predictors distinguished between choices of gray and 
green electricity. As Table 5 shows, a green default and a more pro-environmental 
attitude were the only significant predictors of green choices in this model. Participants 
confronted with a green default were 4.35 times more likely to choose green electricity 
than participants in the gray default condition. Likewise, a one-point increase in 
environmental attitude scores raised the probability to choose green electricity by 2.39. 
Participants in the enhanced strength and the control conditions were equally likely to 
choose green electricity and the strength by default interaction remained insignificant.  
------ insert Table 5 about here ------ 
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Exploratory analyses 
As we could not find any effects of the strength manipulation on the manipulation 
check, it is not surprising that it did not affect choices either. To check whether 
measured attitude strength instead of manipulated strength produced similar results and 
to replicate the analyses from Experiment 1, we tested a model with default condition, 
environmental attitude, measured attitude strength, and both two-way interactions of 
default by strength and default by environmental attitude. This analysis was not 
preregistered but seems useful due to the failed manipulation of attitude strength. 
The full model was again significant χ²(4, 535) = 99.99, p < .001, R² = .24 
(Nagelkerke). A model including the interactions was not significantly different from a 
model with only main effects. This means, a green default, a stronger attitude, and, 
marginally so, a more pro-environmental attitude raised the probability to choose green 
electricity independent of each other (see Table 6). Conditioning choices on strength 
percentiles confirmed that the default condition remained a significant predictor of 
choice at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentile. In other words, defaults influenced 
choices regardless of whether people held strong or weak attitudes and regardless of 
whether people held pro-environmental attitudes or not. 
------ insert Table 6 about here ------ 
To illustrate the independence of default effects from attitude strength, we divided 
attitude strength into quartiles and examined the influence of defaults on choices 
separately for each quartile of attitude strength (see Figure 1 lower left). Across all 
quartiles, participants in the green default condition chose significantly more green 
electricity than participants in the gray default condition, all p < .01, .22 < Φ < .39. The 
differences for quartiles one to four were: 39.7%, 25.7%, 29%, and 15.8%. 
Women were significantly more likely to choose green electricity than men, 72% vs. 
62%, χ² (521) = 5.38, p = .02. Not surprisingly, of the 163 actual customers of green 
electricity providers 85% chose green electricity, compared to only 51% of the 229 
customers of gray providers. Controlling for these two factors did not change the overall 
pattern.  
Facets of general attitude strength as individual predictors 
As in Experiment 1, we also checked whether the individual facets of attitude 
strength moderated the impact of the default manipulation. Knowledge (p = .02) was the 
only significant moderator. All other facets did not interact with the default condition.  
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Thought listing 
Two research assistants independently coded each reason participants gave for their 
choice. As guiding categories we used the most frequently mentioned reasons also used 
by Pichert and Katsikopoulos (2008, see also Table 7) and added “regional provider”. 
Reasons that did not fit into these six categories were coded as “other”. Participants 
could list as many reasons as they wished resulting in 1171 reasons provided overall. 
Cohen’s kappa as an index for interrater reliability was high, κ = .79. To analyze which 
reasons were mentioned most frequently (preregistered), first, disagreements were 
resolved by discussion. Table 7 shows the reasons given and their frequencies. We also 
exploratory examined systematic associations between the default people received, the 
choice they made, and the reasons they mentioned to support their choice. First, 
environmental considerations were mentioned by 68% of the people in the green 
default condition but only by 49% in the gray condition, χ²(535) = 21.15, p < .001. A 
reverse pattern emerged for price considerations which were mentioned in the gray 
default condition more frequently than in the green default condition, 53% vs. 38%, 
χ²(535) = 12.35, p < .001. For none of the other categories did similar associations 
emerge. Second, when people chose green electricity, environmental considerations 
were mentioned similarly often, no matter whether the green choice resulted from a 
default or an opt-out, 77.7% vs. 79.6%, Δ = 1.9%, χ²(366) = 1.85, p = .17. In contrast, 
when people chose gray electricity, price considerations were mentioned much more 
frequently after opting out of green electricity as compared to sticking with a gray 
default, 77.3% vs. 68%, Δ = 9.3%, χ²(169) = 13.43, p < .001. Apparently, changing from 
green to gray lead to more pressure to justify the change than changing from gray to 
green did. The anticipated effort of switching from a default (a proxy for general effort 
explanations of default effects) was mentioned by 16% of all participants. 
------ insert Table 7 about here ------ 
Discussion 
In Experiment 2, we find a similarly strong effect of the default manipulation as 
compared to Experiment 1 and the original demonstration. Different from Experiment 1, 
we now also find predictive power of general environmental attitudes on choices. The 
NEP predicts electricity provider choices only when attitude strength is not included. 
Future research should consider environmental attitude measures stronger than the 
NEP to predict actual choices or behavior. Both effects further validate the scenario.  
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Judging by the manipulation check, we did not succeed in experimentally 
manipulating attitude strength levels. This seems less surprising given that we found 
very high stability of attitude strength over time. The absence of an interaction between 
manipulated attitude strength and the default manipulation thus cannot be interpreted 
as evidence against the existence of such a moderating influence. Yet, the analysis of 
measured attitude strength again supports such a conclusion. Including measured 
strength as a potential moderator, as in Experiment 1, we did not find evidence that 
stronger preexisting environmental attitudes reduce the effect of a default manipulation. 
Even for the 25% of participants with the strongest attitudes in our sample, the default 
manipulation was effective. 
The selective mentioning of reasons suggests that different defaults trigger different 
queries (Dinner et al., 2011). More specifically, defaults triggered congruent reasons, 
such that the environment was mentioned after a green default and the price was 
mentioned after a (cheaper) gray default. Additionally, people also perceived the effort 
associated with switching as one reason for their choices, irrespective of which default 
they received. This finding supports present effort explanations for default effects.  
Combined analysis of both experiments (exploratory) 
We conducted a (non-preregistered) small meta-analysis including all 1095 
participants from Experiments 1 and 2 to assess the overall reliability and strength of 
the interaction between attitude strength and the default manipulation. Analogous to 
previous analyses, we used a logistic regression analysis to predict choices by the 
centered NEP and attitude strength measures and the default manipulation only 
including the interaction between the latter two. We used a multilevel model 
implemented in the R package lme4 to account for the fact that the interaction was 
assessed under three different conditions (i.e., Experiment 1 and the two experimental 
conditions of Experiment 2). This allowed for variation of the effect estimates between 
the three groups. The overall results are shown in Table 8. Confirming the previous 
analyses, default manipulation and attitude strength predicted choices, while the NEP by 
itself had only a marginally significant influence. Crucially, the interaction between the 
default manipulation and attitude strength did not reach the level of statistical 
significance. 
------ insert Table 8 about here ------ 
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 General Discussion and conclusion 
Across two studies with more than 1000 participants taken from a heterogeneous 
sample of the German population, we could show that defaults and attitudes both play a 
powerful yet largely independent role in environmental decision making. Our studies 
and previous (online, lab, and field) experiments on green electricity defaults (Ebeling & 
Lotz, 2015; Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008) provide strong support for the conclusion 
that the choice of an electricity provider is significantly influenced by the pre-selected 
default option with comparably large effect sizes (OR > 4).  
The picture for preexisting environmental attitudes is somewhat more mixed. While 
environmental attitude strength consistently predicted choices, the NEP as our 
environmental attitude measure was less predictive. Given the sample-independent, 
high correlations of attitude strength and environmental attitude (.37 < r < .40), a clear 
separation of attitude position and attitude strength seems impossible for this measure 
of general environmental attitudes: Stronger environmental attitudes imply more 
positive environmental attitudes and as such, environmental attitude strength is 
asymmetric. At least in the samples used in our studies, strong anti-environmental 
attitudes were not represented. This could be different for topics such as abortion where 
people are strongly opposed, indifferent, or strongly in favor. 
While replicating default effects, the expectation that “if preferences […] are strong, 
we would expect defaults to have little or no effect” (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003, p. 1339) 
was not supported. The presented data does not suggest that “well-formed preferences 
(…) trump default rules” (Sunstein & Thaler, 2003, p. 1198). Defaults influenced people’s 
choices across the whole range of how strong attitudes can be and the effects were 
additive rather than interactive (see Kaiser, Arnold, & Otto, 2014). Attitude strength only 
trumped the default effect for the most extreme 7% of participants and only for a 
specific measure of attitudes towards renewable energy in Experiment 1. 
The results do not allow for a theoretically and empirically convincing interpretation 
of the individual facets of attitude strengths: First, the compound attitude strength 
measure is internally consistent and all facets load on one latent factor speaking for the 
more reliable 11-item measure. Second, no facet moderated the impact of the default 
manipulation consistently in both experiments. 
One might still argue that there were no well-formed preferences in our samples. 
However, the heterogeneous distribution of attitude strength levels and their predictive 
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power speaks against this argument. In sum, the findings suggest that the context or 
“choice architecture”, though powerful, works additively with pre-existing attitudes to 
determine choice propensities. However, our findings and conclusions are limited to 
environmental attitudes and the strength with which they are held and their interplay 
with sustainable default options. Generalization to nudges and attitudes beyond green 
defaults and environmental attitudes, warrants conceptual replications of similar 
patterns in other areas, with different target behaviors and different nudges, e.g., organ 
donation defaults and pro-social attitudes.  
Keeping the aforementioned limitation in mind, our findings have several 
implications for libertarian or soft paternalism which claims that, “if an individual’s 
preferences are incoherent, her choices can be influenced by interventions which, 
although paternalistic in intent, do not contravene the principles to which anti-
paternalists are committed” (Sugden, 2008, p. 227). As we have shown, even in the 
presence of defaults, environmental attitudes are not necessarily “unclear and ill-
formed” (Sunstein & Thaler, 2003, p. 1159) and their influence (if measured correctly) is 
stable and predictive over and above the influence of choice architectures such as 
defaults. Yet, systematic differences in who is affected by a nudge (i.e., who chooses the 
default) and who is not (i.e., who opts out) could provide a way to combine paternalistic 
measures with libertarian values or an approach “to have one’s cake and eat it too” as 
Camerer et al. (2003, p. 1212) suggest. Extending the concept of “asymmetric 
paternalism” to defaults (Camerer et al., 2003), i.e., paternalistic measures that influence 
different people differently, individual attitudes should be one such source of 
asymmetry. The asymmetry would arise because the indifferent should profit from a 
default, while it should leave those with strong attitudes unaffected. However, at least 
for electricity provider defaults, we found no support for asymmetric effects; the 
paternalistic influence of green and gray defaults was rather symmetric and not 
systematically influenced by individual attitudes in the presented studies. On the other 
hand, one could also interpret the independent influence of attitudes and defaults as 
support for the libertarian (attitude-based) and paternalistic (context-driven) nature of 
a nudge. The opposing conclusions drawn from the same results highlight that 
libertarian paternalism still lacks conceptual clarity.  
On a more applied side, the presented studies support confidence in defaults as tools 
to influence environmental decision-making. We do not answer the question whether 
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green electricity is better than gray electricity, nor do we claim that other measures to 
increase the adoption of green electricity such as education or subsidies are less 
effective (as criticized by Gigerenzer, 2015). Rather, we complement existing knowledge 
about the effectiveness of defaults in environmental policymaking. 
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Appendix A. Instructions and material used in both studies (translated from 
German) 
Adapted from Pichert and Katsikopoulos (2008) 
Gray condition: “Imagine you have to relocate to another town. After you move into 
your new flat, you receive a letter from the electric power supplier, Acon. You are told 
that by moving into your new flat you became an Acon customer: ‘Acon is pleased to 
welcome you as a new customer. We are responsible for the basic electricity supply in 
this residential area. We offer low-priced electricity tariffs—you cannot beat our prices. 
Save money with Acon! Your monthly premium is 26 € per person’. You are kindly asked 
to fill in some personal data on an attached document, which you do. A couple of days 
later a contract is sent to you.  
Some weeks later you find a flyer in your mailbox, advertising offers from the 
electric power supplier EcoEnergy: ‘Switch to EcoEnergy! Did you know that you can 
easily switch your electricity supplier? EcoEnergy sells clean electricity, generated from 
renewable energy sources. Contribute to climate protection and environmental protection! 
Your monthly premium will be 33 € per person’.”  
What do you do?  
 Stay with Acon 
 Switch to Ecoenergy  
 
Green condition: The vignette describes the reverse situation; that is, the default 
company offers ‘green’ power and the advertisement is for cheaper electricity (see text). 
Although premiums for electricity vary according to individual consumption, 
participants are told to accept the premiums as given for the sake of simplicity. 
What is the name of the default electricity supplier in the situation just described? 
(Acon, EcoEnergy, none of the two, don’t know) 
How do you judge the environmental impact of Acon / Ecoenergy? 
How do you judge the price of Acon / Ecoenergy? 
(7-point scale from very negative to very positive) 
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Please arrange the following attributes according to their relevance for your choice of an 
electricity supplier starting with the most important, followed by the second most 
important and so forth. 
 company reputation, environmental impact, location of provider, quality of service, 
price  
Environmental attitude (NEP) 
Listed below are statements about the relationship between humans and the 
environment. For each one, please indicate whether you strongly agree, mildly agree, are 
unsure, mildly disagree, or strongly disagree with it. 
Do you agree or disagree that: 
1. We are approaching the limit of the number of people the earth can support 
2. Humans have the right to modify the natural environment to suit their needs 
3. When humans interfere with nature it often produces disastrous consequences 
4. Human ingenuity will insure that we do NOT make the earth unlivable 
5. Humans are severely abusing the environment 
6. The earth has plenty of natural resources if we just learn how to develop them 
7. Plants and animals have as much right as humans to exist 
8. The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the impacts of modern 
industrial nations 
9. Despite our special abilities humans are still subject to the laws of nature 
10. The so-called “ecological crisis” facing humankind has been greatly exaggerated 
11. The earth is like a spaceship with very limited room and resources 
12.  Humans were meant to rule over the rest of nature 
13. The balance of nature is very delicate and easily upset 
14. Humans will eventually learn enough about how nature works to be able to 
control it 
15. If things continue on their present course, we will soon experience a major 
ecological catastrophe. 
Attitude strength items (environmental attitude strength) 
Participants indicate on 7-point scales the level of 
1. importance: 
Paper 2: Nudge me if you can | 126 
 
 
“How important is the topic how humans should deal with the 
environment for you?” 
“How important is this topic for you compared with other issues?” 
2. certainty: 
“How sure are you that your opinion on how humans should deal with the 
environment is correct?” 
“How likely are you to change your opinion?” 
“How certain are you about your opinion concerning this topic?” 
3. personal relevance: 
“How relevant is the topic how humans should deal with the environment 
for you personally?” 
4. Elaboration: 
“How much have you thought about the topic before?” 
5. knowledge about the environment and ecology: 
“How knowledgeable are you about the topic?” 
6. Subjective ambivalence: 
Concerning the topic how humans should deal with the environment (labeled ends 
of 5-point scales)… 
I feel no inner conflict / maximal inner conflict 
I have a clear opinion / I have no clear opinion  
I have mixed feelings / I have clear feelings 
Attitude towards renewable energy (used in Experiment 1 only) 
Participants indicate on 5-point scales the level of agreement. 
Electricity from renewable energy sources… 
1. Contributes a great deal to environmental protection. 
2. Is worth paying a higher price. 
3. Should be supported in my view. 
4. Does not have a positive effect on the environment. 
Electricity provider attitude strength (used in Experiment 1 only) 
Participants indicate on 7-point scales the level of 
1. importance: 
“How important is the choice of an electricity provider for you?” 
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“How important is this topic for you compared with other issues?” 
2. certainty: 
“How sure are you that your opinion on the choice of an electricity 
provider is correct?” 
“How likely are you to change your opinion?” 
“How certain are you about your opinion concerning this topic?” 
3. personal relevance: 
“How relevant is the choice of an electricity provider for you personally?” 
4. Elaboration: 
“How much have you thought about the topic before?” 
5. knowledge about the environment and ecology: 
“How knowledgeable are you about different electricity providers?” 
6. Subjective ambivalence: 
Concerning the choice of an electricity provider (labeled ends of 5-point scales)… 
I feel no inner conflict / maximal inner conflict 
I have a clear opinion / I have no clear opinion  
I have mixed feelings / I have clear feelings 
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Appendix B. Additional instructions for Experiment 2 
Instructions for the enhanced strength condition after filling out the NEP 
You just gave your opinion on how humans should deal with the environment. We 
are now interested in some of your reasons for answering the way you did. 
Please choose four statements for which you are especially certain, or which are 
especially important for you, or on which you have a very clear opinion. Maybe there are 
also statements you have a lot of knowledge on, or you have thought about much before. 
Please give reasons for four of the statements depicted below now. 
 
Instructions for thought listing 
Please list all aspects that influenced your decisions for or against the two electricity 
providers. You can list as many aspects as you wish. 
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Appendix C. Results of Experiment 1 for N = 350 
Table C1 
Logistic regression Model 1 of Experiment 1 with originally planned sample size 
 B (SE) p Exp(B) 95% CI for Exp(B) 
Constant -1.13 (.20) <.001 0.32 -- 
Default 1.63 (.26) <.001 5.13 [3.09, 8.51] 
Env. attitude (NEP) .02 (.31) .95 1.02 [0.56, 1.87] 
General attitude strength 1.07 (.31) <.001 2.92 [1.60, 5.32] 
Default × strength -.55 (.38) .15 0.58 [0.27, 1.22] 
Note. χ²(4, 328) = 59.00, p < .001, R² = .22 (Nagelkerke) 
 
 
Table C2 
Logistic regression Model 2 of Experiment 1 with originally planned sample size 
 B (SE) p Exp(B) 95% CI for Exp(B) 
Constant -1.06 (.19) < .001 0.35 -- 
Default 1.55 (.26) < .001 4.71 [2.86, 7.76] 
Specific attitude .84 (.21) < .001 2.32 [1.54, 3.50] 
Specific attitude strength .55 (.21) .01 1.74 [1.14, 2.64] 
Default × strength -.49 (.28) .09 0.61 [0.35, 1.07] 
Note. χ²(4, 328) = 68.19, p < .001, R² = .25 (Nagelkerke) 
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Table 1 
Scale characteristics of the measures used in Experiments 1 and 2 
 M (SD) α eigenvalues > 1 
explained 
variance 
(%) 
rit (range) 
Experiment 1 (N = 560)      
NEP 3.81 (.44) .79 3.89, 1.46, 1.17, 1.06 25.9 [.25, .50] 
General attitude strength 4.78 (.72) .84 4.76, 1.62 43.3 [-.18, .68] 
Specific attitude 3.92 (.67) .75 2.38 59.6 [.37, .66] 
Specific attitude strength 3.93 (.96) .88 5.11, 1.89 46.4 [.06, .73] 
Experiment 2 (N = 535)      
NEP 3.76 (.44) .78 3.87, 1.43, 1.26, 1.07 25.8 [.26, .54] 
General attitude strength 4.98 (.73) .86 5.02, 1.53 45.6 [-.07, .68] 
Note. Explained variance refers to the amount of variance explained by the first factor. 
 
Table 2 
Logistic regression Model 1 with default condition, NEP, and general attitude strength 
(Experiment 1) 
 B (SE) p Exp(B) 95% CI for Exp(B) 
Constant -.86 (.14) <.001   
Default condition 1.40 (.19) < .001 4.05 [2.80, 5.87] 
Environmental attitude (NEP) .23 (.23) .32 1.26 [0.80, 1.96] 
General attitude strength .89 (.22) < .001 2.44 [1.59, 3.73] 
Default × strength -.49 (.28) .08 0.61 [0.36, 1.05] 
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Table 3 
Logistic regression Model 2 with default condition, specific attitude, and specific attitude 
strength (Experiment 1) 
 B (SE) p Exp(B) 95% CI for Exp(B) 
Constant -.88 (.14) <.001   
Default condition 1.44 (.19) <.001 4.22 [2.89, 6.16] 
Specific attitude .86 (.16) <.001 2.36 [1.74, 3.22] 
Specific attitude strength .53 (.15) <.001 1.70 [1.27, 2.27] 
Default × strength -.50 (.20) .01 0.61 [0.41, 0.90] 
 
Table 4 
Internal consistency and test-retest correlations for the follow-up measures of Experiment 
1 
Scale α rtt 
rtt 
corrected for attenuation 
Environmental attitude (NEP) .78 .79*** 1 
Environmental attitude strength .86 .75*** .88 
Specific attitude .68 .66*** .92 
Note. *** p < .001. rtt = test-retest correlation 
 
Table 5 
Logistic regression Model with default condition, manipulated attitude strength, and NEP 
(Experiment 2) 
 B (SE) p Exp(B) 95% CI for Exp(B) 
Constant .16 (.17) .35   
Default condition 1.47 (.28) < .001 4.35 [2.49, 7.58] 
Environmental attitude (NEP) .87 (.23) <.001 2.39 [1.53, 3.75] 
Attitude strength condition -.02 (.25)  .93 0.98 [0.60, 1.60] 
Default × strength .09 (.42) .83 1.1 [0.48, 2.49] 
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Table 6 
Logistic regression Model with default condition, NEP, and measured attitude strength 
(Experiment 2) 
 B (SE) p Exp(B) 95% CI for Exp(B) 
Constant .21 (.13) .11   
Default condition 1.47 (.22) < .001 4.34 [2.84, 6.64] 
Environmental attitude (NEP) .45 (.25) .07 1.56 [0.96, 2.55] 
Measured attitude strength  .86 (.20) < .001 2.37 [1.60, 3.50] 
Default × strength -.26 (.30) .39 0.77 [0.43, 1.39] 
 
Table 7 
Frequencies of reasons mentioned for provider choices (Experiment 2) 
Reasons Mentioned by ... % 
Environmental considerations 59 
Price considerations 45 
Anticipated effort caused by switching/laziness 16 
Distrust/skepticism of a provider 11 
Insufficient information about energy sources or conditions 11 
Regional provider 5 
Other 21 
None 9 
Note. Because participants could give more than one reason, percentages do not add up 
to 100%. 
 
Table 8 
Regression table of the combined data of Experiments 1 and 2 including all 1095 
participants  
 B (SE) p Exp(B) 95% CI for Exp(B) 
Constant .55 (.28) .05   
Default condition 1.44 (.16) <.001 4.23 [3.09, 5.79] 
NEP .36 (.19) .06 1.44 [0.99, 2.10] 
General attitude strength .71 (.12) <.001 2.03 [1.61, 2.56] 
Default × strength -.33 (.23) .15 0.72 [0.46, 1.12] 
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Figure 1. The amount of green energy choices (y-axis) in quartiles of attitude strength (x-
axis) ranging from low strength to high attitude strength. Black bars = green default 
condition, gray bars = gray default condition. 
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Abstract 
Although being discussed as powerful tools to influence decision making, defaults are 
expected to only be behavior relevant when attitudes are weak. This conditional model 
of the interplay of defaults and attitudes stands in contrast to a compensatory model 
based on the Campbell paradigm which predicts additive but not interactive effects of 
defaults and attitudes on decision making. We tested both models in an online shopping 
scenario presenting green or conventional default products to 242 participants and 
measuring environmental attitudes. Our results support a compensatory model. First, 
environmentally-friendly choices were found to be an additive function of defaults and 
environmental attitudes. Second, the passive acceptance of defaults was predicted by a 
default by attitude interaction such that attitude-congruent defaults were accepted more 
frequently. These findings are in line with understanding defaults as behavioral costs 
that can be overcome by individual attitudes and provide empirical evidence for an 
additive effect of defaults and attitudes. As such, defaults are also effective in attitude 
heterogeneous populations but for a more precise prediction of choices, attitudes should 
be included in the model. 
Keywords: defaults, environmental attitudes, nudge, Campbell paradigm, behavior 
change 
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Theoretical background 
The promise of achieving behavior change with nonfinancial and noncompulsory 
alterations to choice architecture (for an overview, see Münscher, Vetter, & Scheuerle, 
2015) called “nudges” (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008) has sparked the interest of policy 
makers around the globe and led to a remarkable public interest in behavioral sciences 
(Shafir, 2012). Defaults, i.e., options that become effective without an active choice, in 
particular appear as a promising tool to influence decisions in various behavioral 
domains from medical decision making (Ansher et al., 2014) to consumer behavior 
(Brown & Krishna, 2004; Herrmann et al., 2011), financial decision making (Agnew, 
Szykman, Utkus, & Young, 2012; Madrian & Shea, 2001), and moral conduct (Mazar & 
Hawkins, 2015). Most prominently defaults have been discussed as a reason for the huge 
differences between organ donation rates in different countries (Johnson & Goldstein, 
2003). Environmental protection and the impact of “green defaults” (Pichert & 
Katsikopoulos, 2008) is another field of application for the use of default effects in policy 
making. People whose energy provider offered renewable energy by default were more 
likely to choose green energy than people who received conventional energy by default 
in controlled experiments as well as in field settings (Ebeling & Lotz, 2015; Pichert 
& Katsikopoulos, 2008; Vetter & Kutzner, 2015). Switching printers to double-sided 
printing defaults is another example for the influence of green defaults on individual 
environmental protection behavior (Egebark & Ekström, 2013). 
However, defaults are expected to be behavior relevant only when attitudes are 
weak (see e.g., Johnson & Goldstein, 2003). In this paper, we challenge this conditional 
model (i.e., attitudes moderating the influence of defaults) with a compensatory model in 
which defaults and attitudes do not interact (i.e., additive main effects of both). 
In the following section, we first outline both models in more detail. Secondly, we 
suggest refining experimental designs of default effects by tracking people’s actual 
choices in case of a default rejection (opt out). Hypotheses for the presented study are 
then deduced and tested in a well-powered online study on green consumerism before 
we discuss theoretical and policy implications of the results. 
Two models for the interplay of defaults and attitudes 
Despite their well explored individual contributions to behavior change, the 
interplay of defaults and attitudes in decision making remains a constant subject for 
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speculation. On the one hand, ample evidence on the power of defaults exists especially 
but not limited to the domain of environmental behavior. On the other hand, research 
has demonstrates the predictive power of environmental attitudes (e.g., Kaiser & Byrka, 
2015; Kaiser, Woelki, & Vllasaliu, 2011) but also pointed out how attitude change can be 
a difficult and tedious endeavor (Kaiser, Brügger, Hartig, Bogner, & Gutscher, 2014). As 
such, defaults and other nudges have been well received for their relative 
inexpensiveness and the promise to achieve behavior change without attitude change. 
After all, changing a few features of the context in which a decision is taken is less 
complex than persistently changing the way people think about a topic.  
Problematically however, some expect defaults to be behavior relevant only in the 
absence of strong attitudes. For example, Johnson and Goldstein (2003, p. 1339) suggest 
that “if preferences […] are strong, we would expect defaults to have little or no effect”. 
Similarly, Sunstein and Thaler (2003, p. 1198) assume that “well-formed preferences 
(…) trump default rules”. Accordingly, green and gray defaults are believed to be less 
effective for people with high environmental attitude levels (Sunstein & Reisch, 2014). 
This conditional model of the effectiveness of defaults and attitudes is in line with 
current theorizing in social and environmental psychology (Reis, 2008; Stern, 2000). 
Statistically speaking, attitudes moderate the influence of defaults in the conditional 
model such that a default exerts more influence on choices when attitude levels are low 
than when attitude levels are high. Indeed, absent default effects have been interpreted 
as evidence for interindividual differences to moderate the success of defaults. In a field 
study on carbon offsetting conducted with people who were knowledgeable and 
experienced concerning carbon offsetting, the authors found no effect of a default on the 
willingness to compensate for one’s emissions (Löfgren, Martinsson, Hennlock, & 
Sterner, 2012). A high level of experience could be a proxy for more pronounced 
attitudes as it is also discussed as a facet of attitude strength (Krosnick, Boninger, 
Chuang, Berent, & Carnot, 1993; Wegener, Downing, Krosnick, & Petty, 1995). The 
absent default effect for experienced people (despite lacking a non-experienced control 
group) was interpreted to indicate that “the effect of default options attenuate [sic] with 
experience” (Löfgren et al., 2012, p. 69). 
In contrast, the compensatory model suggests an additive influence of defaults and 
attitudes on behavior (Kaiser, Arnold, & Otto, 2014). This model is based on the 
Campbell paradigm (Kaiser, Byrka, & Hartig, 2010) which describes behavior as an 
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additive function of two components: a person’s attitude and the behavior’s costs. Note 
that behavioral costs are not limited to monetary costs but include all structural factors 
which influence the difficulty associated with performing a behavior. In line with current 
explanations of what drives default effects (Dinner, Johnson, Goldstein, & Liu, 2011), 
defaults can be conceived as behavioral costs due to the additional effort that is 
necessary to opt out. Furthermore, if a default is perceived as a recommendation 
(McKenzie, Liersch, & Finkelstein, 2006), deciding against this recommendation is more 
costly than simply following it. 
According to the Campbell paradigm, the higher the behavioral costs, the stronger 
an attitude needs to be to overcome the costs (hence the term “compensatory” model). 
Thus, people’s attitude levels correspond with the amount of effort, time or money they 
are willing to invest to achieve their attitudinal goal (e.g., environmental protection). 
Whether someone chooses green energy is thus determined by the behavioral costs of 
choosing green energy and by a person’s environmental attitude. The costs are lower if 
green energy is the default than if extra effort is necessary to choose green energy. As 
such, costs and attitudes are independent of each other: The effort to switch energy 
providers (e.g., initiating the change by filling out a form) is, for example, equally high 
for environmentalists and passionate climate change deniers. Thus, costs are assumed to 
be behavior-specific, not person-specific, and equal across individuals performing a 
behavior in the same context (Kaiser et al., 2010). Attitudes are of course person-specific 
and vary between different people such as environmentalists and climate change 
deniers. In line with the Campbell paradigm, Kaiser, Arnold, and Otto (2014) suggest 
that green defaults are behaviorally effective independent of peoples’ environmental 
attitudes. Additionally, higher environmental attitude levels should be reflected in more 
ecological behavior (e.g., green product choices) irrespective of which default people are 
confronted with.  
Assessing person-level variables such as attitudes as possible moderators for the 
effect of experimentally manipulated situational variables is of course a common theme 
in social psychology. In an example involving environmental attitudes, Kaiser and Byrka 
(2015) assessed participants’ cooperation in a social dilemma. In line with the 
compensatory model outlined above, claims for the common resource were found to be 
an additive function of environmental attitudes and the type of the resource (i.e., points 
vs. energy units). Specifically, cooperation turned out to be higher (i.e., indicating a 
Paper 3: How defaults and environmental attitudes influence ecological choices | 140 
 
 
lower behavioral difficulty) when the common resource consisted of generic ‘points’ as 
compared to ‘energy units’, irrespective of participants’ attitude levels. Conversely, 
participants with higher environmental attitude levels were more willing to cooperate, 
irrespective of the type of common resource. 
However, such research is conspicuously absent for defaults as a specific case of a 
situational variable. Specifically, the two conflicting models proposed for the interplay of 
defaults and attitudes both lack empirical support since the effectiveness of defaults and 
attitudes has typically not been assessed within the same study (for an exception which 
lacks reporting of the interaction term, see Campbell-Arvai, Arvai, & Kalof, 2014). Thus, 
no research has – to our knowledge – tested the popular assumption of conditionally 
effective defaults, nor has the contrasting (compensatory) model been tested. 
Default acceptance and opting-out 
What does opting-out of a default mean? In most previous research on defaults the 
choice is dichotomous, e.g., receiving green or gray energy (Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 
2008), donating organs or not (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003), continuing with a task or not 
(Shevchenko, Helversen, & Scheibehenne, 2014). Participants either follow a default or 
opt out which is equated with the opposite choice. However, in most daily choices there 
are more than two opposing alternatives. Someone might for example opt out of a green 
energy default to choose another green provider. Likewise, in the case of green 
consumerism rejecting the environmentally-friendly, organically produced apple juice in 
a glass bottle does not imperatively lead to choosing the least environmentally friendly 
alternative product instead. Classifying every green default rejection as a non-green 
choice misclassifies a significant proportion of people’s choices. A green default, despite 
being rejected, might raise the odds of actively choosing a different environmentally 
friendly alternative. This possibility is not empirically represented in binary choice 
experiments on default effects although one theoretical explanation for their power 
claims that defaults are interpreted as recommendations (McKenzie et al., 2006). 
Therefore, experiments on the behavioral impact of defaults and other nudges should 
not turn a blind eye to people’s alternative choices to increase ecological validity of 
these experiments.  
Because opting out of a default is not always equivalent to choosing the opposite 
course of action, it is possible to disentangle the behavior guiding function of defaults 
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from the default acceptance rate. Equally attractive defaults should be accepted equally 
often but does this hold independent of a decision maker’s attitude? Whereas the 
compensatory model assumes independence of defaults and attitudes concerning their 
behavior guidance, a different prediction arises when turning to default acceptance as 
an outcome criterion. By passively tolerating the offered option and accepting a default, 
people can avoid behavioral costs that come with searching for and switching to an 
alternative. The Campbell paradigm in which the compensatory model is grounded 
suggests that people’s attitudes are manifest in their readiness to overcome such costs 
(Kaiser et al., 2010). Thus, whether or not people accept the extra hassle to reject the 
default likely depends on their attitudes and whether attitudes and defaults are 
congruent. Strong attitudes incongruent with the default (e.g., environmentalists being 
offered an un-ecological product) fuel the decision to overcome the behavioral obstacles 
set by the default, whereas attitude-congruent defaults do not necessitate any action.  
The present research 
To test the influence of defaults and attitudes on people’s choices, we employed an 
online shopping scenario. In this scenario, we offered either green or conventional 
default products and assessed participants’ environmental attitudes. The core 
dependent variables were the amount of green product choices and the default 
acceptance rate. In contrast to previous research on defaults, we tracked people’s actual 
choices when they rejected a default. Therefore, choices and default acceptance did not 
logically result from each other. We were thus able to examine the influence of defaults 
and attitudes on these two dependent variables separately. 
Hypotheses 
Drawing on the compensatory model, we derive the following hypotheses on the 
influence of each predictor and their interaction: We expect a main effect for the default, 
such that green defaults should result in a higher amount of green product choices 
(Hypothesis 1). We also expect a positive linear relationship of environmental attitudes 
predicting people’s ecological behavior (Hypothesis 2). In line with the assumed 
independence of behavioral costs (defaults) and attitudes, we expect these predictors to 
work independently and non-interactively (Hypothesis 3). Thus, defaults should predict 
behavior equally well for low, medium, and high environmental attitudes. Finally, 
whether a default is accepted or actively rejected should depend on the congruency of 
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that default and a person’s attitude. Accordingly, we assume an attitude by default 
interaction to predict default acceptance (Hypothesis 4). 
Methods 
Power analysis 
To detect even a small interaction effect of default condition and environmental 
attitude assuming an effect size of f² = .05 (equaling partial R² = .048) with 90 % power 
(α = .05, two-tailed), a sample size of N = 213 is necessary as indicated by G*Power 
(Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). 
Participants 
We recruited 242 participants from a German online panel (138 female [57%], 87 
male [36%], mean age = 34.54 years, SD = 13.03). One participant reported not having 
worked carefully and was excluded from analyses. Ten participants failed to fill out the 
environmental attitude scale and were excluded from all related analyses. Upon 
completion, participants could win products chosen in the study. 202 (87%) participants 
entered their email addresses for the raffle of which 32 won. The mean value of the 
product bundles was 10.07 Euro. 
Procedure 
At the beginning of the study, participants were informed that they would take part 
in an online shopping task for everyday products. In order to encourage serious choices, 
participants were informed that one out of six would win the chosen products. Upon 
providing their informed consent, participants first completed a test trial which 
explained how choosing products in the online shop worked. To assure that participants 
were only confronted with products that were relevant to them, each participant chose 
five products from a list of ten (e.g., jam, apple juice, paper towels) to put on their 
shopping list.  
Participants were randomly allocated to either a green or a conventional default 
condition. Dependent on condition, the default product offered was always organic 
respectively eco-friendly (glass bottle, recycled paper towels) or conventional 
respectively eco-unfriendly (can, bleached paper towels). Product pairs with similar 
mean prices (Mgreen = 2.22 Euro, Mconventional = 2.16 Euro) were presented to prevent the 
perception that either alternative was more valuable. For each selected product 
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category, participants were shown a default product (e.g., organic or conventional jam) 
and could either choose the presented product or an alternative brand of the same 
category (a different jam) from an online shop. They were free to choose any alternative 
product as long as it belonged to the same category (e.g., jam) and fell below the price 
limit set by the more expensive default product. We introduced a maximum price 
because most real shopping situations are also confined by price considerations. Several 
green and conventional alternatives were always available. The procedure was repeated 
for each of the five products on the shopping list. 
After the simulated shopping part, participants answered questions concerning 
their purchasing habits (How frequently do you buy the following products? How often 
do you change brands for each product? How high is the percentage of green products in 
your shopping overall?) and completed the environmental attitude measure and the 
consumer self-confidence scale. Next, participants filled out demographics and rated 
how conscientiously they had worked on the study as well as how similar their choices 
were to real-life choices. Finally, participants were thoroughly debriefed. 
Measures 
Environmental attitude. We assessed environmental attitude based on a Rasch 
scale of ecological behavior, as suggested by the Campbell paradigm (Kaiser et al., 2010). 
To do so, we alternately employed two overlapping 26-item versions (45 items overall) 
adopted from the General Ecological Behavior scale (GEB, Kaiser & Wilson, 2004), a self-
report measure that taps mundane ecological behaviors (e.g., “I collect and recycle used 
paper”). The scale has proven to be a reliable (.71 ≤ Rasch based separation rel ≤ .88) 
and valid measure of environmental attitude (Kaiser & Wilson, 2004). Items that 
represented unecological activities were reversely coded (e.g. “I kill insects with a 
chemical insecticide”). Engagement in 15 behaviors could be acknowledged by a yes/no 
statement. For the remaining 30 items, we used a five-point scale (never to always). In 
line with Kaiser and Wilson (2004), the responses to these polytomous items were 
recoded into a dichotomous format by collapsing never, seldom, and occasionally as 
indicators of a low environmental attitude level. Often and always were combined, 
indicating a high environmental attitude level. When participants were unable to answer 
an item (e.g., asking about driving behavior when people did not have a license) they 
could mark “not applicable”, which was treated as a missing value. Two items tapping 
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green consumerism were excluded from the scale in order to avoid trivial predictions of 
green product selections in the experimental task. 
The dichotomous Rasch model served as the measurement model. Each 
participant’s environmental attitude level was derived based on a maximum likelihood 
approach (see, e.g., Bond & Fox, 2007), and estimated in logits, which stand for the 
natural logarithm of the engagement/nonengagement ratio of a person across all items. 
Higher environmental attitude levels are thus reflected in larger positive logit values. 
Environmental attitude had a separation reliability of rel = .60. Because we alternately 
employed two overlapping 26-item versions, 42% of the data were missing by design. 
Using the obtained environmental attitude levels and item difficulties, we simulated 
these missing data resulting in an expected reliability of rel = .84 with a complete data 
set (cf. Curtis, 2004). Joint calibration of the two item sets is feasible due to the uniform 
item discrimination inherent in Rasch Models. Fit statistics indicated that the 43 items 
represent a Rasch-homogenous (unidimensional) scale (0.85 ≤ MSitems ≤ 1.19). The 
estimated environmental attitude levels were sufficient for accurately anticipating 
participants’ responses to the items (t  ≥ 1.96 for 3.9% of participants; see e.g., Bond 
& Fox, 2007).  
Consumer self-confidence. We further assessed consumer self-confidence using 
the information acquisition (α = .77), consideration-set formation (α = .75), and personal 
outcomes subscales (α = .72) of the consumer self-confidence scale each containing five 
items (Bearden, Hardesty, & Rose, 2001). Participants expressed their (dis)agreement to 
the 15 items on a 5-point scale. Consumer self-confidence is used as a trait measure for 
marketplace metacognition (Brown & Krishna, 2004), i.e., metacognitive processing of 
situations in market contexts like reactance towards a perceived manipulation. 
Dependent variables: Amount of green products and default acceptance rate 
Participants in the two conditions did not differ significantly (i.e., at a Bonferroni 
corrected level of α = .005) concerning their pre-selection of the ten products (χ²-tests, 
.047 ≤ p ≤ .913). We therefore aggregated choices over all products to achieve a more 
reliable measure of product choices. When an alternative product was chosen instead of 
the default, these choices were independently coded as green or conventional by two 
research assistants blind to the hypotheses. The resulting Kappa of κ = .98 indicates 
almost perfect agreement (Landis & Koch, 1977). For the amount of green product 
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choices measure, we computed the percentage of green product selections for each 
participant by dividing the number of green products chosen by the total number of 
valid choices. For the second dependent variable (default acceptance rate), we divided 
the number of default products chosen by the number of choices. 
Results 
We conducted two separate moderated regression analyses using the PROCESS 
macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2013). Default condition (green vs. conventional, manipulated 
between participants), environmental attitude, and their interaction served as 
predictors in both regressions. The percentage of green products chosen was the 
dependent variable in the first analysis; the default acceptance rate was the dependent 
variable in the second analysis. 
Participants in the two conditions did not differ a priori concerning the percentage 
of green products usually bought in daily shopping, environmental attitude, age, gender 
(.36 ≤ p ≤ .88) or household income (p = .11) and thus randomization was generally 
successful. 
Green choices as an additive function of default and environmental attitude 
In the full model with mean centered default condition, environmental attitude, and 
the interaction, default condition and environmental attitude independently and 
significantly predicted the amount of green products chosen, F(3, 227) = 48.72, p < .001, 
R² = .32. Hypothesis 1 is supported by the finding that participants in the green default 
condition chose more green products than participants in the conventional default 
condition, M = .58 (SD = .32) vs. M = .29 (SD = .31), t(229) = 7.00, p < .001, d = 0.92, 95 % 
CI [.21, .37]. Environmental attitude and amount of green products chosen correlated 
significantly, r = .38, p < .001. Thus, more green products were chosen with increasing 
environmental attitude levels which supports Hypothesis 2. Importantly, as predicted by 
Hypothesis 3, attitudes did not moderate the effect of default condition as visible in the 
non-significant interaction (see Table 1). Figure 1 illustrates the independence of both 
predictors in the model. As further analysis using the Johnson-Neyman technique 
revealed, the significant influence of the default condition persisted for participants with 
environmental attitudes below 2.37 logits (i.e., 2.77 SD above the mean) which pertains 
to 99 % of all participants. 
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We additionally controlled for participants’ self-reported purchasing habits. When 
the amount of green products usually bought is entered as a covariate, R² rises to .44 
leaving the pattern of significance unchanged. By contrast, consumer self-confidence did 
not predict the amount of green choices and did not moderate the relation of the 
examined variables. 
----------------- Insert Table 1 about here ----------------- 
----------------- Insert Figure 1 about here ----------------- 
Acceptance of the default as an interactive function of default and environmental 
attitude.  
To test Hypothesis 4 that the likelihood of rejecting an attitude-incongruent 
default despite the associated behavioral costs increases with ascending attitude levels, 
we conducted a second moderated regression analysis. Default acceptance rate was 
predicted from mean-centered default condition, environmental attitude, and the default 
by attitude interaction. The full model including the interaction was significant, F(3, 
227) = 9.94, p < .001, R² = .10, but neither the main effects of default condition nor 
environmental attitude reached significance (see Table 2). However, the interaction 
between the two predictors significantly predicted default acceptance. The simple slope 
for the conventional default condition was negative (b = -0.11, p < .001), and the simple 
slope for the green default condition was positive (b = 0.11, p < .001). This supports 
Hypothesis 4 that default acceptance in the green condition (attitude congruent default) 
increases with ascending levels of environmental attitudes. The reverse pattern 
emerged in the conventional condition (attitude incongruent default): Here, default 
acceptance decreased with ascending levels of environmental attitudes as illustrated in 
Figure 2. The effect did not change when controlling for purchasing habits (frequency, 
brand loyalty) and consumer self-confidence.  
----------------- Insert Table 2 about here ----------------- 
----------------- Insert Figure 2 about here ----------------- 
Importantly, default acceptance and the amount of green choices were not 
redundant. Participants rejecting a green (conventional) default could select an 
alternative green (conventional) product. By coding alternative choices, we were able to 
determine the percentage of alternative product choices from the same category as the 
default, i.e., the amount of green alternative products chosen after rejecting the green 
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default and the amount of conventional alternative products chosen after rejecting the 
conventional default. Overall, 38.95 % (SD = 37.97 %) of all alternative choices belonged 
to the same category as the default. This is the amount of choices we would have 
classified incorrectly, if we had assumed that people always choose the opposite 
category when they reject a default.  
Discussion 
The central question of this paper concerned the relation of defaults and individual 
attitudes in the prediction of people’s choices. We found support for the predictions 
derived from a compensatory model that green defaults and pro-environmental 
attitudes independently increase the amount of green products people choose. The 
assumption that attitudes moderate the impact of defaults on people’s green product 
selection as implied by a conditional model was not supported. Furthermore, by 
separating the question concerning the behavioral effectiveness of a default (do green 
defaults increase green choices?) from default acceptance (when is a green default 
accepted or rejected?), we could show that default acceptance depends on the 
congruency of individual attitudes and pre-selected defaults. 
The results support predictions derived from the Campbell paradigm (Kaiser et al., 
2010) and indicate that defaults can be conceived as behavioral costs that impede or 
facilitate a choice independently from the decision maker’s attitude (Kaiser, Arnold et 
al., 2014). Understanding defaults as cost factors corresponds with the processes 
discussed to drive default effects such as inertia/effort (Dinner et al., 2011) and implied 
endorsement (McKenzie et al., 2006). Thus, conceptualizing defaults as cost factors 
provides a parsimonious theoretical umbrella for the individual processes responsible 
for default effects. Our results do not provide a definite answer to the question which 
process is dominant in which situation, i.e. which kind of cost a certain default raises or 
reduces. It may very well be that ambiguous situations involving a lot of uncertainty 
(like, e.g., organ donation) trigger the recommendation (i.e. implied endorsement) 
function of defaults whereas the extra effort necessary to reject a default drives default 
effects in situations where rejecting a default is tedious. Yet, in other situations several 
processes might work together to produce default effects. Since default effects have also 
been shown in paradigms without any switching effort (Johnson, Bellman, & Lohse, 
2002; Shevchenko et al., 2014), it seems likely that effort alone is not a sufficient 
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explanation. Additionally, 39 % of all alternative choices in our study belonged to the 
same category as the default (e.g., green alternative choice after green default) which fits 
an implied endorsement explanation of default effects. However, the present data can 
only provide first starting points to deal with these questions.  
Our research also strengthens the role of individual attitudes in the prediction of 
choices. Even for one of the most prototypical nudges, namely defaults, attitudes are not 
necessarily inconclusive and arbitrary as sometimes suggested (Ariely, Loewenstein, & 
Prelec, 2003). Although there might be situations in which people want one thing and do 
another, this idiom has somehow overshadowed the equally true proposition that 
oftentimes people want one thing and do the same. We thus argue not to erase attitudes 
from choice architecture research or treat them as mere moderators but pay attention to 
both contextual factors such as defaults and individual factors such as attitudes. 
A methodological concern of the presented experiment could be that measuring 
environmental attitudes after the choice task rather than before made participants 
derive their attitudes from their choices and thus inflated the predictive value of 
attitudes. However, despite systematic differences in choices, we found no difference in 
environmental attitude levels between conditions. Furthermore, as the GEB derives 
attitudes from very concrete instances of past behavior and not from evaluative 
statements which are probably more malleable, a reverse influence is less likely. Finally, 
previous research has demonstrated the stability and robustness of environmental 
attitudes assessed with the GEB (Kaiser et al., 2014). For these reasons, we are confident 
that attitudes influenced choices and not vice versa. 
Although the shopping scenario remains an experimental situation and is no field 
experiment, we maximized ecological validity by introducing real choices instead of 
hypothetical choices and by coding participants’ alternative choices. We would have 
classified 39 % of all alternative choices incorrectly, had we automatically assumed that 
participants who rejected a green (conventional) default preferred a conventional 
(green) product. Avoiding this large error rate provides a tremendous validity increase. 
From an applied perspective, our findings are good news for policy makers 
considering the use of defaults as behavior change interventions even for attitude-
heterogeneous target populations. In the realm of environmental decision making, our 
findings add to previous research on green defaults and go one step further by applying 
green defaults to a novel situation (sustainable consumption) with an enormous 
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potential for environmentally friendly choices and behavior (see also Demarque, 
Charalambides, Hilton, & Waroquier, 2015). Notwithstanding, the behavioral end 
towards which defaults might be used as a means is a normative decision ideally 
emerging out of a democratic process (as argued by Kaiser, Midden, & Cervinka, 2008). 
Whether the promotion of green products provides a suitable end for society is not 
answered by our research but we can conclude that defaults as a means of behavior 
change can be useful. Importantly, our research also shows that defaults are not silver 
bullets. Luckily, one could say – and sooth critics who anticipate choice architecture to 
sound the bell for an age of subtle manipulation – attitudes remain important predictors 
for individual behavior.  
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Table 1 
Regression of amount of green choices on default condition and environmental attitude. 
 
b (SE) 
[95 % CI] 
t(227) p 
Constant 0.43 (0.02) 
[0.39, 0.47] 
22.17 <.001 
Default condition 0.29 (0.04) 
[0.21, 0.36] 
7.40 <.001 
Environmental attitude 0.15 (0.02) 
[0.11, 0.19] 
7.09 <.001 
Default × attitude interaction -0.03 (0.04) 
[-0.12, 0.05] 
-0.73 .47 
 
Table 2 
Regression of default acceptance on default condition and environmental attitude. 
 
b (SE) 
[95 % CI] 
t(227) p 
Constant 0.41 (0.02) 
[0.37, 0.45] 
20.73 <.001 
Default condition 0.04 (0.04) 
[-0.04, 0.12] 
1.01 .31 
Environmental attitude -0.00 (0.02) 
[-0.04, 0.04] 
-0.18 .86 
Default × attitude interaction 0.22 (0.04) 
[0.14, 0.30] 
5.29 <.001 
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Figure 1. The share of green products as a function of default condition (green vs. 
conventional) and environmental attitude. Dotted lines indicate the 95 % confidence 
intervals.  
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Figure 2. The extent of default acceptance as a function of default condition 
(green vs. conventional) and environmental attitude. Dotted lines indicate the 95% 
confidence intervals.
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